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ABSTRACT 
 
The present dissertation aims at the comparative study of agenda-setting 
(i.e., the impact of media content for the importance people give to several 
political and social issues) in Europe. The focus is set on the 2009 European 
Parliament election campaign period and one of the central objectives is to 
establish whether or not the media agenda-setting capacity varies from 
country to country, and why this may be the case. The hypothetical causes 
of cross-country variability are the nature of the several European media 
systems (in terms of development of press and TV markets, freedom of 
press, journalist professionalization, state intervention, media partisanship) 
and their effects in the informational environment, both from the 
perspective of the supply (information quality, diversity of agendas) and 
demand (trust in the media, patterns of exposure). The results show that 
these macro-level dimensions vary considerably in Europe, and that there 
is a link between media system dimensions related to political balance and 
agenda-setting, mediated by information quality.  
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PART I – Introduction 
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1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
“The power of the press in America is a primordial one. It sets the agenda of 
public discussion; and this sweeping political power is unrestrained by any law. It 
determines what people will think and talk about – an authority that in other 
nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties and mandarins.” 
White (1973, in Newton, 2006, p.228) 
 
 
 
In this day and age, the media play a crucial role in the daily lives of 
most citizens, providing not only information and entertainment but also 
making them aware of events, personalities and realities that, otherwise, 
would remain unavailable to them. The key factor in this role of the media 
is its widespread accessibility. The degree to which people are able to use 
the traditional media has evolved beyond the initial limits set by social 
class and purchasing power. The tabloid and free press phenomenon, and 
the extraordinary dissemination of television and radio sets are examples 
of this effort and its success. The advent of the new media – and its 
increasing role in everyday life – has augmented even further the 
accessibility of information.  
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The media are also an important actor in the political arena. In the 
contemporary world, the mass media are the principal sources of political 
information for most citizens – since the political sphere is essentially out of 
reach, out of sight, and out of mind for most people (Lippmann, 1922). 
Politics are complex and remote from the daily experience of the majority; 
the media, therefore, play a role by helping citizens make sense of it.  
In democratic societies, the mass media have other important 
political functions. They not only contribute to informed citizenship by 
providing regular, varied, and timely information about important issues, 
but should also provide an electoral forum for candidates and political 
parties to present themselves and debate ideas (a free marketplace of ideas, 
presumably independent of government interference). The media should 
also serve as a watchdog, scrutinizing the actions of politicians on behalf of 
the citizens, fostering democratic accountability (Voltmer, 2006; Lange, 
2004; Druckman, 2005).  
However, the media are also accused of several sins, such as fostering 
ignorance or incomprehension due to a very fast flow of news; debasing 
the political discourse leading to political fatigue; mainstreaming and 
homogenizing society; creating an image of a cruel world, undermining 
social capital leading to low turnout, decreasing party membership and 
identification, fostering a focus on packaging over political substance, 
promoting short-term policy making, shortening political lives – amongst 
other negative effects (see Newton, 2006, for an excellent schematization of 
these arguments). Recently, Strömbäck (2008) and Strömbäck & Kaid (2008) 
have stressed the distinction between mediated politics (a situation in 
which the media are the main channel for political information, and of 
communication between political actors and the electorate) and mediatized 
politics, in which the mass media are not only the mediator, but become 
independent actors in the political system, to such a degree that their 
standards of newsworthiness – their media logic – are adopted by the 
political actors. As a consequence, and as politics becomes increasingly 
mediatized, we should worry less about the independence of the media 
from politics and society, but rather about the independence of politics and 
society from the media. 
5 
 
Some other scholars believe that the role and the effects of the media 
are negligible. Newton (2006) defines media effects in modern societies as 
weak forces, denying that the media have either a positive impact in terms 
of knowledge and mobilization or a strong negative impact in the society. 
He discusses previous research and points to case studies that support his 
argument that media effects – positive or negative – are weak, and 
deflected by more powerful influences on people’s attitudes and opinions.   
I do not wish to contribute to the discussion about whether the mass 
media is a villain or a hero. My aim is much more modest: I argue that 
media can have an impact on the way people see the world that they live 
in, by ignoring specific facts and events and giving salience and importance 
to others. These effects may be weak in strength, as Newton (2006) argues. 
The idea of the media as a super-powerful factor of persuasion and opinion 
change belongs to the early 20th century. Nevertheless, the media remain  
relevant for the interaction between citizens and the realm of politics, have 
consequences (either good or bad) in the electoral sphere and, indirectly, in 
the functioning of the democratic systems.  
This thesis is focused on the agenda-setting1 power (or, to keep things 
modest, capacity) of the mass media, that refers to the transfer of saliency 
of issues from the media agenda to the public agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 
1972). More specifically, issues that are heavily covered by the media 
outlets consumed by specific individuals or a community tend to be 
considered more important by those specific entities right afterwards, even 
if one controls for other causes of issue relevance (personal sensibility, real-
world events) and deal appropriately with the problem of the direction of 
causality. Agenda-setting is important because it can have an impact on 
issue positions, economic perceptions and candidate evaluations, which in 
turn have a impact upon voting behaviour at elections, as well as for other 
aspects of political participation.  
                                                 
1. There is no agreement in the literature about how to write this expression: 
hyphenised (e.g.: McCombs, 2005) or not hyphenised. It is also possible to find 
both orthographies in the same work (e.g., Cook et al., 1983; Roessler, 1999). In this 
thesis, I choose to use the expression “agenda-setting” with a hyphen, following 
the proponents of this term (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).  
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The agenda-setting hypothesis2 is now based upon four decades of 
research, which has been able to give empirical support to this idea in 
different countries (although the majority of the research was undertaken 
in America), contexts (pre-election and routine periods), time frames (cross-
sectional vs. longitudinal), issues or sets of issues (from daily-life relevant 
topics, such as unemployment, to more abstract issues, such as foreign 
policy), and with different methodological strategies (experiments, survey 
research, historical analysis, and others). However, there are still some 
unanswered questions to which the present thesis aims to give an answer. 
In the following sub-sections I will present in detail the objectives of 
the present research, describe the geographical scope and time frame that it 
covers, and discuss data sources and data analysis strategy. This chapter 
ends with a description of the structure of this thesis.    
1.1 Goals 
 
After reading most of what has been published on this phenomenon 
in recent decades, my main critique of the agenda-setting research concerns 
the national focus found in the majority of the studies. Aside from a few 
notable exceptions, the empirical literature on agenda-setting is almost 
exclusively composed of single-country analyses – to some extent, those 
can be seen as a variety of quantitative large-N case studies. These studies 
are unable to give a satisfactory answer to the question about whether 
agenda-setting magnitude varies between larger units of analysis (outlets, 
countries), and the reasons that account for that variance. For instance, the 
majority of the American literature provides support to the agenda-setting 
hypothesis, while authors focusing on countries such as Britain or 
Germany report negative results/minor effects (see Semetko, 2004) and 
students of Sweden (Asp, 1979), Portugal (Santana Pereira, 2007) or Spain 
(Lopez-Escobar, Llamas & McCombs, 1998) report convincing empirical 
                                                 
2 My work is focused on the agenda-setting phenomenon (and literature) coming 
from the field of studies on media and public opinion. In fact, there is another 
agenda-setting research stream, in the framework of policy studies, interested in 
understanding how political and economic elites form their issue priorities – in 
other words, how they decide what to decide (Wolfe, Jones & Baumgarten, 2012).  
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evidence of agenda-setting. The only way to find out if those different 
findings are due to methodological differences or truly mean that some 
contexts create less space for agenda-setting effects to occur than others is 
by implementing a comparative research framework.   
There is some consensus about the fact that agenda-setting research 
needs to tackle the lack of knowledge about the potential moderating role 
of national-level factors – agenda-setting needs to go cross-national 
(Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Semetko & Mandelli, 1997). Cross-country studies 
offer an opportunity to avoid ethnocentric explanations about what is 
happening in each country, which, according to Semekto, de Vreese & 
Peter (2000), are fairly common in the field of political communication. The 
other side of that coin, however, which may also compromise the quality of 
the research, is naïve universalism (Dearing & Rogers, 1996), that is, the 
notion that the conclusions drawn from one country apply to any other 
context. Cross-country studies allow us to see if the interrelations between 
citizens, media outlets and political parties are dependent upon contextual 
factors at the country level.  
The literature offers some hints about how agenda-setting may be 
influenced by national-level factors. Considerations about the contingency 
of media effects in general on contextual factors are present in the literature 
almost from the beginning, for example in the work of Lazarsfeld, Berelson 
& Gaudet (1944) or Klapper (1960).  Media effects are shaped by a number 
of systemic constraints that have an impact on mass media performance 
and consumer’s behavior. As Popescu (2008, p. 69) puts it, “The content of 
media messages is the result of a series of societal, inter- and intra-
institutional factors and audience pressures. Nor do citizens rely on 
(receive and accept) mass media information independently of political and 
social circumstances. If contextual characteristics are systematically 
associated with message content, (…) and message content in its turn 
influences effects, then clearly the determinants of content have a bearing 
on media effects.” Norris (2009) also defends that individual-level media 
effects may be strongly conditioned by specific cultural, institutional or 
social contexts.  
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In the case of agenda-setting, national level characteristics are not 
expected to have a direct impact on this phenomenon, whose nature is 
mainly psychological. Instead, they are believed to be indirectly associated 
with agenda-setting, being this relationship mediated by factors that are 
known moderators of the agenda-setting, as well as by dimensions 
associated with news production. 
The main objective of this research project is therefore to contribute to 
the agenda-setting theory building process by addressing empirically some 
of the lacunae resulting from the lack of comparative studies of agenda-
setting3 and the impossibility of answering research questions outside the 
case (town, region, and nation) frame. The study of media effects from a 
cross-country perspective (instead of a single country study) allows for 
variation in the contingent conditions. The general aim is, therefore, to test 
the agenda-setting hypothesis with a multilevel approach, crossing 
individual, media outlet and media system dimensions. This will broaden 
our understanding of how national-level dimensions (namely those related 
to the specificities of the media system) moderate this process, but also of 
the impact that the characteristics of media outlets have on their own 
power to influence. This objective entails the collection of data on media 
systems and outlets in 26 countries (27 territories), as well as the use of 
quantitative data on media (television and press) content and public 
opinion during the 2009 European election.  
The theoretical basis for comparative political communication 
research are not well established. Only three years ago, Norris asserted that 
“in contrast to progress in some other fields of comparative politics, the 
subfield of comparative political communications has not yet developed an 
extensive body of literature that establishes a range of theoretically 
sophisticated analytical frameworks, buttressed by rigorously tested 
scientific generalizations, common concepts, standardizes instruments and 
shared archival datasets, with the capacity to identify common regularities 
that prove robust across widely varied contexts” (2009, p. 322). Therefore, 
                                                 
3 There are a few studies of agenda-setting that have used cross-country strategies 
in their analysis (e.g., Peter, 2003, 2007). However, these studies usually focus on a 
single issue or theme and use agenda-setting as a framework to understand its 
dynamics, instead of focusing primarily on the process of agenda-setting.  
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most of what is done in this thesis is an exploratory exercise that tries to 
match a recent taxonomy of media systems proposed by Daniel Hallin and 
Paolo Mancini with a socio-psychological concept such as agenda-setting.  
The second objective of this research is to introduce politics into the 
study of agenda-setting. On the one hand, there are only a handful of 
studies assessing the potential moderating role of party identification 
strength on agenda-setting, and at the individual level. Since this process is 
about learning, consciously or subconsciously, about the degree of 
importance of the issues that compose our complex modern world, it is 
reasonable to expect that levels of political bias in the system in general or 
in specific media outlets may play a role here. On the other hand, other 
media system dimensions that I deal with in this thesis – namely the 
freedom of the press and the nature of its constraints – explore the 
dynamics of the relationship between media and politics.  
The model that I will test is presented in Figure 1.1. The general 
hypothesis to be tested, present in this graphical representation, states that 
the amount of media coverage an issue is given will have an impact on the 
importance people assign to it (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). 
The specific hypotheses about the role of media systems and 
information environments are presented and discussed in detail in 
Chapters Four and Seven. Grosso modo, I expect that the factors that impact 
the production and consumption of media messages (development of 
media markets, strength of public broadcasters, press freedom, 
partisanship) will moderate the strength of agenda-setting effects, but not 
directly. I argue that those media system dimensions have an mediated 
impact on agenda-setting, by impacting upon habits of exposure, the 
degree of trust citizens have in the media outlets that serve them, the 
quality of the information they offer, and the diversity of agendas in the 
market. Trust can easily be understood as varying according to the 
characteristics of the trusted entity, while patterns of exposure can be 
influenced by what the market offers in terms on news contents and 
platforms. On the other hand, quality of the information and diversity of 
the media agendas are, undoubtly, associated with the context where that 
information and those agendas are produced. Trust, exposure, quality and 
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diversity are believed to be relevant moderators of agenda-setting (Asp, 
1979; Wanta & Hu, 1994a, 1994b; Tsfati, 2003; McCombs, 2005). Specific 
hypotheses about the relationship between these different dimensions will 
be presented and discussed in Chapters Three, Four and Seven.  
 
Figure 1.1 – Media Systems, Information Environments and Agenda-setting 
 
 
 
This study is placed under the umbrella of comparative studies in the 
field of political communication. There is, however, considerable variation 
among the comparative studies in this field. For instance, Chang et al. 
(2001) analysed 151 comparative international communication studies  that 
were published in six important communication journals, placing them in 
four groups: 1) cross-national comparative (designed at assessing and 
identifying, to use the sociological jargon, generalities and specificities); 2) 
cross-time comparative (designed at studying change or stability); 3) cross-
national and cross-time comparative (in which stable and dynamic factors 
are studied at the same time); and 4) comparison of different social units in 
different points in time (complex and quite rare).  
The research reported in this dissertation belongs to the first type. 
Type 2 studies are, as we have seen, fairly common in the field of agenda-
setting, particularly in the United States (Funkhouser, 1973) and Germany 
(Brosious & Kepplinger, 1992). Type 3 is the natural next step of this 
research, only possible when the several types of data used in this thesis 
become available for other time periods. The next European Election Study 
project may give rise to such data, and the opportunity to answer to new 
questions concerning the impact of context on media cognitive effects. 
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1.2 Geographical Scope and Time Frame 
 
The objectives mentioned above are pursued through the study of 26 
European Union member-States.4 The geographical framing of this research 
includes, therefore, a sufficient number of countries for a strong statistical 
analysis of national-level dimensions. But will these dimensions vary, or is 
Europe a single entity in terms of media systems? Previous research has 
shown that there are substantial differences in the media systems of 
Western Europe (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Unfortunately, the authors of 
this study did not include the most recent member-States of the European 
Union in their framework, but some literature (e.g.: de Smaele, 1999) 
underlines the differences between media systems in Central European and 
South-Eastern countries, and, to some extent, between those countries and 
Western Europe. Therefore, the assumption of variability within Europe is 
very likely to be empirically supported.  
The time frame of this research is bound by data collection 
specifications. The media content refers to the 2009 European Parliament  
(EP) election campaign period – that is to say, the three weeks before the 
election days (4-7 June). The data on public opinion was collected 
immediately after the elections; likewise, data on media outlets and media 
systems were collected in the same period, in order to illustrate the political 
and media landscape of 2009 in the most coherent and complete way.   
But how appropriate is the European Parliament election as a context 
for the study of political communication? It is known that during 
campaigns, the structure of the news changes – the share of political news 
tends to increase both in television and newspapers in the weeks before the 
election. However, European Elections are frequently described as a 
collection of national second-order elections, characterized by low turnout, 
decline of support for governing parties and preference for small and/or 
new political parties, probably in order to punish the incumbent, or as an 
expression of sincere voting vis-à-vis strategic voting in national first-order 
                                                 
4 Luxembourg is not included in the analysis, since it is not possible to measure 
most media system and media outlet indicators for this country, due to lack of data 
in Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin (2010). See Appendix 1 and Popescu (2011). 
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elections (van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 
2005). The 2009 election was no exception, having conformed to the main 
lines that define second-order elections (Trechsel, 2010; Hix & Marsh, 2011; 
Marsh, 2011). What this implies is a tendency for second-order 
campaigning from the main political parties (i.e. low intensity and less 
resource-consuming; de Vreese, Lauf & Peter, 2007; Gagatek, 2010) and 
second-order reporting from the media (Wilke & Reinemann, 2007), as well 
as second-order (i.e. lower) voter interest and attention to the campaign.  
I do not believe that this constitutes a problem for this study, the goal 
of which is not strictly connected to an electoral campaign setting. My goal 
is not to prove that agenda-setting had a specific – direct or indirect – 
impact on voting behaviour in the 2009 European elections, but to show 
that at this specific moment the media had an effect on what issues were 
considered to be the most relevant in the European countries. Moreover, if I 
find agenda-setting effects in a setting where the general climate of 
motivation to collect political information is not particularly greater or 
stronger than in non-campaign periods, I will be running a test of media 
effects that will be fairly similar to the several agenda-setting studies 
conducted in routine times that are described in Chapter Two.  
European elections have been studied by teams of political scientists 
since 1979, and information about media content during campaigns was 
collected in 1999, 2004 and 2009. However, this study will only focus on the 
more recent election period. The decision to analyse the 2009 period is 
connected, first, to the desire to maximize the number of countries in the 
analysis. The inclusion of the 2004 context would just mean the loss of two 
cases (Bulgaria and Romania), but these cases are very valuable in terms of 
media system specificities. In addition, the inclusion of the 1999 context 
would mean that this research would be restricted to Western Europe. 
Second, and more importantly, the availability of data from sources other 
than the several European Election Studies – with respect to media system 
characteristics in particular – is greater for 2009 than for earlier years. 
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1.3 Data Sources 
 
The best way of testing causal hypotheses about media messages and 
public opinion is experimentation. However, the nature of this research 
makes the use of the experimental method impossible, both for practical 
and substantive reasons. Media system differences are difficult, if not 
impossible, to operationalize in experimental terms; moreover, if I decided 
to manipulate only the media outlet variables, I would still lack the 
resources needed to replicate the same experimental setting in 27 different 
contexts, not to mention the 23 national languages involved.   
Survey research is therefore the most feasible method for the study of 
agenda-setting with a comparative perspective. Of course, statistical 
controls are a less satisfactory way of ruling out concurrent explanations of 
the phenomenon under study, if compared with random assignment of 
people to experimental groups. There are always unobservables that may 
play a role. However, survey research usually has stronger external 
validity than experimental studies (especially those conducted in 
laboratory settings), and allows me to contrast different kinds of data of 
different provenence, representing different levels of analysis.  
In what specifically concerns agenda-setting, the evidence needed to 
support this hypothesis encompasses “…evidence of opinion changes over 
time in a given section of the public (preferably with panel data), a content 
analysis showing media attention to different issues in the relevant period, 
and some indication of relevant media use by the public concerned” 
(McQuail, 1983, p.197; see also Barabas & Jerit, 2009, for a discussion of the 
conditions for the establishment of causality in media studies). In medium 
to large-N studies that include a reasonably large number of countries, it is 
usually impossible to gather in-depth information about the contextual 
variables and the association between them and with individual-level 
factors. Fortunately this is not the case with this study, which is 
advantaged by the existence of a rich amount of data on public opinion, 
media content, media system and outlet characteristics.  
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In 2009, PIREDEU5 centralized the collection of data about the 
European Elections, in a research infrastructure composed by five 
components:  the EES voter survey (with about 27,000 respondents)6 and 
media content collection (of a sample of about 140 outlets),7 but also a 
candidate survey, manifesto study, and context study. This was considered 
to be the most plausible and reliable source of data on media content and 
public opinion from all the member-States in 2009. In addition, there are 
other data sources in this study – those that contribute by offering 
information about just one or two variables considered in the models 
tested. These sources are Eurobarometer 72.4 for trust in the media (TNS 
Opinion & GESIS, 2010), Freedom House for freedom of the press 
(Freedom House, 2010), World Press Association for newspaper circulation 
data (WAN, 2010), MAVISE and EAO for television channels and 
audiences in Europe (EAO, 2010; MAVISE, 2010) and the Expert Survey on 
Media Systems in Europe for political bias, information quality and 
journalist professionalization, amongst others (Popescu, Santana Pereira & 
Gosselin, 2010). These sources will be described in greater detail in the 
chapters in which the data is used.  
 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
 
 In the following chapters I will tackle the subjects of agenda setting, 
media systems, and information environments in both a theoretical and an 
empirical way. These chapters are organized into four main sections: 
Theory (Chapters Two and Three), Media Systems and Information 
Environments (Chapters Four and Five), Agenda-Setting (Chapters Six and 
Seven) and Conclusions (Chapter Eight).  
                                                 
5 PIREDEU was a pan-European project based at the European University 
Institute. For more information see www.piredeu.eu. 
6 Approximately 1,000 respondents in each country.  
7 In each country, this project collected data on the content of the two most 
important TV news shows and the three most widely read newspapers. To give an 
example, for Portugal the three newspapers are Público (reference), Correio da 
Manhã (tabloid) and Jornal de Notícias (something in between); the TV shows are 
Telejornal (from the public broadcaster RTP) and Jornal Nacional (from the private 
broadcasting station TVI). In the cases of Spain and Germany, the number of 
outlets was higher than 5.  
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 The first section is, therefore, focused on the theoretical grounds of 
this research. In Chapter Two, the agenda-setting theory is presented. I 
begin by offering a synthesis of the research in the field of political 
communication that was carried out before the advent of the cognitive 
studies (agenda-setting, priming and framing). Following that, the main 
concepts in the agenda-setting hypothesis are presented and described, and 
the most emblematic studies are summarized. Discussions about the 
dynamics of the agenda-setting phenomenon are highlighted and the 
moderators that the literature has identified are presented. The relevance of 
agenda-setting for political attitudes and behaviours is also addressed.  
 Chapter Three introduces the issue of media systems and their 
impact on media effects. The definition of media systems is presented, and 
their most relevant features (development of media markets, 
commercialization, freedom of press, journalist professionalization, 
partisanship) are described, as well as their impact on relevant 
informational environment dimensions (exposure, trust in the media, 
information quality, agenda diversity).  
 Chapters Four and Five focus on the media systems and 
information environments. The first chapter presents some general 
hypotheses and deals with the methodology used in this thesis to analyse 
media systems in Europe. In Chapter Five, the media system characteristics 
are empirically described, in order to confirm the assumption that there is 
plenty of variation within the European context, and their impact on the 
information environment is tested.  
 In turn, Chapters Six and Seven introduce information about 
agenda-setting in Europe during the 2009 European Parliament election 
campaign. In Chapter Six, the methodological approach to the agenda-
setting hypothesis is set out – the data analysis strategy is presented and 
discussed, and the data used to provide an empirical test of those 
assumptions is presented. Following that, in Chapter Seven the agenda-
setting hypothesis is tested with data from the PIREDEU research project. 
Three alternative research strategies are used: an aggregate strategy (which 
corresponds to the traditional agenda-setting studies conducted from the 
1970s onward), a semi-aggregate strategy (audience analysis – see Santana 
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Pereira, 2007), and an issue-based strategy aimed at testing the competing 
impact of real-world cues and (in some cases) personal sensitivity. 
Moreover, the moderating impact of issue characteristics is tested. In this 
chapter, the central question of this dissertation – the potential moderating 
impact of media system and information environment characteristics on 
agenda-setting effects – is addressed.    
  Finally, Chapter Eight revises the most important findings of this 
research, debates some shortcomings and methodological concerns, and 
ends with some suggestions for future research.  
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2 
 
AGENDA-SETTING:  
FOUR DECADES OF RESEARCH 
 
 
“The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to 
think, but it is stunningly successful much of the time in telling people what to 
think about” 
Cohen (1963, p.13) 
 
The concept of agenda-setting is at the core of a stream of research 
that has flourished over the last 40 years. But what exactly is agenda-
setting? In this chapter, I will explore this key concept in the field of media 
studies by reviewing and discussing the literature published in the last four 
decades.  
 In 1993, Gerald Kosicki declared that “coming to grips with the 
totality of what has been written about agenda setting is an exceedingly 
complex task” (p. 101). Writing almost twenty years after Kosicki, I must 
acknowledge that the task has become even harder. One could argue that, 
since 1993, several important books seeking to encompass and systematize 
the most relevant research and theoretical reasoning over the concept of 
agenda-setting have been published (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; McCombs, 
Shaw & Weaver, 1997; McCombs, 2004). However, the number of studies 
about agenda-setting has increased substantially since 1993 (see, for 
instance, Weaver, 2007). As will be explained in the following pages, 
agenda-setting research is spread over four decades (the first empirical 
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work was published in 1972) and can be found in several journals within 
the field of communication (e.g., Communication Research) and political 
science (e.g., American Journal of Political Science), as well as thematic pan-
disciplinary journals (e.g., Public Opinion Quarterly) and several edited 
books and monographs, some of which are difficult to track. Consequently, 
the picture of agenda-setting offered here is necessarily incomplete. 
Nonetheless, I believe that it offers a comprehensive systematization of the 
main concepts, methodological distinctions, theoretical disputes and 
empirical results in this field of research.  
 This chapter is structured as follows. I start by presenting a 
summary of what happened before agenda-setting reached the world of 
media effects research. Then, I focus on the definition of agenda-setting, its 
history, its different approaches, the processes through which it occurs 
(mediators) and the factors that condition its intensity (moderators), in 
order to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this construct. This 
chapter also includes a comparison of this hypothesis with other media 
theories – priming and framing, but also spiral of silence or uses and 
gratifications.  
2.1 Political Communication Research Prior to Agenda-
Setting 
 
Before introducing the concept of agenda-setting, it may be useful to 
take a glance at what happened in the field of political communication 
studies before the 1970s. In fact, there is much to be said. Academic interest 
in media effects is almost as old as the media themselves. In the first 
decades of the twentieth century – a time in which newspapers where the 
mass media par excellence in most western societies, while radio and 
television were in their infancy – scholars believed the media to have a 
great and immediate impact on public opinion, but no empirical research 
was undertaken to substantiate that argument (Lundberg, 1926; McQuail, 
1983; Sears, 1987).  
In the United States, scientific journals such as the American Journal of 
Sociology or the Journal of Applied Sociology published some relevant articles 
on this matter, in which the role and the impact of the media (the press, at 
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those times) on American public opinion was discussed (Yarros, 1899; 
Hayes, 1925; Leupp, 1910; all quoted in Lundberg, 1926). Moreover, the 
cultural production of the time reproduces this perspective. The novels 
Brave New World (Aldous Huxley) or 1984 (George Orwell) are good 
examples. These pessimistic novels about the future of humanity portray 
the media as having a preponderant role in the control of the citizens by 
totalitarian regimes.8 
This purely theoretical understanding of media effects was 
discredited in the 1940s and 1950s by Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at 
the University of Columbia. Their Erie County study found negligible 
persuasive effects and demonstrated that, rather than changing attitudes, 
the media were better at reinforcing existing attitudes (Lazarsfeld, Berelson 
& Gaudet, 1944). The team used an innovative and sophisticated research 
design, interviewing a representative sample of voters in the 1940 
American presidential elections (Erie County, in Ohio, was seen to  be 
representative of the country as a whole) six times during a six-month 
period. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues observed that shifting from one 
candidate to another rarely occurred, and that only 5 per cent of the 
participants had changed their vote intention due to the persuasive 
political messages provided by the media (i.e. newspaper, news magazines 
and the radio). In fact, they found that the more people exposed themselves 
to the media, the less their opinions changed – which was explained by the 
fact that people would engage in selective exposure, choosing which media 
outlets to use. In 1948, a follow up study conducted in a New York 
community produced the same results (Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 
1954). As a result, the hypodermic needle model (or bullet model) initially 
proposed by the Frankfurt school (see Kitzinger, 2004) gave way to the 
resonance model of media effects – the messages conveyed by the media 
would have an impact only when resonating with existing positions 
(Iyengar & Simon, 2000).  
                                                 
8 In fact, some scholars refer to the hypodermic needle model of media effects, 
postulating strong and homogeneous effects of media exposure on public opinion, 
as in the 1984 perspective, and to the media in this context as an “Orwellian 
specter” (Shaw, 1977, 1979; Ramaprasad, 1983). 
 
 
 
 
22
Drawing on this empirical evidence, the authors of the 1940 Erie 
County study gave birth to the paradigm of minimal effects, which 
postulates that, generally speaking, political communication through the 
mass media is only useful to reinforce previous attitudes due to selective 
exposure (people would tend to expose themselves to channels of 
information which agreed with their position, to avoid dissonance  with or 
opposition to their attitudes).  Therefore, media exposure would not lead to 
attitude change, whereas interpersonal communication would assume a 
greater role in political persuasion (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944; 
Lipset et al., 1954). This second claim of the paradigm is at the core of the 
two-step flow of communication model which suggests that, in a given 
community, there are opinion leaders that, on one hand, expose themselves 
more frequently to the media than most people (first step), and on the 
other, influence the attitudes and positions of the other members of the 
community (second step) (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944; Katz & 
Lazarsfeld, 1955).  
This model was widely accepted by the scientific community and 
continues to be used to understand the media/public opinion dynamics 
today. An interesting example of a 21st century revisitation of this vintage 
idea is a recently published work by Pippa Norris and John Curtice. The 
authors propose that the dissemination of political information offered by 
the Internet in Britain might occur in the way suggested by the two-step 
flow of communication, in the sense that political activists browse the party 
websites (ill-organized and often neglected by the general public), and then 
disseminate their content, since they are very likely to talk about the 
election with other people (Norris & Curtice, 2008). 
At the same time as the Columbia studies were being conducted, a 
team of sociologists and social psychologists based at Yale carried out a 
comprehensive series of experimental studies, designed with the purpose 
of identifying the factors that condition persuasion: source (e.g. credibility), 
message (type of argument, order of presentation), channel (written, audio 
or audiovisual supports) and audience characteristics (individual and 
socio-cultural factors). This team, led by Carl Hovland, was very successful 
at isolating those conditions and establishing rules for efficiency in 
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persuasion (Hovland, 1954). Nevertheless, those studies did not have the 
same impact for political science as the line of research carried out at 
Columbia. This is probably because, unlike Lazarsfeld, Hovland studied 
psychological rather than sociological dimensions, focused on individuals 
instead of communities, studied persuasion in general instead of political 
persuasion in its own specificities, and undertook experimental rather than 
survey research (McDonald, 2004).  
At the beginning of the 1960s, the minimal effects paradigm 
continued to prevail. Klapper (1960), defending the media users’ capacity 
of selective exposure (and related capacities of selective memory and 
perception), considers that reinforcement is the most relevant form of 
media impact, and finds poor evidence of persuasion (both in terms of 
conversion or minor attitude change), but suggests that this might be due 
to context. The main idea is that the media does not serve as a necessary 
and sufficient cause of audience effects, but works as a factor within a 
complex situation. During the following decade, research on media effects, 
influenced by the advent of television and interested in its potential as a 
means of political persuasion (McDonald, 2004), was also unable to prove 
its persuasive role empirically (Sears, 1987); moreover, some studies that 
found small but relevant effects were overwhelmed by the “minimal 
effects” idea, being quite circumspect and modest in the discussion of their 
findings (Zaller, 1996).  
The persistence of the minimal effects paradigm for several decades is 
considered by Larry Bartels as one of the biggest and most notorious 
embarrassments in the contemporary social sciences. In his words: “The 
pervasiveness of the mass media and their virtual monopoly over the 
presentation of many kinds of information must suggest to reasonable 
observers that what these media say and how they say it has enormous 
social and political consequences. Nevertheless, the scholarly literature has 
been much better at refuting, qualifying and circumscribing the thesis of 
media impact than at supporting it” (1993, p. 267). The idea of minimal 
effects is not only counterintuitive but also counter-factual, if we remember 
that political actors spend a great deal of effort and money in highly 
mediatized electoral campaigns.  
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2.1.1 The Reaction to the Minimal Effects Paradigm 
 
From the 1970s onwards, mostly as a reaction to a frustrating 
paradigm, political communication shifted away from the classical 
persuasion studies and produced new theories and perspectives, such as: 
the uses and gratifications theory, focusing on what people do to the 
media, instead of the other way around9 (Blumler & Katz, 1974); the spiral 
of silence approach, focusing on the media as provider of information 
about what opinions are consensual, helping people deal with the fear of 
social isolation due to expression of unpopular opinions (Noelle-Neuman, 
1974); an interesting debate between media malaise and 
mobilization/learning effects; new persuasion studies (particularly in new 
democracies), and cognitive studies. I will focus on these last three subjects 
in the following section; the other will be discussed later in this chapter.  
2.1.1.1 Malaise vs. Mobilization/Learning 
 
The term video malaise was proposed by Michael Robinson in an 
article published in the mid-1970s, in which the author argues that 
watching “public affairs television” (in this case, a documentary) results in 
an increased sense of malaise, cynicism or detachment towards political 
actors and institutions. The author was trying to establish a connection 
between two phenomena that were clearly discernible in the 1960s and 
1970s – the decrease of political trust and efficacy and the rise of television 
news as dominant source of political information in the US. Indeed, 
Robinson (1976) observed that people who relied predominantly on 
television for political information had lower levels of internal political 
                                                 
9 The extent to which this theory is actually a reaction to the minimal effects 
paradigm is debatable. The uses and gratifications approach to the mass media 
stresses intrapersonal needs rather than interpersonal factors to argue that the 
media do not have a strong impact on public opinion (see Shaw, 1979). This 
research tradition assumes that the media are primarily sources of diversion, 
gratifiers of individual needs, and entertaining outlets for personal escape: 
“Audiences are not passively overpowered by what they read in newspapers, hear 
on radio, or see on television and at the movies. Instead, people put to their own 
use and for their own gratification the media content they actively choose to pay 
attention to” (Shaw, 1979, p. 98). 
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efficacy and trust in political institutions than those who consumed a more 
diverse set of media outlets for political news.   
Moreover, watching television – which in the early 1980s was mainly 
considered to be a family activity (McQuail, 1983) –  was pointed out as one 
of the reasons why people were bowling alone in the end of the century. In 
1995, Putnam argued that in the US television has lead to the erosion of 
social capital (in the sense of dense social networks bound by norms and 
social trust) and civic engagement, because it fosters time displacement (he 
argued that television watching is one of the few social and cultural 
activities that is negatively related to other activities outside the home), or 
because it creates a “mean world” view (pessimistic views of the human 
kind) and passivity.  
On the other hand, there are several empirical studies showing that 
the media have a positive impact. For instance, Aarts & Semetko (2003) 
argue that levels of political interest, discussion and sophistication 
increased in several countries over time, a phenomenon that is linked to the 
rise of the media and its educative role. In the same vein, Gunther and 
Mughan (2000), in the concluding chapter of an edited book analysing the 
relationship between democracy and media, declare that even if political 
communications seem to help authoritarian regimes in the short-term, in 
the long run they help democratization – eroding the credibility and 
legitimacy of non-democratic regimes, fostering the development of 
pluralistic attitudes and party alternatives, and contributing to the re-
socialization of elites and masses according to the rules and values of 
democracy.   
Shifting from an aggregate to an individual perspective, it is 
important to quote Stephen Chaffee, who has produced and collected 
substantial evidence about the positive impact of media use on political 
knowledge (e.g.: Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986; Chaffee, Zhao & Leshner, 1994; 
Zhao & Chaffee, 1995; Chaffee & Kanahan, 1997). Norris (2000) reports 
similar results, while de Vreese & Boorgaarden (2006b) observed gains in 
terms of knowledge and political participation as a consequence of 
exposure to media rich in political news content. In addition, Denemark 
(2002) has found that Australian television offers relevant cues to poorly-
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informed citizens, which they use in their vote calculus; and Eveland & 
Scheufele (2002) noted that, in the context of the 1996 US presidential 
election, the knowledge gap between citizens with high and low 
educational backgrounds was smaller in the case of heavy consumers of 
television news than in the case of light users (see also Jerit, Barabas & 
Bolsen, 2006). Lastly, Norris & Sanders (2003) observed that media 
exposure increased levels of knowledge, especially in the case of those with 
low prior knowledge at the beginning of the study.  
At the same time, mobilization receives considerable support in 
Western Europe (Newton, 1999). Esser & de Vreese (2007) have found 
evidence of the impact of media exposure (newspaper reading, TV 
watching and particularly the use of Internet to collect political 
information) for youth turnout in several European countries. In new 
democracies, the media seems to enhance political knowledge, foster 
positive attitudes towards the political actors and encourage electoral 
participation (Voltmer & Schmitt-Beck, 2006).   
The concept of spiral of cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997) shares 
the same pessimistic view of the “video malaise” hypothesis, but places the 
blame largely on the message, rather than on the medium. In fact, it seems 
that this is the path to follow. Recent research (de Vreese, 2005; de Vreese, 
2007; Elenbaas & de Vreese, 2008; de Vreese & Elenbaas, 2008) has found 
that the impact of news on political cynicism is conditional on the use of 
strategic frames and that the relationship between cynicism and turnout is 
unclear (de Vreese, 2005). Accordingly, Norris (2000) and Peter (2007) 
observed that EU news with negative tones results in negative attitudes 
towards the EU, but positive tones fosters EU support. Morris (2005) found 
that the audiences of a highly conservative-biased network (Fox News)10 
can misinform, leading viewers to underestimate the number of casualties 
in the Iraq war by comparison with non-viewers, in a context where the 
                                                 
10 Fox News is usually portrayed as being quite biased towards the Republican 
Party. For instance, there is recent evidence that Fox News did, over a period 
encompassing two presidencies, show bias in broadcasting poll results about levels 
of presidential approval, privileging the broadcasting of bad news for the 
Democratic president Bill Clinton and good news for the Republican President 
George W. Bush, while other networks (ABC, NBC, CBS) seemed to favour good 
news for Clinton and bad news for Bush (Groeling, 2008).  
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incumbent president was Republican. Similarly, Kleinnijenhuis, van Hoof 
& Oegema (2006) have found that negative news leads to distrust in the 
political realm, and long term sleeper effects in terms of turnout; and a 
much quoted article on the effect of negative campaign advertising in the 
US shows that it reduces turnout intentions and perceptions of political 
efficacy, but also fosters cynicism about the responsiveness of public 
officials and the electoral process (Ansolabehere et al., 1994). Therefore, it 
seems that what can lead to malaise is the type (and tone) of the news rather 
than mere media exposure.  
2.1.1.2 Persuasion Studies 
 
Persuasion studies have seen a degree of revival from the 1970s 
onwards, focusing not only on voter choices but also on the direction of 
attitudes towards political objects. The revisionists of the minimal effects 
paradigm attribute the negative findings of past research to methodological 
factors, such as measurement errors (see Prior, 2009a; Prior, 2009b), lack of 
variance in terms of the independent variable (media content, which tends 
to be consistent in short-term), use of exposure to media as proxy of media 
content, short observation periods, and lack of statistical power of the 
surveys used in political communication, choice of topics backed by very 
stable attitudinal stances, and other methodological deficiencies (Bartels, 
1993; Zaller, 1996, 2002; Iyengar & Simon, 2000). Media effects would 
therefore have been underestimated by political communication research.  
Focusing on media content also seems to be better than focusing 
solely on exposure to specific media outlets (see Graber, 2004, or Barabas & 
Jerit, 2009). For instance, Dalton, Beck & Huckfeldt (1998) found a 
relationship between the editorial content of newspapers and preferences 
in the US 1992 presidential election, and stressed the role of local 
newspapers as cue-providers that can have an impact on voting choices. 
Della Vigna & Kaplan (2006) noted that the introduction of the 
conservative-oriented Fox News to certain American towns in the late 
1990s increased the vote share of the Republican Party in those cities.  
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Persuasion studies with strong media effects can be found in several 
new democracies. For instance, in Hungary, the presence of media effects 
was strong in the late 1990s, a time at which the party system was still 
fairly fluid and relatively new to the public11 (Popescu, 2008). Similar 
results were found in Russia in the early 2000s (White & McAllister, 2006) 
In Mexico, political news and (to a lesser extent) political advertisements 
explained voting preferences in the 2000 election (Beltràn, 2007).  Finally, in 
Estonia, Palmaru (2005) found strong causal effects of media content on 
election results via changes in public opinion, in the period between 1999 
and 2003. Fluidity of the political context is the key factor explaining media 
effects in new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (Popescu, 2008) 
or South America (Lawson & McCann, 2004), but the strong impact of 
media on vote choices in the Italian election of 1994, reported by Ricolfi 
(1997) and in Gunther & Mughan (2000) can also be explained by fluidity. 
In fact, those elections took place in a context marked by new electoral laws 
and important new actors on the political scene, such as Silvio Berlusconi’s 
Forza Italia or Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord.  
2.1.1.3 Agenda-Setting, Priming and Framing 
 
It is within the difficult and frustating context of the minimal effects 
paradigm, marked by the inability to find evidence of persuasion, that a 
new generation of scholars developed a line of research studying media 
effects other than persuasion (Kosicki, 1993; Takeshita, 1997), focusing on 
the media’s capacity to inform (McCombs, 1981; Rogers, 1993). This effort 
established a new paradigm, called cognitivist (because it focused on the 
cognitions of media users, instead of on choices) or journalistic, because it 
                                                 
11 Actually, the media system was also quite fluid. A new system of public 
broadcasting regulation was introduced in Hungary in 1996, and private 
nationwide television channels started to operate in 1997. Print media developed 
rapidly in the later 1980s and early 1990s, both in terms of number and range of 
publications. In 1994, the impact of public television on feelings and vote for the 
incumbent parties was strong, but negative. As the media environment became 
more pluralistic and the political context less fluid, the impact of the television 
became first positive (probably because now they enjoyed more credibility than 
before the advent of private TV) and in the end, very much weakened (Popescu, 
2008).  
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was detaching itself from the traditional vision of communication as a way 
of effectively mobilizing and persuading people, and focusing on the media 
as a provider of the information citizens need in order to make informed 
choices (Takeshita, 1997).  
 The new paradigm gave birth to three interconnected research 
areas: agenda-setting, priming and framing (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; 
Iyengar, Peters & Kinder, 1982; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). These 
cognitive effects are ways by which the media influence the way people 
develop their perceptions of the world and organize their patterns of 
response (Lippman, 1922). The present chapter addresses the first of these 
indirect effects of media on public opinion: agenda-setting. However, since 
there are clear connections and similarities between the three, I will also 
discuss the relationship of this phenomenon with priming and framing.  
2.2 The Concept of Agenda-Setting 
  
The agenda-setting hypothesis was the first to appear in the academic 
literature on media cognitive effects, and postulates that the amount of 
media coverage of issues influences people’s opinion about their relevance, 
because they use the salience of an issue in the media as an indicator of its 
importance (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Thus, the concept of agenda-setting 
refers to a specific effect of media through which the issue agendas 
(composed of the most important issues for a given entity) are affected by 
the content of the media. Therefore, the students of agenda-setting are 
basically proposing a middle-range theory for the understanding of media 
impact on issue salience in contemporary societies (Takeshita, 1997).  
In this section, I will discuss three relevant features of the concept of 
agenda-setting: what an agenda is, and how many types of agendas there 
are in the society; the fact that those agendas have limited capacity; and 
that media influence can take the form of a transfer of salience from the 
media agenda to the public agenda, via exposure to newspapers, television 
and other media outlets. I will also tackle the issue of the linearity of the 
relationship between media and public opinion: a relevant question that 
has, however, been insufficiently studied.  
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2.2.1 Agendas  
 
 According to Cobb & Elder (1982, in Dearing & Rogers, 1996) an 
agenda is a set of politically controversial issues that, at a given moment, 
are seen as legitimate concerns of a given group. James Dearing and Everett 
Rogers define issues as a series of related events that fit together in a broad 
category (1988, p. 566) and that are conflictual or have the potential to 
become relevant (1996). Ramaprasad (1983) and Kwansah-Aidoo (2003) 
discuss the distinction between issues and events, the latter being 
subordinate to, or part of, the former. In sum, issues are those social, 
cultural, economic, or political concerns or ideas which are at any given 
time considered important, and which are the source of debate, controversy 
or conflict.12 Unemployment, transportation, health care and racism are 
typical examples of issues in the context of agenda-setting studies.  
 There are essentially four types of agenda: the intrapersonal agenda 
(composed of the issues that each individual considers important), the 
interpersonal agenda (the issues discussed between someone and his/her 
close friends/relatives), the media agenda (composed of the issues present 
in the media outlets in a given time frame) and the public agenda – the set 
of issues that receive the community’s attention. In this sense, a public 
agenda (as a set of relevant issues) is at the core of the public opinion, that 
is here understood as a set of opinions on matters of concern to the 
community, freely expressed by people outside the government who claim 
that their opinions should influence or determine the actions of the state 
(Speier, 1995).13  
                                                 
12 The dimension of conflict is not actually agreed-upon in the literature. For 
instance, Kosicki (1993) argues that the agenda-setting literature claims to focus on 
issues in public opinion and media coverage, but mostly studies lists of topics that 
are specified rather abstractly, such as ‘arms control’, ‘crime’, or ‘the economy’, The 
real concern of agenda setting seems to be not the issues but the broad topics in the 
news. An issue should be something inherently contested—a controversial matter 
about which there are strong views presented on various sides, but one gets little 
sense of controversy about the various matters taken up by agenda setting – and 
that is probably a major shortcoming in the agenda-setting research (see Kosicki, 
1993).   
13 Public opinion is not understood here in contrast with private opinion. My use of 
this expression in this thesis does not intend to make reference to opinions that are 
disclosed to others, or noted by others, as it is used in some studies inspired by the 
spiral of silence framework.  
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If we take the media agenda as the independent variable, it is possible 
to consider that agenda-setting can occur at three different levels: intra-
personal (e.g. Roessler, 1999; Santana Pereira, 2007), interpersonal (e.g. 
Weaver et al., 1981; Roberts, Wanta & Dzwo, 2002) and public14 (classic 
agenda-setting, e.g. McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Research on interpersonal 
agendas provides answers to Robert Parks’ theoretical concerns about 
media effects on topics of discussion within communities in the 1920s, 
whereas the other two areas of research are closer to Walter Lippmann’s 
speculations about the media impact on the translation of the world outside 
into pictures on people’s minds (Ramaprasad, 1983). 
As with most of the existing literature, the research reported here 
addresses the classical variety of agenda-setting – the type that refers to the 
impact of media agendas on public opinion about the importance of issues. 
Therefore, agenda-setting is defined here as the process through which 
media have an impact on how public agendas are built, or, in other words, 
how the media influence which problems will be considered important by 
a given community – issues that people believe politicians and policy 
makers should focus on (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In this context, the 
public agenda is believed to consist of “all issues which (1) are the subject 
of widespread attention or at least awareness, (2) require action, in the view 
of a sizeable proportion of the public; and (3) are the appropriate concern of 
some governmental unit in the perception of community members” (Cobb, 
Ross & Ross, 1976, p. 127).  
 The scholars of political communication also study other kinds of 
interconnections between agendas. Research has shown that the media can 
also influence the agenda of other media outlets (intermedia agenda-setting; 
e.g.: Roberts & McCombs, 1994; Lopez-Escobar et al., 1998; Lee, 
Lancendorfer & Lee, 2005; see also Dearing & Rogers, 1996, and Golan, 
2006) and the agendas of politicians (political agenda-setting; e.g.: Black & 
Snow, 1982; Cook et al., 1983;  Baumgartner, Jones & Leech, 1997; Tedesco, 
                                                 
14 Some studies were able to differentiate empirically between the intrapersonal 
and the public/social agenda, and therefore defend the idea that people should be 
asked about what the most important problem is for them, and what the major 
problem is for their community (see McCombs, 2005). However, in most cases, the 
public agenda is assessed by analyzing intra-individual agendas, either at the 
aggregate or the individual level. 
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2001; Soroka, 2002; see Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006 or van Aelst & 
Walgrave, 2010, for a comprehensive literature review).  
 The separation between these three areas is often thought to be 
artificial – each sub-type is incomplete and somewhat unsatisfying in itself 
(Kosicki, 1993). In the same vein, Dearing & Rogers (1996) try to make sense 
of this diversity by providing a much broader definition of agenda-setting – 
a process with three steps or areas of interest: the public agenda-setting 
(link between salience of  issues in the media and the issue priorities of the 
public) policy agenda-setting (impact of media content on the issue agenda 
of public institutions and officials) and media agenda-setting (the 
antecedents of media content - who decides what is covered in tomorrow’s 
newspaper or this evening’s newscast).   
Lastly, if the other agendas are seen as independent variables (and/or 
the media agenda as dependent variable), many other types of agenda-
setting research can be identified (see, for instance, Rogers, 1993; Wanta & 
Foote, 1994; Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Tedesco, 2001; Brandenburg, 2002; 
McCombs, 2004; Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Horvit, Shiffer & Wright, 2008).   
2.2.2 Agenda Capacity 
 
Empirical research has shown that the public agenda has a limited 
capacity, usually being composed of no more than three to six issues 
(McCombs, 1981, 1997, 2004), a finding that is in line with classical 
cognitive psychology research on capacity of immediate memory (seven 
minus or plus two; Miller, 1956). Moreover, the capacity of the public 
agenda seems to be fairly stable over time, at least in the US (McCombs & 
Zhu, 1995). Therefore, agenda-setting is considered to be a zero-sum game, 
in which issues compete for a place in the agenda – the rise of an issue 
occurs at the expense of other issues (Zhu, 1992).  The use of rank-order 
correlations in the first studies (e.g. Funkhouser, 1973) had this zero-sum 
assumption implicit (since the ranks, or percentages of a single issue 
depend on the salience of the other issues), but this idea was only formally 
tested by Zhu in 1992.  
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At the same time, agendas are becoming thematically more diverse15 
– the scenario of two overriding issues consistently mentioned in polls 
during the 1950s was substituted in a situation where several themes 
compete for attention (McCombs & Zhu, 1995). A stronger issue 
competition without an increase in the capacity of the agendas leads to 
strong issue turnover, which is in line with Downs (1972) perspectives 
about high volatility and speed in issue cycles.16 But are all competitors 
equal? Not according to Brosius & Kepplinger (1995). These German 
scholars refute the equal-displacement model of issue competition 
proposed by Zhu (1992) and have observed the existence of «killer issues», 
that, due to several reasons (personal consequences, danger or threat, 
change in knowledge, symbolic value, etc) are able to considerably reduce 
the amount of awareness of the other issues. 
Since its capacity is restricted by time, access, and psychological 
factors (Zhu, 1992), the agenda of a given community is created, at the 
intra-individual level, as a function of how important a given problem is 
perceived to be, compared to the other competing issues. That is to say, 
there is a tremendously high number of problems that affect and preoccupy 
a given population, but only a few reach this public agenda, by means of a 
comparative analysis made by each member of that community (Erbring, 
Goldenberg & Miller, 1980).  
 The perception of relative importance of a given issue is influenced 
by the media because people, as cognitive misers, use information 
                                                 
15 The concept of thematic diversity is proposed by an interesting stream of 
research on agenda composition under the umbrella of the agenda-setting 
hypothesis. A few studies extended the understanding of this media effect from 
simply an impact on what people think about, to how many things (nominal 
diversity) and how many different things (thematic diversity) people think about 
(Allen & Izcaray, 1988; McCombs & Zhu, 1995; Wanta, King & McCombs, 1995; 
Peter & de Vreese, 2003). Research has found that agenda diversity is a factor of 
age, education, interest in politics, frequency of media exposure, diversity of media 
used, and diversity of media agendas, but most of these results tend to differ from 
country to country (see Peter & de Vreese, 2003, for a review of the – few – studies 
on agenda diversity). 
16 Issues would live five different stages: preproblem (when it has not yet captured 
public attention), discovery (it becomes suddenly salient to the society), the plateau 
(when the interest stops increasing quickly, due to the realization of how complex 
it is), the decline (people get inattentive, frustrated, bored and/or demotivated by 
the issue) and postproblem (when it falls into a limbo of inattention, even if 
objective conditions related with him has not changed).   
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provided by the media as a basis for their judgements, instead of 
undertaking a more complex and cognitively demanding analysis. How 
does this happen? The salience given to a certain issue in the media is used 
as a criterion for evaluating the importance of that issue, either in an 
automatic or conscious way. Therefore, issues that receive a great amount 
of media coverage at a given moment have a high probability of being 
considered important by public opinion some time after (McCombs & 
Shaw, 1972; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). 
Media agendas also have restrictions in the number of issues to cover, 
both in terms of market constrains (money, space, time, news values; see 
Zhu, 1992) and, of course, audience demands and expectations. Since 
perfect equity in the way issues are presented is not possible, some political 
views will be more represented than others. There cannot be, of course, a 
perfect relationship between events in the real world and the content of 
media outlets. And that is why it is to be expected that the agendas of 
people that rely on the media for information will be different from those of 
people who do not consume political news.  
2.2.3 Issue Salience, Importance and Relevance  
  
The key concept of agenda-setting is salience17 (Iyengar & Ottati, 
1994; Dearing & Rogers, 1996): in fact, agenda-setting has been simply 
defined as a transfer of salience from the media agenda to the public 
agenda (McCombs, 2004).  
In real context studies, this independent variable – salience in media 
outlets – has been traditionally studied by using media content analysis (for 
instance, McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Funkhouser, 1973). Experimental 
studies, in turn, manipulate issue salience thought non-obtrusive 
techniques – in the case of television studies, for instance, the news shows’ 
records are slightly changed in order to make some issues salient, but in 
such a way that participants do not realise that they are actually watching a 
                                                 
17 Most studies employ the term salience, but McCombs & Shaw (1972) use the 
term importance; other studies use the expressions “awareness”, “attention” or 
“concern” (see Edelstein, 1993).  
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fake news show (see, for instance, Iyengar, Peters & Kinder, 1982; Iyengar 
& Kinder, 1987).  
With regard to the public agenda, the salience of a given issue is the 
importance that the community grants it. This dependent variable is 
traditionally operationalized through questionnaires – either with open-
ended questions (namely the notorious Gallup question about the most 
important problem affecting the nation; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Behr 
and Iyengar, 1985) or questions in which people are asked to rate the 
degree of importance of issues selected and listed by the researchers 
beforehand (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Brosius & Kepplinger, 1990).  
But what does salience actually mean? Kiousis’ (2004, in McCombs, 
2005) theoretical explication of media salience identified three dimensions 
of this concept: attention, prominence, and valence. Following the general 
lead of content analysis in mass communication research, most agenda-
setting studies have emphasized attention – the number of news stories 
devoted to a particular topic – and, secondarily, the prominence of the 
news about an issue. For instance, when people read newspapers, they 
employ information such as article location, title size, visual effects, and 
article size to guide their judgements; in the case of TV, the amount of air 
time each issue gets, the use of visual/musical effects, or the position of the 
issue in the show’s alignment (see Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) provide the 
same kind of cues about how important an issue is. Websites also provide 
cues to their users (McCombs, 2004). Lastly, valence also has been 
measured on some media agendas, reflected, for example, in the degree of 
conflict or its overall positive or negative tone. 
What about salience in public opinion? Personal and public agendas 
are often measured by items that assess the perceived importance of 
various issues rather than the interest generated by these issues. Why? 
While in many instances we would expect respondents to attach 
importance to interesting issues and vice versa, these two dimensions of 
issue salience (perceived importance and interest) are not likely to coincide 
for all issues (see Hill, 1985).  
On the other hand, Takeshita (2006) points out that salience can have 
two meanings – the first is the idea of perceived importance, and it is closer 
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to the use of this term by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, whereas 
the second (accessibility) is closer to the idea of cognitive accessibility bias. 
Evett & Ghanem’s (2001, in McCombs, 2005) factor analysis of these data 
identified two dimensions of issue salience, which they labelled social 
salience and personal salience. Takeshita (2006) quotes research showing 
that these two meanings seem to be correlated, but are not identical from a 
theoretical point of view (accessible issues might not be considered 
important, and vice-versa). Moreover perceived importance (a self-report 
question) is more valuable for salience (at least for attribute agenda-setting) 
than a measure of accessibility (response time to stimulus words).  
2.2.4 Linear vs. Non-linear Approaches  
 
Is the relationship between media and public agenda linear? Not 
according to some authors (Neuman, 1990; Watt, Mazza & Snyder, 1992). A 
linear model allows salience of issues in public opinion to increase 
infinitely as long as media coverage increases. But there is always a floor 
and a ceiling for the salience of an issue; in addition, previous research 
observed that media impact varies over time (Zhu et al., 1993).   
To deal with the possible non-linearity of agenda-setting, Watt, 
Mazza & Snyder (1992) propose a model of gradual decay of effects of 
media coverage on public opinion. The importance of media coverage for 
issue salience in public opinion depends both on for how long the issue has 
been covered in the news, and the recency of strong coverage. Media effects 
are believed to be bound to vanish, sooner or later, according to those 
characteristics (Watt, Mazza & Snyder, 1993).   
In a different vein, Neuman (1990) proposes a logistic model for crisis 
issues (e.g. the Vietnam war) and symbolic crisis issues (e.g. poverty) which 
would follow the dynamics of issue life cycle that Downs (1972) proposes – 
a period of media coverage without great effects on public opinion, an 
exponential increase after a specific threshold is crossed, and a period of 
stagnation of public interest irrespective of a stronger coverage by the 
media. When the issues are actually problems (for instance, inflation, 
unemployment), the Downsian logic no longer applies, and a linear 
relationship between media coverage and public attention is expected. 
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 According to Zhu and colleagues (1993), these models, while 
seemingly contradictory, are in fact complementary: “Taken together, 
media coverage at a given point in time has immediate effects which then 
decline exponentially; however, when accumulated across the entire public, 
the effects can be seen to increase logistically over time” (p. 13). 
  
2.3 First Agenda-Setting Studies and Subsequent 
Research  
 
The idea that the media could determine what people consider 
important can be found in Walter Lippmann’s book, first published in the 
1920s, which is considered to be the founding text for communication 
research (Rogers, 2004). In fact, according to this author, the media are 
important because they help us to shape our picture of the world beyond 
our direct personal experiences – and the sphere of politics is, generally 
speaking, beyond the reach of the common citizen(Lippman, 1922).  
In the following years, Robert Park and Harold Lasswell also stressed 
(albeit in an equally speculative way) the influence of the media in the 
establishment of an issue agenda (Park, 1922, 1940; see McLeod, Becker & 
Byrnes, 1974; Saperas, 1987). Even the proponents of the minimal effects 
paradigm believed that the media were able to grant different status to 
public issues (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1948, quoted in Kinder, 2003). The 
statement that Cohen published years later – “the press may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling his readers what to think about” (1963, p.8), 
is paradigmatic and inspirational for this research stream.18 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 According to Rogers (1993) or Rogers, Hart & Dearing (1997), the epiphany 
leading to the first agenda-setting study happened when McCombs, inspired by a 
chat with colleagues in a bar, decided to buy Bernard Cohen’s The Press and Foreign 
Policy (1963). 
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However, the very first empirical test of this hypothesis was 
undertaken only in the 1970s by Maxwell McCombs & Donald Shaw.19 
These researchers interviewed 100 undecided American voters living in a 
small community (Chapel Hill) during the presidential campaign of 1968, 
and collected data on the content of the nine mass media that served this 
community during that period. The results showed that the issues that the 
participants considered most important were, in fact, those that had 
received more attention from the media. In other words, there were very 
strong correlations between the issues in the media agenda and in the 
public agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).  
In the following decades, other correlational studies were carried out 
in order to strengthen empirical support for the agenda-setting hypothesis 
– these included longitudinal studies of small communities, as well as of 
representative samples of American citizens and other populations. The 
research carried out by Shaw & McCombs (1977, in McCombs, 1994) is an 
example of this. The authors aimed at strengthening the internal validity of 
the results by measuring the independent variable (media content) before 
the dependent variable (public opinion on issues), and were successful. The 
longitudinal work done in the Unites States by Funkhouser (1973) and 
Germany by Brosius & Kepplinger (1990) provided, respectively, strong 
and moderate empirical support for the agenda-setting hypothesis. There 
were, of course, a few studies that failed to observe agenda-setting effects, 
raising speculation about the possible spuriousness of the relationship 
between the two agendas. For instance, Iyengar (1979) found weak and 
confusing patterns of influence between TV content and public opinion, as 
well as no impact whatsoever of the moderating variables suggested by the 
literature. 
                                                 
19
 The primacy of McCombs & Shaw (1972) is implicitly contested in McLeod, 
Becker & Byrnes (1974), in which a conference paper by Jack McLeod on agenda-
setting effects during the US 1964 presidential elections is quoted. However, this 
paper, where the expression “agenda-setting” was not used, was never published, 
and was therefore almost inevitably bound to be forgotten. In fact, it is not even 
mentioned in the most exhaustive analysis of agenda-setting research growth over 
time, whereas the 1972 piece by McCombs and Shaw ranks first in terms of citation 
rates (Rogers, 1993).  
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Agenda-setting was also studied in laboratory contexts. Experimental 
work built up its internal validity, by isolating the independent variable 
and controlling for the effect of other intervening variables in the process of 
establishing the public agenda. In the most paradigmatic agenda-setting 
experiment, conducted by Iyengar, Peters & Kinder (1982), participants 
were asked to fill in a questionnaire about politics, which included a 
question on the importance of several national problems (pre-test). In the 
next four days, they saw a tape of the ABC news show broadcasted on the 
previous evening. This tape was altered slightly, in order to manipulate the 
independent variable – the most salient issues in the news programme 
(defence, pollution, and inflation). In the sixth and last day of the 
experiment, the participants filled in a second questionnaire, which also 
contained questions about the importance of several issues (post-test). 
Iyengar, Peters & Kinder (1982) found that, in the conditions where the 
news broadcast gave salience to defence and pollution, there was an 
increase in the importance conferred to these issues from the pre-test to the 
post-test (there were no results in the inflation condition due to occurrence 
of a ceiling effect). Therefore, these authors showed that the content of the 
news had an influence on people’s agendas. Subsequent experimental work 
reached similar results (e.g.: Iyengar & Kinder, 1985, 1987).  
Unfortunately, in the real world, dominant messages such as the ones 
used in those experiments are not very common, at least in the 
communication flows of democratic societies. In addition, Zaller (1992, 
1996) argues that the settings used in most experiments of political 
communication are too extreme – specially the ones involving political 
interest. In his words, politics is low key and not involving, causing the 
manipulation of interest to be excessively artificial. Therefore, the external 
validity of such studies can be debated.  
However, there are also field experiments that were able to provide 
empirical support to the agenda-setting ability of the media towards both 
public opinion and policy makers, with a design that respects the rules of 
experimentation but takes place outside the lab, in a realistic context. For 
instance, Cook et al. (1983) observed that fraud in home health care became 
an important public issue due to the media coverage it was given, by 
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assessing the importance granted to this issue before and after an 
investigative report on this topic was aired by a national network.  
Participants had been randomly assigned to exposure to this report in their 
homes – treatment condition – or to another show airing at the same time – 
control group.  
From the 1970s until the end of the 20th century, academia produced 
about 300 studies focused on the agenda-setting hypothesis (Dearing and 
Rogers, 1996; Roessler, 1999). Correlational studies carried out in natural 
settings strengthened the external validity of this hypothesis, through an 
almost systematic observation of statistically significant correlations in 
different populations and contexts (see, for instance, McCombs et al., 2011, 
for a literature review of agenda-setting studies around the world).  
In addition, experimental work built up its internal validity, by 
isolating the independent variable and controlling for the effect of other 
intervening variables in the process of establishing the public agenda. From 
small temporal range studies such as cross-sectional studies, passing by 
trend studies, panel designs, and arriving at long temporal range studies 
such as time series designs, research has successfully given agenda-setting 
a consistent empirical support (Gozenbach & McGavin, 1997).  
2.3.1 Taxonomies of Agenda-Setting Research 
 
How can we make sense of all this literature? There are taxonomies of 
agenda-setting research that illustrate the richness and variety of research 
conducted to date, based on differences in research concerning a) the level 
of analysis and number of issues, b) the media channel under analysis.  
The first of these taxonomies was proposed in 1981 by one of the 
founding fathers of agenda-setting research, Maxwell McCombs, at the 
International Communication Association meeting in Acapulco, Mexico. 
According to this Acapulco typology, the research can be systematized in a 
space shaped by two orthogonal axes – the level of analysis of the agendas 
(individual or aggregate) and the quantity of issues under analysis (single 
item or entire agenda) (Figure 2.1).  
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This space is therefore composed by four fields: a) mass perspective 
(or issue competition) studies, that focus on several issues with an 
aggregate approach (e.g.: McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Iyengar & Simon, 1993); 
b) automaton: the analysis of the importance conferred on several issues by 
a group, focusing on the individuals that compose that group, and 
assuming that those will incorporate the media agenda composed by 
various themes (e.g.: McLeod, Becker & Byrnes, 1974); c) natural history 
studies, interested in understanding the presence of a given issue on the 
media and its impact on public agendas by using aggregate data  and a 
longitudinal perspective (e.g. Winter & Eyal, 1981); and d) cognitive 
portrait: one issue analysed at the individual level, that it, the observation 
of issue salience from the medium to the user (e.g. Erbring, Goldenberg & 
Miller, 1980). In the words of McCombs (2004), the most important 
perspective is the first, since “the ultimate goal of agenda setting theory 
(…) [is] a comprehensive view of mass communication and public opinion 
in the life of every community and nation” (p.32). 
 
Figure 2.1 – Research Taxonomy according to Number of Issues and Level of 
Analysis (Adapted from McCombs, 1981) 
 
 
 
In historical terms, aggregate studies were the first to be carried out, 
with the studies by McCombs and Shaw (1972) or Funkhouser (1973) being 
the seminal mass studies and Benton & Frazier (1976) or Winter & Eyal 
(1981) as the first natural history studies. Automaton studies followed. 
However, this perspective implies that individual agendas would strongly 
resemble media agendas, an expectation that is fairly close to the 
hypodermic needle model, and therefore considered unlikely 
(Ramaprasad, 1983). Indeed, the few automation studies available report 
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weak to moderate agenda-setting effects – for instance, Roessler (1999) 
found significant effects for less than 20% of the participants in his study. 
Cognitive portrait studies are more common than automaton studies, but 
their results are weaker than those observed with aggregate measures (e.g. 
Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Hügel, Degenhardt & Weiss, 1989).   
This taxonomy was proposed at the outset of this research stream. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the path followed by the research since 
the 1980s made the second dimension fairly useless, since the debate within 
the community of agenda-setting researchers focused on the decision to  
study this phenomenon from an aggregate or individual perspective 
(Eichhorn, 1996, quoted in Roessler, 1999).  
Until now, the proponents of the aggregate level of analysis seem to 
have prevailed – in fact, most of the research conducted was done in an 
aggregate way (Roessler, 1999). McCombs et al. (2011) noted that, around 
the world, the most frequent agenda-setting studies are either mass or 
natural history perspectives. However, since the publication of the 
paradigmatic study of Erbring, Goldenberg and Miller (1980), that merged 
individual survey data with the content of the newspaper that each 
individual read, there is a trend towards “disaggregation in agenda-setting 
research” (Dearing & Rogers, 1996, p. 92).  
What about the media outlets? The discussion about which media 
would produce stronger effects on public opinion was adopted by agenda-
setting research right from the beginning (Weaver et al., 1981; Saperas, 
1987; see also Wanta, 1997b). Some authors believe that television is the 
medium with more potential to influence the construction of reality (e.g. 
Blumler, 1973, in Saperas, 1987): it leads to passive learning – since it 
requires little effort to use; it conveys different types of information – 
sound, sight and motion; it is often perceived to be more attention-
grabbing, interesting, personally relevant, emotionally involving and 
surprising than newspaper content (see Wanta, 1997b, for a review of 
studies defending stronger TV effects); and, in Europe, the average citizen 
usually relies more heavily on television than on newspapers for political 
information (e.g., Norris, 2000).  
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Iyengar and colleagues (1982, 1987) report strong TV agenda-setting 
effects in their experiments. Moreover, journalists and politicians in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden agree that television is more 
powerful than newspapers and other outlets (news sites included); in the 
first two countries politicians attribute more power to newspapers than the 
journalists do (van Aelst et al., 2008; Strömbäck, 2011a).  
Other authors believe that the press would be more effective than 
television in terms of influencing public agendas. Reading a newspaper 
takes more effort than watching television: it is more difficult, requires 
more attention and good reading and interpretative skills – and mental 
effort is believed to lead to greater learning. In addition, newspapers can be 
used at one’s own pace, are read at different times of the day, and people 
can return to them as many times as they wish, whereas people have less 
control over how the TV news are paced and when it is watched (see 
Wanta, 1997b, for a literature review of studies defending stronger press 
effects). Moreover, newspapers are better able to inform citizens about 
candidates’ issue positions than television (Robinson & Levy, 1986; 
Druckman, 2005). Several studies report stronger agenda-setting effects 
from newspapers than from TV channels (e.g. McCombs & Shaw, 1972; 
Tipton, Haney & Baseheart, 1975; Benton & Frasier, 1976; Shaw & 
McCombs, 1977, in McCombs, 1981; Asp, 1983; McCombs, 2004). 
There are scholars who have noted that the relative superiority of one 
of these channels will depend on factors such as the type of issues (e.g.: 
Palmgreen & Clarke, 1977), audience characteristics such as occupation 
(Weaver et al., 1981), cognitive resources (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), 
motivation (newspapers are used mainly by people actively seeking 
information, whereas people that do not seek political information learn 
more from the television; Chaffee & Frank, 1996; Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997), 
or the quality of the information conveyed (exposure to television do not 
generate more or less learning than exposure to newspapers, but tabloid 
newspapers are not associated with learning in Britain during the 2001 
election; Norris & Sanders, 2003).  
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Finally, there are studies that show that time plays a role: television 
effects happen quickly but can vanish equally as fast, whereas press effects 
take more time to happen, but lasts longer (Weaver et al., 1981; Wanta & 
Hu, 1994a; Wanta, 1997b; but see also Iyengar & Kinder, 1987).  
The debate on this subject does not only focus on television and 
newspapers, but also includes the radio and Internet. For instance, Kopacz 
& Volgy (2005) quote research showing that outlets based on the written 
word (such as journals and, to a lesser extent, the Internet) would have a 
bigger impact than audiovisual media (television and radio), since the 
greater the effort in processing a message, the larger its impact in terms of 
attitudes and behaviour (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
In practice, this debate produced four types of studies: press agenda-
setting (e.g. Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Winter, Eyal & Rogers, 
1982), television agenda-setting (Hill, 1985, Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Brosius 
& Kepplinger, 1990; Watt, Mazza & Snyder, 1993), new media agenda-
setting (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002) and multi-channel agenda-setting 
research, with comparative (e.g.: Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002) or integrative 
(e.g.: McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Peter, 2003) purposes.  
The research displayed in Table 2.1 testifies to the richness in agenda-
setting research in the past forty years.  The variety corresponds not only to 
the typologies discussed above, but also to the way the dependent variable 
was operationalized and measured (open Most Important Problem 
questions, closed lists in which the participants pick one or several issues, 
closed lists of issues to be rated by the participants, and even open 
behaviour – Stroud & Kenski, 2007)20 as well as method (survey research, 
experimental studies, historical analysis), time (one month, several months, 
several years) and space (small communities vs. entire countries; US-based 
research vs. European, African and Middle-Eastern research).  
Some of the studies presented below investigated other agendas as 
independent or dependent variables (especially during the first two 
decades of research) or second-level agenda-setting, priming and framing 
                                                 
20 See other examples of behaviour as dependent variable in Weaver, McCombs & 
Shaw, 2004). 
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effects (particularly in the last twenty years.21) In order to reduce 
complexity in the table, I refer only to those characteristics of the study that 
directly refer to the classical agenda-setting hypothesis.  
Most of the studies on agenda-setting were conducted in the US 
(Weaver, McCombs & Shaw, 2004), as the table makes clear. This is surely 
not dissociable from the fact that in the United States, content analysis is 
helped by the existence of sources of information about media content such 
as LexisNexis or the Vanderbilt Television News Archive (see Graber, 
2004), whereas in other countries such ready-to-use sources do not exist.  
A relevant point of the systematization I propose is the fact that I 
found several studies conducted outside North-America in which agenda-
setting has been observed. Semetko (2004) noted that research conducted 
during election campaigns outside the US have failed to observe agenda-
setting effects, giving Britain and Germany (Semetko & Schoenbach, 1994) 
as examples. However, both the literature review offered by Weaver, 
McCombs & Shaw (2004), which is more complete and convincing, or the 
set of studies I present below, mention German, Spanish, Portuguese and 
other European studies in which evidence of agenda-setting was found.  
Finally, Table 2.1 also confirms that there is a national focus in most 
studies of agenda-setting. With a couple of remarkable exceptions (Peter, 
2003, 200722; Peter & de Vreese, 200323; Soroka, 200324), the agenda-setting 
literature is almost exclusively composed of single-country analysis.  
                                                 
21 Priming and framing are almost absent from communication journals research 
articles before 1990. The concepts first appeared in the literature during the 1980s, 
but the affirmation of these research areas is quite recent (Weaver, 2007). 
22 The author focused on television influence on the importance assigned to the 
issue «European Union» by citizens from the 15 member-States just after the 1999 
European elections, using polarization of elite opinions about Europe as a national-
level moderator. Agenda-setting depended on the nature of elite opinion – the 
more EU stories people watched in countries in which political elites disagreed 
about European integration, the more important they considered European 
integration. If elite opinion about European integration was consensual, no 
agenda-setting effects were found (Peter, 2003, 2007).  
23 This study is not actually about mainstream agenda-setting, but about nominal 
agenda diversity (number of issues in each citizen’s agenda) and thematic agenda 
diversity (number of different issues present in those agendas). The authors study 
five European countries selected due to their similarities (Denmark, Netherlands, 
UK, Germany, France), and observed that TV news agenda diversity lead to 
personal agenda diversity only in Denmark.  A drawback of this study is the fact 
that it is a comparative study where country diversity is not taken into account. 
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Most of these articles report empirical evidence of agenda-setting. 
This does not mean that most studies find strong media effects; however, 
publication bias against negative results cannot completely explain the 
amount of papers reporting positive results. Even controlling for the 
possible impact of such bias, evidence of agenda-setting effects is (at least 
in the USA) rich and convincing.    
                                                                                                                            
Even if the countries selected are believed to be the most similar in terms of media 
system characteristics – dual system, with strong public and private broadcasters – 
there are within-country differences that should be taken into account.   
24 This longitudinal study compares the agenda-setting power of the newspapers in 
the US and the UK and finds similar agenda-setting effects in both countries.  
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2.4 The Mechanisms Underlying Agenda-Setting 
2.4.1 The Audience – Learners or Victims? 
 
As stated earlier, research showed that public agendas have a limited 
capacity, being usually composed of no more than five issues, and therefore 
the agenda of a given community is created as a function of how important 
a given problem is perceived to be, compared to others (Erbring, 
Goldenberg & Miller, 1980). The perceived relative importance of a given 
issue is influenced by the media because people naturally economize on 
their own cognitive resources, using the news as a basis for their 
judgements, rather than undertaking a more complete analysis (McCombs 
& Shaw, 1972; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). 
But is this process conscious or not? The literature on agenda-setting 
is still debating the subject. Thus, it is possible to find authors who consider 
the agenda-setting to be a subconscious endeavour and others who believe 
it is a conscious process.  
Since the 1990s, agenda-setting has been understood under the 
umbrella of the model of associative networks. This theoretical instrument 
holds that human memory is composed of a set of organized networks of 
concepts (the nodes), interconnected through pathways, that symbolize 
substantive elements of rational or emotional meaning, and whose 
accessibility varies over time (Srull, 1981). When people have to make  
difficult decisions (for instance, assess the relative importance of several 
issues), they do not use all the information they have about the subject, but 
unconsciously use a shortcut known as the «heuristic of availability». This 
heuristic allows people to save cognitive resources and form judgments 
based on the information that comes to mind more easily (i.e. that is more 
accessible). Since accessibility also depends on the frequency and 
recentness with which the information was used32, the media boost the 
degree of accessibility of certain issues by covering them regularly (Brewer, 
Graf & Willnat, 2003; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). 
                                                 
32 As well as on the importance of the nodes, the number of linkages, and how 
strongly they are connected to other nodes in the associative network (see Lee, 
2004).  
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Therefore, accessibility in memory is the key mediator in the relationship 
between media coverage of issues and people’s perceptions of their 
importance. Agenda-setting would be therefore a result of this accessibility 
bias (see Takeshita, 2006).  
In the last decade, this perspective – which understands agenda-
setting as subconscious and media users as victims (Iyengar & Kinder, 
1987) – was challenged in the literature. There are some researchers who, 
while agreeing that people do not use all the information they have to 
assess the relevance of problems, do not believe that people use shortcuts 
unconsciously (e.g.: Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Kinder, 2003). There is 
evidence that the MIP question would not elicit an automatic reaction from 
the respondents – the salience of an issue in news broadcasts or elsewhere 
is not likely to turn it into a frequently cited concern unless the public 
judges it to be of genuine importance (Schuman, Ludvig & Krosnick, 1986). 
Moreover, the role of need for orientation as a moderator of agenda-setting 
is considered to be an argument against the victim perspective (Takeshita, 
2006). For these authors, agenda-setting is a conscious process of learning 
or inferring the degree of importance of current issues, based on implicit or 
explicit information provided by the media (for instance, the frequency of 
coverage of each issue). It is worth noting that McCombs & Shaw (1972) 
themselves employ the expression “attention and learning effects”.  
 Takeshita (2006) raises the idea that there might be two types of 
agenda-setting. Drawing on Miller & Krosnick (2000), who found strong 
effects for high-knowledge and high-trust people, and weaker agenda-
setting effects for others, the author proposes the existence of “a deliberate 
genuine agenda-setting involving active inference and an automatic pseudo 
agenda-setting explained by the accessibility bias” (p. 279).  
In 1985, Iyengar and Kinder tested three different hypothesis 
concerning psychological mechanisms that could explain agenda-setting: 
counter-arguing (people that critically scrutinize news stories about 
national problems, quarrelling with the message, would be less likely to 
alter their priorities, when compared with people that passively accept the 
news), source credibility (since counter-arguing takes time and effort, 
people use the credibility of the sources as a cue to accept/reject the 
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message), and affect (emotional responses to vivid pictures and dramatic 
stories broadcasted by the TV would increase attention to the news, or 
directly have an impact on the importance attributed to national problems). 
A series of four experiments were able to show that the credibility 
hypothesis was the most supported by their empirical work; regarding 
affect, the results were mixed; actually, the vividness of stories seems not to 
contribute to agenda-setting, but to undermine it (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). 
The counterarguing hypothesis received very weak empirical support 
(Iyengar & Kinder, 1985). These results would reinforce the understanding 
of agenda-setting as an unconscious endeavour.  
2.4.2 The Media Effect – Intentional or Mediational? 
 
 The agenda-setting hypothesis presupposes that the priorities of 
political and interest groups influence the news priorities of the media, 
which have specific news values and serve particular audiences, and then 
those priorities influence public opinion (McQuail, 1983). The term 
“agenda-setting” seems to imply a deliberate attempt on the part of the 
media to create a certain agenda of issues, the intentionality of this effect 
remains somewhat unresolved in the agenda-setting research.  
 In the typology of media effects proposed by McQuail (1983), 
organized in two orthogonal axes (intentionality vs. non-deliberate effects 
and short-term vs. long term effects), agenda-setting is characterized as 
intentional and long-term. Subsequent research has shown that the effects 
decay in time, depending on the nature of the issue and other variables 
(Watt, Mazza & Snyder, 1993)33; however, the first speculation – i.e. the one 
concerning intentionality – has not yet been confirmed or discredited.  
 Most agenda-setting researchers opted not to take part in a debate 
about the role of the press, in which some political communication experts 
                                                 
33
 Agenda-setting seems to be a short-time process. Watt, Mazza & Snyder (1993) 
observed that agenda-setting strength tends to decrease according to the amount of 
coverage that the issues have before the time frame considered: the decay being 
quicker in the case of very long or very short coverage issues. However, depending 
on the issue at stake, television agenda-setting can decay after 30, 60 or 600 days. 
Agenda-setting on an obtrusive issue such as inflation seems to last longer than on 
other issues, irrespectively of their previous coverage.   
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believe that the media was a neutral observer and reporter of political and 
social events (and therefore see agenda-setting as a by-product of 
journalistic activities) or as having a role that includes surveillance of the 
socio-political environment and political participation fostering political or 
social reform (Kosicki, 1993).  
 However, Semetko et al. (1991) are an exception to this general 
panorama. The authors clearly state that the media have a discretionary 
ability to shape the public agenda, instead of merely mirroring the ideas of 
candidates and parties. They find “the proposition that the media merely 
reflect or mirror an agenda constructed by political spokespersons overly 
simplistic, some might say bankrupt”. Furthermore, they argue that “such a 
position clearly obscures the intricate ways in which political messages 
emerge as the joint product of an interactive process involving political 
communicators and media professionals” (p. 3). Eilders (2000, 2002) takes 
the same position in this debate.    
At the system level, the discretionary power of the media to set the 
agenda is defined by the strength of the political party system (strong 
systems give less space for journalist discretion), degree of 
commercialization (commercialized media systems are associated with 
stronger inclinations of journalists to set the agenda but less space to do so), 
degree of competition for media audiences (more competition leads to 
more attention to the audience’s interests and less attention to political 
agendas by the journalists), degree of professionalization of the campaign 
and cultural differences about how politics and politicians are regarded 
(less respect leads to more discretionary power) (Semetko et al., 1991).  
 
2.5 The Moderators of Agenda-Setting 
 
 At the beginning of the agenda-setting research stream, some 
authors feared that it would mean a return to the hypodermic needle 
paradigm by propagating the idea that the media have an immense 
potential to set the public agenda (see Ramaprasad, 1983). However, this is 
not the case.  
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The majority of agenda-setting studies tested hypotheses concerning 
factors that were thought to moderate its strength – that is to say, the 
dimensions that might influence the intensity/occurrence of the effect 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). This literature shows that agenda-setting is 
moderated by individual factors such as need for orientation, education, 
political knowledge, partisanship, trust in the media, degree of exposure 
and attention to the media and habits of discussion. The audience is not an 
indistinct, amorphous, entity, but a heterogeneous body – and its 
heterogeneity can prevent or facilitate agenda-setting. Moreover, issue 
characteristics may also play a moderating role.  
2.5.1  Individual-level Moderators  
 
Need for orientation was the first moderator proposed in the agenda-
setting literature (Shaw & McCombs, 1977, in McCombs, 1994; Weaver, 
1977 & 1984, in Dearing & Rogers, 1996). This concept encompasses the 
ideas of relevance and uncertainty (McCombs, 2005). In effect, if there is 
both a low level of interest about the political and social environment and a 
low level of uncertainty, need for orientation (and, consequently, the 
susceptibility to agenda-setting) should be equally low. On the other hand, 
if an issue has a high degree of interest and uncertainty the correlation 
between the media and the public agenda should be high. People who 
believe that being informed about current affairs is important but have a 
high degree of uncertainty about these issues (i.e. those with a high need 
for orientation) will be more susceptible to the media content.  
Recently, Matthes (2008) proposed a scale of need for orientation, 
based on an ingenious reconceptualization of this construct, and observed a 
positive impact of need for orientation on the strength of agenda-setting. 
However, this kind of scale, which can be very useful in experiments and 
panel studies specifically designed to study agenda-setting, is not – 
understandably – present in any of the most important public opinion 
surveys conducted in the field of public opinion research.  
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Whenever need for orientation is not possible to operationalize 
directly, usually scholars use their consequent (degree of exposure) as a 
proxy34, since need for orientation is thought to increase information 
seeking (Poindexter et al., 2002, in McCombs, 2004; Matthes, 2008; see also 
Ramaprasad, 1983). In fact, when people want to be informed about what is 
happening in the world, but feel that keeping up is too hard, they use the 
media as a way to digest information and reduce complexity. The research 
on the effects of exposure to the media observed that this factor is 
positively related to stronger learning, civic engagement and agenda-
setting effects, even if attention may be more important that mere exposure 
(Hill, 1985; Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986; Wanta & Hu, 1994a; Zhao & Chaffee, 
1995; Norris, 2002; Drew & Weaver, 2006).  
 
If need for orientation and degree of exposure/attention increase 
accessibility, political sophistication increases applicability.35 Education 
and political knowledge – often used as indicators of the construct political 
sophistication – are thought to have an impact in agenda-setting. However, 
in both cases there is no agreement in the literature about the direction of 
their moderating effect.  In the case of education, some authors believe that 
less educated people will be more influenced by the media, since they do 
                                                 
34 It is also possible to use survey data indirectly to operationalize need for 
orientation without using a proxy. For instance, people with high interest in 
politics and low political efficacy are, in fact, people that have a higher need for 
orientation. Some other studies used vote intention to operationalize the second 
part of the concept of need for orientation, assuming that people that do not know 
who to vote for are, generally speaking, more uncertain about the current affairs in 
the political and social world (e.g. Högel, Degenhardt & Weiss, 1989). I do not 
think that this assumption necessarily holds true – a highly efficacious and 
knowledgeable citizen might be uncertain about who to vote for due to a poor offer 
on the side of the parties, or to a concentration of more than one party around 
issues that interest and motivate that citizen. Nevertheless, a partial 
operationalization of need for orientation (using, for instance, only interest in 
politics) is highly undesirable, because people with high interest in politics can be, 
grosso modo, more (Schönbäck & Semetko, 1992) or less susceptible to media effects 
(McLeod, Becker & Byrnes, 1974), for reasons that likely have nothing to do with 
need for orientation. 
35
 Price & Tewksbury (1997, in McCombs, 2005) show that when messages are 
processed, the salient attributes of a message evoke and activate other constructs, 
which then have an increased likelihood of use in evaluations made in response to 
the message (applicability effects). Once activated, constructs retain some residual 
activation potential, making them likely to be activated and used in subsequent 
evaluations (accessibility effects). 
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not have the same capacity to analyse critically what is broadcasted 
possessed by more educated citizens (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987).  
Others argue that more educated citizens are strongly influenced 
because they access information on current issues in the media more 
attentively and frequently (Hill, 1985; Wanta, 1997a). Lastly, some studies 
find no effects of education, reporting an homogeneous agenda-setting 
effect for some issues and lack of agenda-setting for others, independently 
of the respondents’ cognitive sophistication (Zhu & Boroson, 1997), and 
others maintain that the moderately knowledgeable citizens are the ones 
that absorb the television issue agenda the most (Denemark, 2002).36  
In terms of political knowledge, it is possible to find articles stating 
that less knowledgeable people will be more susceptible to agenda-setting, 
since they do not possess any information other than that provided by the 
media (e.g. Iyengar, Peters & Kinder, 1982), as well as research showing 
that people with a high degree of political knowledge will be more affected 
by the media, because they consume it more frequently (Miller & Krosnick, 
2000). The existence of a curvilinear relationship between persuasion and 
political knowledge (Zaller, 1992, 1996) may also be observable between 
agenda-setting and political knowledge, which would explain the mixed 
results reported in the literature. It might be that the relationship between 
these two variables is nonlinear and depends on message-specific traits 
(such as accessibility, novelty and dissemination) or the information flow.  
People with greater political sophistication are, at the same time, 
those who are more likely to be aware of the content of the media agenda, 
and those who are less affected by it, having their own agenda (McLeod, 
Becker & Byrnes., 1974; Weaver et al., 1981). This idea was revisited by John 
Zaller two decades ago. The author suggested that political awareness 
increases the probability of receiving messages that are contrary to 
predispositions, but decreases the likelihood of accepting those messages 
(Zaller, 1992, 1996). Therefore, in contexts that Zaller describes as medium 
                                                 
36
 It is worth underlining that in different countries, the same levels of education 
(either measured in number of years of schooling or qualifications attained) might 
not mean the same thing – namely in terms of information and skills (see Dimock 
& Popkin, 1997). This might explain, at least in part, the lack of clarity about this 
variable’s role. 
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or low information flows (which probably corresponds to the flow during 
routine times and second-order campaigns), people with average levels of 
political awareness (or knowledge) are more likely to be influenced 
because, on the one hand, they are exposed to political messages more 
frequently than less sophisticated people, but less capable of resisting 
influence because their predispositions are weaker than those of the highly 
sophisticated. Moreover, political knowledge seems to be a better predictor 
of news awareness, when compared to self-reported media use, 
interpersonal communication or education (Price & Zaller, 1993).  
 
What about trust in the media? Trust is seen as an important 
moderator of agenda-setting, since it will happen only if the media outlet is 
seen as trustworthy or reliable; otherwise suspicion will harm the media’s 
potential to influence (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, Kinder, 2003; Wanta & Hu, 
1994b; Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Tsfati, 2003). Accordingly, Zaller (1992) 
proposes an idea by William McGuire stating that trust is not associated 
with learning or involvement with the message, but with an openness and 
willingness to follow opinion leaders. Stigmatized sources are more 
scrutinized (people tend to guard themselves against them), and therefore 
their effects are less probable (Petty, Fleming & White, 1999). The same can 
be said for distrusted sources.  
Trust seems to be only marginally related to frequency of media 
use,37 and its relationship with discussion of news is not clear, depending 
on the outlet in question (Kiousis, 2001). Moreover, trust in the media 
seems to be negatively correlated with right-wing partisanship and/or 
strength of partisanship (Cook & Gronke, 2001; Jones, 2004). 
It is worth pointing out that trust is not necessarily connected with 
bias or bad practice from the media – biased or poor quality media can still 
be credible for some people. But usually the two seem to be associated – for 
instance, Italy is a country in which trust in the media is very low (as we 
                                                 
37 Jones (2004) found no relationship between trust and TV or newspaper 
consumption. Tsfati & Cappella (2003) observed that the relationship is negative 
when it comes to exposure to mainstream news media and positive when it comes 
to use of non-mainstream news media. Without this distinction, the effect might 
not be observed. It is also relevant to say, however, that trust can contribute to 
selective exposure to the most trusted outlet.  
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will see later) and, at the same time, has been characterized by The Atlantic 
as a place where fake news and fake interviews are fairly common in the 
newspapers – even in those reputed to be high-quality, such as La 
Repubblica.38  
 
Competing sources of information about the relevance of issues, such 
as social networks or party ideology, were also studied by agenda-setting 
researchers. Let us start with the analysis of discussion of current affairs as 
a moderator of agenda-setting.  
The idea that media effects were contingent on patterns of 
interpersonal discussion goes back to the Katz & Lazarslfed (1955) two-step 
flow of communication model. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues portrayed 
interpersonal communication as a crucial mediator of media effects, in the 
sense that news is something that will make people talk (Park, 1940), and 
those conversations would then lead to persuasion.  
Recent research focusing on effects other than agenda-setting stresses 
the same idea: the social network (in the pre-Facebook sense of the term) 
was the primary source of information, and an important vote factor in the 
1992 US presidential campaign (Allen-Beck et al, 2002); and if the 
information offered by the media is not in accord with the prevailing 
opinion of the recipient’s network, there is a strong chance that it will be 
rejected (Schmitt-Beck, 2004).  
Nevertheless, discussion of current affairs has no clear effect on 
agenda-setting. Several authors (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Shaw, 1977; 
Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980) reported that interpersonal discussion 
reduced the influence of media, whereas others stress that discussion 
reinforces the power of the media to set the agenda when people talk about 
what they have read or seen in the media (thus strengthening the cognitive 
availability of the issues more frequently covered) and weakens the 
probability of agenda-setting when discussion focuses on other issues 
(Wanta & Wu, 1992). Yang & Stone (2003) observed that people that rely on 
                                                 
38 See the article by Michele Travierso, “The Italian Press’s Tradition of Fake 
Interviews”, published on The Atlantic in April 2011, at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/04/the-italian-presss-
tradition-of-fake-interviews/73377/.  
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interpersonal communication for information show agenda-setting effects 
to a greater extent than people who just use the media without engaging in 
much discussion with friends. This means that interpersonal 
communication can indeed reinforce media effects on public opinion.  
Yet again, other studies found no effects of discussing politics 
(Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) and still others have seen that it depends on the 
issue at stake – for instance, interpersonal communication seems to explain 
most of the salience of domestic issues (Zhu et al., 1993). Moreover, there is 
evidence about West Germany citizens in 1980 showing that interpersonal 
communication weakens press agenda-setting power on unobtrusive issues 
(Hügel, Degenhardt & Weiss, 1989).  
 Interestingly enough, Weimann & Brosius (1994) tried to adapt the 
idea of a two-step flow of communication to agenda-setting, identifying 
influential individuals with a scale of strength of personality, and 
hypothesizing that the agenda of those people (known by being intense 
consumers of media outlets) could lead and influence the agendas of the 
non-influential. The empirical support to this second step was rather 
mixed; step one was not tested due to lack of information on media 
coverage of issues in the models. In 1996, the same authors inserted media 
data into the research design, and tested four different models of 
relationship between media agendas and those of highly influential people 
(early recognizers) and the general public – the classical two-step flow 
model (media influences opinion leaders, leaders influence the rest) and 
other versions. Once again, mixed results were achieved, the main finding 
of this study being that interpersonal communication matters and has a 
role in different directions according to the issues at stake (Brosius & 
Weimann, 1996).  
 
Party identification is also believed to have a moderating role of 
agenda-setting. This is a crucial concept in the study of electoral behaviour, 
and refers to a stable psychological identification with a specific political 
party. Having a party identification means that people think of themselves 
as supporters of a party; however, this cognition is not necessarily 
expressed in voting for that party or assessing its leader in the best way 
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possible. This concept is not behavioural or emotional, but cognitive, a 
matter of self-definition (Campbell et al., 1960; Campbell et al., 1986, in 
Blais et al., 2001). Party identification can be studied in terms of direction 
(with which party does an individual identify?) and strength (how deep is 
that identification?).  
 The moderating role of partisanship in media effects is not a brand 
new idea. Even Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet (1944) suggested that people 
with weak party attachments were the ones most likely to be influenced by 
the media. Indeed, partisanship is believed to be a frame of reference that 
reduces media agenda-setting effects (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; McLeod, 
Becker & Byrnes, 1974). Agenda-setting tends to be strong in the case of 
independents, or nonpartisans, or undecided (see McCombs & Shaw, 1972). 
There is one study that I can quote (Iyengar, 1979) that did not find effects 
of partisanship on television agenda-setting in the US.  
 
Party identification is the last in the list of the most relevant 
moderators of agenda-setting effects. The rationale underlying these 
moderators implies, in some cases, the existence of causal relationships 
between them – the more idiosyncratic variables (such as education or 
knowledge) are believed to explain the issue- or media-related variables 
(such as exposure, trust or discussion). For instance, Poindexter et al. (2002, 
in McCombs, 2004) observed that need for orientation is the mediator 
variable between education and exposure to news programs (in this case, 
candidate debates on TV), and Santana Pereira (2007) found that education 
was significantly correlated with discussion of current issues with other 
people. Additionally, political knowledge seems to be correlated with 
exposure to television (Norris, 1996; 2000; Newton, 1999; see also Aarts & 
Semetko, 2003, for a further specification of this hypothesis).  
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Table 2.2 – Individual Moderators of Agenda-Setting (summary) 
 
Moderator Role Main Source 
 
Need for Orientation 
 
Fosters 
agenda-setting 
 
Shaw & McCombs (1977, in McCombs, 
1994); 
Weaver (1977 & 1984, in Dearing & 
Rogers, 1996); Matthes (2008) 
 
Education 
Can increase or 
decrease the 
magnitude of 
agenda-setting. 
Negative relationship: Iyengar & 
Kinder (1987) 
Positive relationship: Hill (1985); 
Wanta (1997a) 
 
Political Knowledge 
Can increase or 
decrease the 
magnitude of 
agenda setting. 
Negative relationship: Iyengar, Peters 
& Kinder (1982); Iyengar & Kinder, 
1987 
Positive relationship: Miller & 
Krosnick (1996, 2000) 
 
Trust 
 in the Media 
 
Fosters 
agenda-setting 
Iyengar & Kinder (1985, in Kinder, 
2003) 
Miller & Krosnick (2000) 
Tsfati (2003) 
 
Exposure and 
Attention 
Positive 
impact, but 
attention is 
more 
important than 
exposure. 
 
Hill (1985) 
Wanta & Hu (1994a, 1994b) 
 
Discussion 
 
Its impact 
depends on the 
issues at stake. 
Shaw (1977) 
Wanta & Wu (1992) 
 
Partisanship 
 
Independents 
are more 
susceptible to 
agenda-setting 
McLeod, Becker & Byrnes (1974 
   
 
2.5.2 Issue-related Moderators  
 
The occurrence or intensity of agenda-setting is also influenced by the 
characteristics of the issues, since “no one contends that the news media 
influence the salience of all issues” (McCombs, 1994, p.14).  Obtrusiveness, 
geographical focus and obscurity are some of the issue characteristics 
explored in this literature.  
The most relevant characteristic to deal with is obtrusiveness. An 
issue is obtrusive if the public has direct experience of it, and unobtrusive if 
the public has no direct contact with it (Zucker, 1978, in Zhu & Boroson, 
1997). Usually, international affairs are more unobtrusive than domestic 
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issues. The impact of media is supposedly greater for one’s perceptions of 
unfamiliar issues, or issues that are complex or unclear, than on 
perceptions of issues than people have experienced personally (e.g. 
Newton, 2006). Neuman (1990) proposes inflation as the quintessential 
obtrusive issue because people are aware of it in their daily lives and thus 
do not need the media to provide official statistics for them to realize that it 
is an important issue. Of course, the need for orientation will be greater for 
issues that are more distant, either in terms of geography or personal 
experience (McCombs, 1994).  
If the results of Behr & Iyengar (1985) and Brosius & Kepplinger 
(1990) are seen under the light of this concept of obtrusiveness, it is even 
possible to raise the hypothesis that the nature of issues affects not only the 
intensity of agenda-setting, but also the direction of causality between the 
media and public agenda. In the case of the north-American research, the 
observation of an “agenda-setting in reverse” effect (p. 48), that is to say, 
the influence of public opinion on the media agenda, happened in just one 
highly obtrusive issue in the USA during the 1970s – inflation. In turn, 
Brosious & Kepplinger (1990) found agenda-setting effects in issues such as 
European politics, defence or environment (not very involving) and an 
impact of the public agenda on the media in highly important issues such 
as pensions and crime. Soroka (2002) also proposes different patterns of 
relationship between the media, the public and the policy agenda 
according to the nature of the issue. 
Obtrusiveness of issues differs from person to person. That is why 
some authors prefer to talk about issue sensitivity (see Zhu & Boroson, 
1997), that is, the degree to which people are personally affected by the 
issue at stake. For instance, the existence of a union member or 
unemployed person in the household can be a measure of sensitivity to 
unemployment, income as a measure of sensitivity to inflation, age and 
gender as sensitivity to crime or healthcare. Issue sensitivity is a moderator 
of agenda-setting, in the sense that it can facilitate its occurrence (e.g. 
Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Iyengar & Kinder, 1985), but not in 
every single case (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; see also Price & Zaller for similar 
evidence from outside the agenda-setting theoretical umbrella).  
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 However, the role of obtrusiveness of issues is not crystal clear. As 
we have seen above, several studies noted that when the issues have a very 
strong and direct impact on people’s daily life, the media effect will be 
smaller. In this context, the degree of importance of issues will be high due 
to their relevance to people and independent from the amount of coverage 
they get in television and newspapers, and vice-versa (Winter, Eyal & 
Rogers, 1982; Hügel, Degenhardt & Weiss, 1989; Zhu et al., 1993; Watt, 
Matta & Snyder, 1993; Soroka, 2002; Watt, Mazza & Snyder, 1993). The less 
personal experience or contact people have with a social environment, the 
greater the degree of ambiguity and threat posed by that social 
environment, and therefore the greater their dependence on mass media 
messages (Ball-Rokeach, 1985). This is known as the obtrusive contingency 
hypothesis (Lee, 2004). However, other researchers believe that personal 
experience with an issue can lead people to search for more information 
about it in the media, thus increasing their exposure and probability of 
being influenced (Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Demers, Craff, Choi 
& Pessin, 1989; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987).  This is known as the cognitive 
priming hypothesis (Lee, 2004).  
 In the framework of the associative networks theory, both 
phenomena are possible – the first hypothesis assumes that the obtrusive 
nodes are always active and available, whereas the second presupposes 
than obtrusive nodes need less cognitive work to be activated by means of 
media coverage, being activated more quickly by the media coverage than 
unobtrusive issues in the network (Lee, 2004). The natural history of the 
issues (the amount of time they have been around and their placement in 
the attention cycle; Downs, 1972) might be an interesting qualification to 
the relationship between speed of activation and involvement of issues – 
the recency of the issue in the public sphere may interact with its 
obtrusiveness and foster/reduce activation speed (Lee, 2004).  
The idea of obtrusiveness is connected to the geographic focus of the 
issue. It is argued that agenda-setting will be strong in issues that are 
international. When issues are local, people depend less on media coverage 
to be aware of their importance (Tipton, Haney & Baseheart, 1975; 
Palmgreen & Clarke, 1977). In the case of international news, agenda-
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setting is thought to be stronger for issues that presuppose some degree of 
conflict (e.g. terrorism, crime and drugs) and intervention of the country in 
the international scene, and weaker in abstract themes such as foreign trade 
(Wanta & Hu, 1993; see also Soroka, 2003). Citizens’ assessments of the 
incidence of specific problems (unemployment, drug abuse or 
discrimination) in a small US community were found to be unrelated to the 
media coverage of such issues, but with the actual rates of incidence 
computed by agencies and other institutions (Hubbard, DeFleur & DeFleur, 
1975). Conversely, the media are able to shape citizens’ perception of the 
importance of foreign nations, by increasing or decreasing the amount of 
coverage granted to those countries (Wanta, Golan & Lee, 2004).  
The third relevant issue characteristic is obscurity. Issues that would 
not be identifiable if they had not received media coverage are those where 
agenda-setting will be stronger (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). This is in tune 
with Bartels (1993) observation about issues – persuasive effects are not 
possible for issues with stable prior opinions, but are stronger for new 
issues; this implies that agenda-setting is bound to be bigger in the case of 
new, obscure, issues.  
 
Table 2.3 – Issue  Moderators of Agenda Setting (summary) 
 
Moderator Role Source 
 
Personal 
Experience 
with Issues 
 
It can have an positive or 
negative effect on agenda- 
setting strength 
Negative relationship: Winter, Eyal 
& Rogers (1982), Soroka (2002) 
 
Positive relationship: Erbring, 
Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Iyengar 
& Kinder, 1987 
Geographical 
proximity 
Reduces agenda-setting 
strength 
Palmgreen & Clark (1977) 
Obscurity of 
Issues 
Increases the agenda-
setting strength 
Watt, Mazza & Snyder (1993) 
Dearing & Rogers (1996) 
 
Age 
Younger issues associated 
with stronger agenda-
setting effects 
 
Watt, Mazza & Snyder (1993) 
 
   
 
Finally, Watt, Mazza & Snyder (1993) also suggest issue age as a 
factor to take into consideration. The authors report that agenda-setting 
power tends to be stronger in issues at early stages in the issue-cycle (for 
instance, Iran, which started to be covered in the news at the beginning of 
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the time frame considered by the authors), compared with issues that are 
much older (e.g. the Soviet Union, present in the news for at least 35 years 
before the time frame under study).  
2.6 So What? The Relevance of Agenda-Setting 
 
In general terms, agenda-setting is an interesting subject for the 
understanding of public opinion dynamics; it explains how certain issues 
get to the top of a population’s priorities, with the help of the media which 
are, in turn, influenced directly or indirectly by politicians and other 
groups. Moreover, priming studies boosted the perceived importance of 
the agenda-setting phenomenon for political scientists, since it allowed the 
drawing of indirect lines between media content and electoral behaviour.  
Priming is the mechanism by which the media agenda influences the 
way people evaluate political actors. Generally speaking, this term refers to 
the cognitive process through which the recent or frequent activation of a 
given cognitive schema raises it accessibility at a subsequent moment, 
when the individual thinks or speaks about something else (Srull & Wyer, 
1979).  The media – either news shows (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) and 
entertainment programs (Holbrook & Hill, 2005), or the press (Iyengar & 
Simon, 1993) - influence the establishment of an agenda by giving salience 
to some issues. Afterwards, those issues become more accessible at the 
moment of naming the most important problems of the country (or other 
community), but also on subsequent occasions, such as the evaluation of 
candidates or the assessment of the government’s performance (Iyengar, 
Peters & Kinder, 1982; Iyengar et al., 1984; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; 
Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Krosnick & Brannon, 
1993; Willnat & Zhu, 1996; Miller & Krosnick, 1996, 1997, 2000; Holbrook & 
Hill, 2005; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). In other words, issue salience 
becomes an heuristic for expressing political judgements.   
Agenda-setting and priming are understood as being closely 
connected. On one hand, agenda-setting seems to be a pre-condition for the 
occurrence of priming (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 
2007); on the other, both processes are based on the same cognitive 
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mechanism, the heuristic of availability (Scheufele, 2000; Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2007).  
Since priming has an effect on the appraisal of a given candidate’s 
competence and personality, and this variable is, according to the socio-
psychological model of vote (Campbell et al., 1960), one of the factors 
explaining electoral behaviour, there can be an indirect effect of media on 
vote, mediated by agenda-setting and priming. In 1987, Iyengar and 
Kinder, in the inferences they make based on the results of their research, 
stated that the content of the news media can, through priming, make 
voters oscillate between indecision and strong support towards a given 
candidate. More recently, Sheafer & Weimann (2005) carried out an 
empirical test of this hypothesis of indirect effect on vote, using individual 
and aggregate data collected in the context of four Israeli elections. The 
research design included agenda building (definition of the media agenda), 
agenda-setting and priming (not in the classical sense of influence on 
candidate appraisal, but directly on voting behaviour), and the authors 
found empirical support for all these steps of the relationship between 
media and vote.   
The priming hypothesis has known some degree of criticism in the 
literature. For instance, Lenz (2009) suggests that priming effects are, in 
fact, learning effects: the author only observed priming effects among 
individuals who learn party positions on issues and adopt the favourite 
party’s positions as their own. However, Hart & Middleton (2012) recently 
showed that the priming hypothesis receives stronger empirical support 
than the projection (or, in the words of Gabriel Lenz, learning) hypothesis.  
 Issue voting is another relevant way by which agenda-setting can 
be relevant in political terms. People tend to cast their vote for the party 
that they believe will best deal with/own the issues that they find to be 
important (Petrocik, 1996; Bélanger & Meguid, 2008) – and the media can 
have an impact in this assessment, as we have seen above. Since the impact 
of social cleavages on vote is declining (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck, 1984; 
Franklin, Mackie & Valen, 1992; Clark & Lipset, 2001; Gunther & Montero, 
2001), it has been posited that the impact of economic concerns is now more 
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forceful in terms of explanatory power, alongside contextual short-term 
factors (Kiewiet, 1983; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Anderson, 1995).  
 A recent study has indeed observed that issue voting in the 2009 EP 
elections (operationalized as the relative weight of attitudes towards 
Europe on vote choice) was stronger in contexts where media attention to 
Europe had been stronger, even controlling for the degree of party conflict 
about this issue (de Vries et al., 2011). 
 The work by Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart (2007), even though it 
did not measure explicitly the public agenda, can be pointed out as an 
example of this, since the authors observed a strong relationship between 
the amount of news media reporting immigration-related topics and vote 
for anti-immigrant parties. In a quasi-experimental natural design, 
Boomgaarden & de Vreese (2007) noted that the level of media exposure 
moderated – in this case, intensified – the relationship between a real world 
event starring immigrants as murderers and anti-immigration sentiment in 
the Netherlands. However, this requires the assumption that people know 
the positions of the main parties and candidates on the most important 
issue – an assumption that might not hold in the case of politically 
uninformed citizens, but also in the case of the politically knowledgeable 
(Jenssen, Aalberg & Aarts, 2012). Media can indeed point out the most 
relevant issues of the day but, according to these authors, rarely highlights 
the positions of the parties, because citizens are believed to already possess 
such information.  
Moreover, Weaver (1991) observed that the level of perceived 
significance of a given issue is associated with greater levels of knowledge 
about that issue, strength and direction of opinion about solutions to deal 
with it, and political behaviour (i.e. writing a letter, signing petitions, 
attending meetings, deciding to cast a vote according to the issue).  
Lastly, a different rationale for the relevance of the agenda-setting 
phenomenon is proposed by scholars trying to establish a relationship 
between agenda-setting and framing, considering them as two different 
levels of the same psychological phenomenon. But what is framing? This 
term refers to the influence of the frame the media gives to a specific issue 
on the people’s opinion about that issue (Lilleker, 2006). To frame a specific 
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issue is to select some aspects of its complex nature and make them salient, 
in detriment to others, in order to promote a certain perspective on the 
issue (Entman, 1993). Several framing studies were conducted in the US 
context (e.g. Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Kim, Scheufele & Shanahan, 2002; 
Brewer, Graf & Willnat, 2003; Wanta, Goran & Lee, 2004) and in Europe, 
assessing either the impact of news frames on attitudes about the European 
Union (Werder, 2002; Dursun, 2005; de Vreese & Boorgarden, 2006; de 
Vreese, 2007; Elenbaas & de Vreese, 2008; de Vreese & Elenbaas, 2008; 
Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgaarden & de Vreese, 2008) or other issues 
(Lopez-Escobar et al., 1998; Lopes-Escobar, Llamas & McCombs, 1998).  
Some authors proposed the existence of a close link between framing 
and agenda-setting, asserting that the former is not different from a second-
order agenda-setting phenomenon (Takeshita, 1997; see Kim, Scheufele & 
Shanahan, 2002; Yioutas & Segvic, 2003), which is sometimes named 
attribute-, or second-level agenda-setting. The interest in attribute agenda-
setting is shared by several scholars and resulted in a considerable amount 
of research (McCombs & Shaw, 1993; Ghanem, 1997; McCombs & Estrada, 
1997; Kiousis, Bantimaroudis & Ban, 1999; Kim, Scheufele & Shanahan, 
2002; Kiousis & McCombs, 2004; McCombs, 2004; Wanta, Golan & Lee, 
2004; Dursun, 2005; Kiousis, 2005). Classic agenda-setting refers to the 
transmission of issue salience from the media to public opinion, whereas 
this second-order agenda-setting is the transmission of the attributes of 
those issues (McCombs, 1993, 2004). This is called a second-order 
phenomenon because it is more complex than classic or first-order agenda-
setting, but also because it is thought to have a greater impact on public 
opinion about a given subject. 
Understandably enough, such a close link between agenda-setting 
and framing phenomena is not widely accepted, and remains a matter of 
contention in the literature. Some authors contend that agenda-setting and 
framing are based on different psychological processes; others point out 
that framing and attribute agenda-setting are different because not all 
attributes of an issue can be considered to be frames (Sheufele, 2000; Kim, 
Scheufele & Shanahan, 2002; McCombs, 2004; Sheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; 
Takeshita, 2006; Weaver, 2007). 
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2.7 Agenda-Setting, Spiral of Silence, Uses and 
Gratifications 
 
Beyound priming and framing, agenda-setting also speaks to other 
traditions in the field of political communication. For instance, Elisabeth 
Noelle-Neumann (1994) proposed that there is a link between agenda-
setting and her theory about the spiral of silence. According to her, agenda-
setting creates the issues on which public opinion will be formed. Noelle-
Neumann (1994) defines public opinion as a set of “opinions and behaviour 
in morally loaded areas that can be publicly expressed and shown with the 
expectation of meeting with approval or, conversely, without running the 
risk of isolation” (pp.98-99), in sum, opinions that are important for the 
cohesion of the community. The media would then pre-select the issues 
about which it is reasonably safe to talk, and the ones that can be riskier in 
terms of community cohesion. The role of the media as creator of consensus 
by means of agenda-setting is acknowledged by the founding father of this 
line of research (e.g. McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 1993, 1997; Lopez-
Escobar, Llamas & McCombs, 1998).  
In turn, Shaw (1977, 1979) suggests that there is a link between 
agenda-setting and the uses and gratifications theory (Blumler & Katz, 
1974), since it results from the people’s need to be informed about what is 
happening in the world. The theory of uses and gratifications tells us that 
the decision to use the media is made in order to satisfy needs such as 
entertainment (escape from routine and daily problems), interpersonal 
relations (media provide information that is useful for conversation), 
identity (strengthening of values, self-knowledge) and surveillance (need to 
get information about important factors that might help in performing a 
specific task or achieving a given goal (Blumler & Katz, 1974). In Ball-
Rokeach’s (1985) more succinct terminology, media is consumed to 
respond to motives such as understanding, orientation and play.   
Media use seems to satisfy the surveillance need, since campaign 
coverage offers information that audiences can use in order to take 
decisions about how to vote. However, other needs are also gratified by 
media exposure during campaigns: the need to know the programs of the 
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different parties, to know the most important current issues, to assess the 
political protagonists, remember what are the strong assets of the favourite 
party, understand who will win the elections, enjoy the excitement around 
the electoral race, and get material to use in discussions with friends and 
family (Blumler & McQuail, 1964, in Severin & Tankard, 1998).  
2.8 Critical Appraisal of Agenda-Setting Studies 
 
Despite all the research conducted, agenda-setting still struggles with 
some very important problems. The limitations that Saperas (1987) or 
Edelstein (1993) underlined two decades ago involved unclear definitions 
and criterion variables, uncertainty about the time frames and number of 
issues, or poor knowledge about the effect of individual characteristics in 
this process. Nowadays, these problems are no longer as relevant as they 
were twenty years ago – there is a shared understanding of what agenda-
setting is, and the amount of empirical work done allow to make educated 
choices about time spans and number of issues to include in the research 
design. Moreover, the lack of knowledge on the impact that audience 
characteristics might have, pointed out by Saperas (1987) is no longer true, 
as we were able to show in the section about the moderators of agenda-
setting. 
However, the main critique that can still be made to the agenda-
setting hypothesis concerns the direction of causality between the media 
agenda and the public agenda. It is true that longitudinal and experimental 
studies were successful in establishing the media agenda as chronologically 
preceding the public agenda, thus supporting the claim that this process is 
unidirectional (see, for instance, Iyengar, Peters & Kinder, 1982; Behr & 
Iyengar, 1985; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Watt, Golan & Snyder, 1993).  
Causal direction is typically assessed in a fairly straightforward way, 
that is to say, the media agenda is measured at time point 1 and correlated 
with the public agenda measured at time point 2. This is an important 
weakness (Kosicki, 1993), because causation involves more than mere 
covariation and time order (in the sense that the cause precedes the effect). 
Causality also implies control of other potential explanatory factors of the 
phenomenon under study, which is usually achieved in experimental 
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studies by randomization of participants in different treatment groups, 
perfect management of the experimental setting, and statistical control of 
intervening variables (in the case of survey research).  
In other words, in order to demonstrate a media effect (McLeod & 
Reeves, 1980; in Kosicki, 1993), four steps need to be taken: offer evidence 
about the media content that causes a particular effect; show that the 
people supposedly affected have been exposed to that content; control for 
extraneous variables, rule out competing causal explanations, and specify 
the mechanisms involved in the effect. The problem of causality will be a 
constant preoccupation throughout this thesis – I will try to deal with it in 
the best way possible.  
Direction of causality is also an issue in the field of political agenda-
setting. Several studies have shown that the media have (or are believed to 
have) an impact on the political agenda (see Walgrave & van Aelst, 2006; 
van Aelst et al., 2008; Strömbäck, 2011). In fact, time-series analysis of 
political agenda-setting shows that the media does have an impact on the 
political agenda, but the size of the effect is very small. However, studies 
focusing on politicians’ perceptions of media influence show that they tend 
to consider the media to be a key political agenda setter, sometimes as 
powerful as the prime minister (van Aelst & Walgrave, 2010; Strömbäck, 
2011). Nevertheless, other students of this phenomenon (e.g. Siune & Borre, 
1975; Wanta & Foote, 1994; Brandenburg, 2002; Ridout & Mellen, 2007) 
show that the relationship is the other way around, i.e. the TV and press 
respond to stimuli from (some) political parties, while their agendas are not 
influenced by the media outlets. Tedesco (2001) found reciprocal effects 
between candidate agendas (measured by press releases) and TV newscast 
agendas in the context of the 2002 US presidential primaries. 
Some authors therefore propose a dynamic understanding of agenda-
setting, since, in the same period, the media agenda might influence the 
public agenda on some issues and be influenced by this latter on some 
other issues (Anokwa & Salwen, 1988; Brosius & Kepplinger, 1990; Brosius 
& Weimann, 1996; Soroka, 2002). These studies are not a complete critique 
of the agenda-setting hypothesis, even because, having tested the 
diametrically opposite causal relation between media and public opinion, 
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fairly strong media effects on the public agenda were observed regarding 
certain issues. However, this research line calls attention to the fact that 
agenda-setting can be a dynamic phenomenon of interchangeable influence 
between the two agendas, and that a strong test of the agenda-setting 
hypothesis must include the test of the counter-hypothesis. The test of 
agenda-setting as a dynamic phenomenon is not possible in my work, since 
there is just one time point for the media agenda and one time point for the 
public agenda. Future research into agenda-setting from a comparative 
perspective, conducted in a context with more variety of information about 
media content and public opinion, should test this idea of interchangeable 
effects.  
A second line of criticism of the agenda-setting literature has to do 
with the fact that aggregate approaches have had, and still have, a 
monopoly in this field of research (Willnat, 1997). Roessler (1999) warns 
that aggregate studies risk incurring the ecological fallacy, that is to say, to 
use the relationships between two variables estimated on the basis of group 
means as an indication that, for each individual, the same relationship 
would be observed. In the case of agenda-setting, it is important not to 
forget that the existence of a strong relationship between the salience of 
issues in the media and its importance for the public agenda does not mean 
that every individual agenda reflects, in a standardized way, the coverage 
of the issues by the media. In this study, I will implement and test several 
strategies of data analysis, using mainly a general aggregate overview of 
the phenomenon but crossing it with individual-level perspectives. 
Comparing the results at different levels of analysis will shed additional 
light on the perks and perils of aggregationism and individualism in 
agenda-setting research, and provide a balanced picture of this 
phenomenon in Europe.  
 A third critique has to do with the national focus of the most every 
study of agenda-setting effects. Recently, agenda-setting research has been 
defined as “a bright spot in these scenarios of comparative news studies” 
(Holtz-Bacha & Kaid, 2011, p. 399), but this is not accurate. It is important 
to differentiate between the internationalization of a research idea, with 
studies being conducted in nations other than the US (see Holtz-Bacha & 
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Kaid, 2011; McCombs et al., 2011) and a genuine comparative research 
framework, in which several contexts are analysed at the same time, with 
truly comparable data and a single theoretical and methodological lens. 
Examples of the latter kind of research do not abound. An exception is the 
study by Peter (2003), which only found agenda-setting effects for the issue 
European Union in contexts where the political elite was not consensual 
about Europe.  
Most of the empirical literature on agenda-setting reports research 
focusing in one country. These studies are, of course, very interesting and 
contribute much to our understanding of the agenda-setting phenomenon, 
but they are unable to tackle the potential existence of variance on agenda-
setting magnitude between countries or outlets or the reasons that account 
for that variance. I therefore believe that research on agenda-setting needs 
to tackle this lack of knowledge on national-level moderators, and that the 
inclusion of media system dimensions in agenda-setting models may be 
one very fruitful path for research. The following chapter discusses this 
topic in detail.  
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3 
 
MEDIA SYSTEMS AND 
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 
“Most of the literature on the media is highly ethnocentric, in the sense 
that it refers only to the experience of a single country, yet it is written in 
general terms, as though the model that prevailed in the country were universal” 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p.2) 
 
 
 
Several authors suggest that media systems may have an important 
impact on the strength and nature of media effects (e.g. Noelle-Neuman, 
1973; Asp, 1983; Semetko et al., 1991; McCombs, 1994, 2004; Semetko & 
Mandelli, 1997; Semetko, de Vreese & Peter, 2000; Lawson & McCann, 2004; 
Peter, 2004; Strömbäck & Kaid, 2008; Strömbäck & Luengo, 2008). For 
instance, in 1999, Newton stated that media systems characteristics might 
be the reason why the results he draws from British case are different from 
the US-focused research. The author acknowledges the need for research 
tapping such a hypothesis but is aware that this “takes us into uncharted 
comparative water, which will probably have to be thoroughly explored 
before much more headway can be made on the issue of mass media 
effects” (p. 599).  Seven years later, the author still calls for a focus on the 
circumstances in which the media can have weaker or stronger effects, 
instead of a mere debate on whether they are a powerful force or not 
(Newton, 2006).   
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 To date, there have been very few empirical tests of the media 
system’s moderating role of media effects. In the case of the agenda-setting 
research, empirical studies are virtually non-existent. The main 
contribution of this thesis is, indeed, an effort to shed some light on the 
potential effects of media systems and their correlates on the strength of 
agenda-setting. In this context, media systems are believed to function as 
moderators of agenda-setting effects by means of the informational 
environment they create. The concept of media systems and the theoretical 
grounds for their importance in agenda-setting research are discussed in 
this chapter, as well as the informational environment variables considered 
relevant in this framework.  
3.1 The Concept of Media System  
3.1.1 Definition 
 
In this dissertation, a media system is a network of mass media 
outlets – television channels, press outlets (newspapers and magazines), 
radio and internet – that exist, interact and compete in a given geographical 
area, in a given time period, serving the same population, under the same 
legal framework, and facing identical political, economic and social 
constrains. Usually these geographic areas are countries but, when cultural 
and linguistic diversity calls for it, a single country may have two media 
systems (e.g. Belgium – Flanders and Wallonia). Moreover, when cultural 
and linguistic proximity allows it, a multi-country media system may arise 
(the phenomenon of Al Jazeera in the Middle East attests this possibility). 
Therefore, the focus of this analysis of media systems is placed at the 
macro-level (McQuail, 1992), while the meso-level (specific sectors, such as 
newspapers, radios or TV broadcasters) and the micro-level (a single media 
channel) are units of analysis that allow the characterization of the national 
media system as a whole.  
The idea of media systems as closed national entities may be 
unpopular in a contemporary, globalized world in which several 
publishing houses control newspapers or TV channels in more than one 
country: for instance, Axel Springer in Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, 
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Hungary and other nations; News Corporation in the USA, the UK, 
Australia and other nations; the RTL group in Germany, Luxembourg, 
Austria, the Netherlands and other countries (see Norris, 2009). However, 
in my opinion, it is still is analytically useful to take the national media 
system as an unit of analysis, since the process of external influence (i.e. 
Americanization in the case of Western European systems; Italianization or 
Mediterraneanization in the case of Central and Eastern European systems; 
see Dobek-Oustrowska & Glowacki, 2008) is surely not of equal dimension 
in all European nations39 and has probably not yet erased all the differences 
between systems. 
 The impact of media system characteristics on several relevant 
political attitudes and outcomes has seen some interest in the literature. For 
instance, Adserà, Boix & Payne (2000) found that newspaper circulation is 
positively related to overall quality of government, lack of corruption and 
government efficiency in consolidated democracies and negatively related 
to these outcomes in less democratic regimes. Moreover, Norris & Inglehart 
(2007) report a relationship between the restrictiveness of the media 
environment and regime support.  
 Regarding media system’s impact on political attitudes and 
behaviour, the evidence is considerable: van Kempen (2007) observed that 
media-party parallelism mobilizes disinterested citizens to vote; Popescu & 
Toka (2008) found that the diversity of media outlets in a country is related 
to informed voting; Curran et al. (2009) concluded that the degree of 
commercialization in the TV subsystem impacts the quality of the news and 
increases the gap between the political knowledge of the socially 
advantaged and that of the socially disadvantaged; and Aarts, Fladmoe & 
Strömbäck (2012) noted that in the UK newspaper exposure did not have 
an impact on political trust or political knowledge, whereas its impact in 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Flanders (democratic corporativist systems) 
was consistent. Moreover, freedom of the press is correlated with several 
political and democratic outcomes (Becker & Vlad, 2010).  
                                                 
39
 For instance, the phenomenon of daily newspapers owned by foreign companies 
is quite strong in Hungary, Bulgaria and Czech Republic but not observable in 
Slovenia (Terzis, 2007).  
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 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that media system 
characteristics might also play a role in agenda-setting – a phenomenon 
that is linked both to learning about the relevant issues in the social sphere 
and decision-making in the political realm, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter.  
3.1.2 A History of Theoretical Models 
 
Several models of media systems have been proposed in the last 50 
years. One of the first attempts to deal with all the variability in the media 
systems throughout the world was the book Four Theories of the Press 
(Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956). This work proposes four types of 
media systems, departing from the idea that the social and political 
structures (in particular, the mechanisms of social control) strongly shape 
press systems. These types are the libertarian model (characterized by 
unregulated press, partisan and advocate journalists), the social 
responsibility model (including public broadcasting, press subsidies and 
right-to-reply laws), the authoritarian model (strong and direct government 
control over public broadcasters and press) and the soviet model (identical 
to the authoritarian model, but linked to the communist ideology).  
I find this model historically relevant, but scarcely useful. Seibert and 
his colleagues published a mainly theoretical work, as its title announces; 
the empirical cases quoted (the United States, Britain and USSR) are not 
sufficient to make it a strong comparative analysis of media systems; and 
this framework was heavily influenced by the Cold War era in which it was 
produced (see Norris, 2009). Considering how much media systems are 
prone to change along with shifts in technology and politics, a taxonomy 
proposed 50 years ago is immensely dated.  
In fact, some of the four types suggested could not be traced 
nowadays in European Union’s member-States – the authoritarian model, 
typical of pre-democratic societies, is absent from a set of countries in 
which democracy is “the only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5).  In 
addition, the soviet model vanished from Europe in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the USSR. Moreover, the media are seen by these authors 
strictly as «dependent variables», in the sense that any change in the media 
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structure is a consequence of the system of social and political control. 
Therefore, the possibility that the media can have an impact on itself and 
on the political and social realm is not considered (for an extensive critique 
of this theory see Hardy, 2008). However, despite these and other points of 
criticism, this work continues to be a major reference in the field (de 
Smaele, 1999). 
In 1975, Blumler & Gurevitch proposed four dimensions to analyse 
the connections between the media and political institutions: the degree of 
state control over media organizations, the level of mass media 
partisanship, the degree of integration between media and political elites 
and the nature of the legitimizing creed of media institutions – or the role 
of journalists in society (see Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995). This model is very 
useful even in today’s media reality, and has inspired recent theoretical 
work on the subject, as we shall see below.  
Some years later, Martin & Chaudhary (1983) published their model 
of three media systems around the world, based on their perception of 
different mass media panoramas in Western, Communist and Third World 
countries. This work is not very useful for the purposes of this dissertation, 
for three reasons. First, it is outdated – portraying the media world that 
existed thirty years ago – and thus hardly adaptable to the current 
European panorama. Second, to propose a global taxonomy of media 
systems with just three categories is, as Hallin & Mancini (2004) would put 
it, like making a photo with too much contrast – the differences between 
the members of a single category and the similarities between the members 
of different categories are underestimated. In other words, the categories 
are just not useful at all. Thirdly, this work is ideologically biased, in the 
sense that is uses a framework and a vocabulary that is tied to political 
stances (Varis, 1986), which means that the use of the dimensions at the 
base of Martin & Chaudhary’s (1983) work would probably reproduce that 
bias in my own research.  Several other models produced in the 1980s tend 
to suffer from the same problem (see Jakubowicz, 2010, for a review of 
these theories).  
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In 2004, Pippa Norris proposed a typology of global media systems 
characterized by two orthogonal dimensions – freedom of press 
(operationalized by the Freedom House indicator, created on the basis of a 
comprehensive definition of press freedom) and access to media (measured 
by an indicator computed with data about newspaper circulation, radio 
receivers and television sets, online population and internet hosts). 
However, if one wants to carry out a comparative study of agenda-setting 
in western countries, the typology proposed by Norris (2004) would lead to 
a low degree of variance, since the majority of the countries belonging to 
the European Union and their neighbours would be placed in the free media/ 
widespread access category. Therefore, a set of analytical variables that 
allows for a more fine-grained picture of Europe is needed.  
A valuable model of media systems was proposed eight years ago by 
Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, in the book Comparing Media Systems 
(2004). They studied the media systems of 16 Western European Countries 
and North America, assessing them according to four dimensions – the 
degree of development of media markets (in particular mass circulation 
press), political parallelism (connections between media and interest 
groups, such as political parties), the development of journalistic 
professionalization, and the level of state intervention in the media system.  
Based on the variation that these four dimensions presented in the 18 
countries under study, Hallin & Mancini (2004) proposed three models of 
media systems. The first one is the Polarized Pluralist Model, or 
Mediterranean model, which is characterized by low levels of press market 
development and journalist professionalization, as well as high levels of 
state intervention and political parallelism between media outlets and 
political parties. This system would be observable in Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, and, to a lesser extent, France. The second is the Democratic 
Corporativist Model, which scores high on the four criteria and is 
characteristic of Western and Northern Europe. The third is the Liberal 
Model, which would be present in the US, Canada, Britain and Ireland, 
presents a highly developed press, a highly professionalized journalistic 
body, and low levels of political parallelism and state intervention (Figure 
3.1; Table 3.1).  
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Table 3.1 – The Three Models of Media Systems Described 
 (Adapted from Hallin & Mancini, 2004) 
 Polarized 
Pluralist 
Democratic 
Corporatist 
Liberal 
Development of Mass Press Low High High 
Political Parallelism High High Low 
Professionalization Low High High 
State Intervention High High Low 
    
 
The authors also address the political system correlates of these 
media models (the role of the state, the nature of formal political systems, 
the role of interest groups, rational-legal authority vs. clientelism, and 
moderate vs. polarized pluralism). For instance, they draw a relationship 
between late democratization, clientelism and the media system 
characteristics of the countries in the Mediterranean model. But historical 
factors that have an impact on political systems are also believe to be linked 
to differences in the media realm: language proximity, historical and 
economic connections, or religious denomination and its impact on 
values/literacy rates are believed to be on the basis of the intra-group 
similarities in the Democratic Corporatist and Polarized Pluralist clusters 
(see also Papathanassopoulos, 2007; Weibull, 2007). 
Hallin & Mancini (2004) are reluctant to use the models as boxes in 
which to insert the European countries, underlining the considerable 
imprecision in allocating countries to what they understand to be ideal-
types. However, they end up doing this anyway, opening space for one of 
the main points of criticism levelled at their work (e.g. McQuail, 2006). The 
other line of criticism regards scope. The book Comparing Media Systems 
does not include the 12 most recent member states of the EU, most of which 
are Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. In the last 20 years, 
those nations have shifted from a strictly defined communist model to 
undefined post-communist models. This phenomenon might represent an 
approximation to some European models (Shlesinger, 1995, in de Smaele, 
1999), or the creation of hybrids, mixing the ideal-types proposed by Hallin 
& Mancini in 2004 (Školkay, 2008; see also Voltmer 2008, 2012; Elvestad & 
Blekesaune, 2008).  
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Figure 3.1 – Eighteen Countries Placed in the Three Models of Media Systems  
(Adapted from Hallin & Mancini, 2004) 
 
   Polarized Pluralist Model 
 
Democratic Corporativist Model                                                                                           Liberal Model 
 
An educated guess would state that the model by Hallin & Mancini 
(2004) that is closest to the media realities in those countries is the Polarized 
Pluralist or Mediterranean model; in fact, it takes just a glance at the 
political system correlates of this model (late democratization, clientelism, 
weak rational legal authority, dirigisme as state role) to see the similarities 
between the central and Eastern countries and third-wave democracies 
(Huntington, 1991) such as Portugal, Greece and Spain (Wyka, 2008).  
However, the analysis of the actual media system characteristics 
offers a more complex picture. For instance, de Smaele (1999) underlines 
the differences between the Central European and the Southeastern 
countries, and speculates about the possibility of the first group of media 
systems being more European (i.e. more easily integrated into the existing 
models) than the second group. Blum (2005, in Jakubowicz, 2010) 
hypothesizes that some eastern European countries might resemble 
Southern Europe, specially due to their populist-oriented TV sector and 
elitist press markets, whereas states such as Estonia would be closer to 
Northern European countries characterized by a public service orientation 
 83
both in the broadcasting and print media.40 The idea that the Baltic States 
and most of Central Europe are closer to the Democratic Corporatist model 
is also present in Hallin & Mancini´s (2004) concluding notes. Moreover, 
Romania is pointed out as being a very problematic media system, 
characterized by corruption and a feudal spirit (Gross, 2008; Coman, 2009), 
which detaches it from the general pattern of media in democratic Europe. 
Finally, Poland would stand exactly between the Polarized Pluralist and 
the Liberal model, being an example of an interesting mix of polarization 
and commercialization (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012).  
Three recently published books attest to the relevance of expanding 
the media system theories to Eastern Europe and/or to the entire World 
(Dobek-Ostrowska & Glowacki, 2008; Dobek-Ostrowska et al., 2010; Hallin 
& Mancini, 2012). These books collect a series of essays on media systems in 
polities as distinct as the CEE countries, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 
Lebanon, South-Africa and Brazil. Those countries are believed to be 
associated with the polarized pluralist model, albeit representing an 
extreme example of the model or presenting also characteristics from other 
models: for instance, the Polish, Russian and Lebanese-Saudi systems 
would also have (for different reasons) liberal characteristics; Israel is 
believed to be closer to the liberal models, as far as its national security 
issue allows, whereas the South-African and the Baltic countries are 
thought to incorporate liberal, democratic corporative and polarized 
pluralistic characteristics (Albuquerque, 2012; Balcytiene, 2012; de Smaele, 
2010; Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012; Hadland, 2010, 2012; Kraidy, 2012; Peri, 
2012; Uce & de Swert, 2010; Vartanova, 2012; Wyka, 2008). 
The results of such essays are interesting but some of their 
conclusions are still tentative (mainly due to research agenda and data 
comparability reasons). Most of these essays do not try to expand Hallin & 
Mancini’s model, but just analyse a specific country or countries in the light 
of this model. Borrowing the words of Pippa Norris, they still “follow the 
older Grand Tour travelogue tradition (‘if it’s chapter 4, it’s Belgium’) by 
                                                 
40 This idea is not corroborated by Balcytiene (2012), who describes the Baltic 
public media as weak, its actors as working in a profit-oriented fashion, and the 
“media logic” as prevaling, even if some arrangements in terms of media self-
regulation and PBS independence are present. 
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presenting separate national cases studies, loosely integrated around some 
common organizational sub-headings” (2009, p. 322). In sum, research on 
the media systems in Europe – focusing at least on the EU27 – is needed to 
shed light on where the CEE countries stand. 
 Even though it is not free from shortcomings and criticism (see, for 
instance, McQuail, 2006; Bardoel, 2007; Norris, 2009), the model proposed 
by Hallin & Mancini (2004) is the most accomplished academic study of 
media systems in Europe published so far – therefore, it inspires much of 
the research that will be conducted for this thesis. Since “there is nothing 
more practical than a good theory” (Lewin, 1952, p. 169), Hallin & 
Mancini´s (2004) taxonomy constitutes an excellent framework for the 
empirical study of media systems in Europe. It is worth noting that Hallin 
& Mancini (2004) only provide a general overview of the media system 
realities in Europe, rather than attempting to operationalize the four 
dimensions with empirical indicators, which is seen as a major flaw in their 
work (Norris, 2009). With the research reported in this thesis, I also aim at 
contributing to solve this gap in their work.  
In my research, I do not use Hallin & Mancini’s findings to divide the 
European member states in three groups, according to their connection 
with a media system model.  The study by Aarts, Fladmoe & Stömbäck 
(2012) – or the general pattern of results discussed in Aalberg & Curran 
(2012) – are good examples of how disappointing it can be to study 
countries as ideal-types according to the media system category assigned to 
them by Hallin & Mancini (2004). Instead of making no distinctions 
between countries in each category, I prefer to analyse the dimensions 
proposed by these authors as independent, actually intervening, factors of 
interest.   
Therefore, Hallin & Mancini’s (2004) work is important for my 
research in the sense that it draws attention to four distinct features of 
media systems whose indirect impact on agenda-setting is, in theory, fairly 
probable, but has not yet been empirically tested. In the next section, these 
features, as well as dimensions coming from other taxonomies (i.e., Norris, 
2004), and their expected outcomes will be discussed.  
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3.2 Relevant Features of Media Systems 
 
 The properties of national media systems are believed to influence 
both the supply of news and the public awareness of events in the news 
(Iyengar et al., 2010). In this section, I discuss those that are, in my opinion 
and from an agenda-setting perspective, the most relevant properties: 
development of media markets, strength of the public TV systems, freedom 
of press, journalist professionalization and internal/external diversity of 
political viewpoints in the media.  
3.2.1 Development of Media Markets 
 
The concept of development of the media market is, in Hallin & 
Mancini´s (2004) book, basically debated with reference to the mass 
circulation press. According to these authors, a developed media market is 
one where the mass circulation press has been in existence long enough to 
create habits of consumption amongst different quadrants of the 
population.  
Developed press markets have known massification in the late 19th 
century/early 20th century, and nowadays display a high level of 
newspaper circulation. In those contexts, the target of the press is the 
general population (instead of the political, economic or social elite), and 
there are no gender differences in newspaper readership, but similar 
patterns of consumption of electronic media and press (instead of a clear 
predominance of the latter), a clear separation between 
sensationalist/tabloid and quality press (instead of a clear predominance of 
the latter), and a reasonable number of media outlets (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004).  
In sum, a developed press system is found wherever the press is ipsis 
verbis a mass media; the degree of development of this system generates a 
divide between citizens living in countries where the consumption of press 
outputs is still exclusive and those living in contexts where it is common; 
between those residing in countries in which the media supply is restricted 
and those placed in contexts where supply is wider. 
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There are great differences in terms of newspaper readership in 
Europe, with lower levels of readership in Southern Europe than in 
Scandinavia; interestingly, the average number of minutes per day 
dedicated to newspaper reading is higher in Ireland, Norway and Finland 
(more than 40 minutes), than in Portugal, Spain or Greece (less than 20 
minutes) (Elvestad & Blekesaune, 2008). Eight years earlier, Pippa Norris 
(2000) observed similar patterns, and concluded that, in Northern and 
Western Europe, the advent of audiovisual media has not provoked any 
kind of decay in the realm of printed media.41 In those countries, 
flourishing newspaper markets still exist.  
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) focus on press – and neglect of television, 
radio and internet – could be pointed to as one shortcoming of their 
conceptualization of media market development (Norris, 2009). Other 
scholars proposed a more complete interpretation of this concept – for 
instance, in her analysis of politically relevant dimensions of media 
systems, Norris (2004) introduces the concept of access to media, which is 
similar to this concept of development of media markets but includes 
television, radio and internet.  
From a strictly theoretical perspective, either the narrow or the long 
version of the concept of development of media markets could moderate 
the cognitive effects of the media, because they refer directly to the degree 
of availability of different media agendas. The degree of development of 
press markets might be important for agenda-setting research because it 
might impact on the agenda-setting power of the press vis-à-vis the 
television through habits of exposure. I expect that someone living in an 
underdeveloped press market (in which access is difficult, what is offered 
is less diverse and the habit of newspaper reading are not deeply rooted) 
will read newspapers less often (and be less influenced by their agendas) 
than someone living in a developed press market (in which access is easy, 
offer is diverse and the habit of reading newspapers is widespread), 
                                                 
41
 This would prove that media consumption is not a zero-sum game in which the 
widespread consumption of a specific medium necessarily means a complete 
avoidance of others. 
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because for the latter it is easier/more common to consult newspaper 
sources to form their picture of the world. 
A different hypothesis can be made about the development of the 
audiovisual market – in countries where the television offer is wide, the 
single TV channel’s agenda-setting power should be weaker. Why? Because 
the amount of choice in the TV market is believed to be associated with 
lower exposure to news (Prior, 2007), and lower patterns of exposure 
usually mean weaker media effects. While levels of development of the 
press market are believed to increase news consumption, the opposite 
phenomenon is expected in the case of TV markets, due to the nature and 
role of this type of medium. In fact, while newspapers offer news to the 
readers (independently of their relevance for policy and political choices), 
TV channels may offer contents that have nothing to do with news: films, 
fiction, contents for children, sports, music, home shopping, etc.  
Therefore, in high-choice environments the proportion of people that 
watch the news, or the frequency of TV news consumption, is probably 
much lower than in low-choice environments (Prior, 2007). Why? In high-
choice settings people with stronger preferences for entertainment can 
switch from newscasts to entertainment shows, whereas in low-choice 
environments these entertainment fans may decide to watch the news show 
anyway, instead of turning the television off, because they enjoy watching 
television. In other words, there is a stronger negative relationship between 
preference for entertainment and exposure to news in high-choice 
environments (for instance, households with cable) than in low-choice 
settings (Prior, 2007).  
In addition, the development of press and TV markets may be 
associated with the diversity of the media agendas in the country, i.e., the 
degree by which different outlets give equal space to issues. Semekto and 
colleagues (1991) believe that the power of the media to set the agenda can 
vary according to the degree of competition for media audiences: 
competition, which is higher in contexts composed by several media actors) 
should lead to more attention to the audience’s interests and less attention 
to politicians’ agendas, but we do not know if this may result in more 
homogeneous or diverse agendas. The diversity of the media agendas is 
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thought to be an important intervening variable in the agenda-setting 
phenomenon (Asp, 1983; McCombs, 2005).   
There are almost no comparative studies testing the relationship 
between the development of the press market and strength of media 
effects. An exception to this is the work by Popescu & Toka (2008), which 
analysed the impact of the effective number of newspapers42 on the press’s 
informational power and the influence of the effective number of television 
news shows on its power as well. Lastly, other authors have drawn 
attention to the potential role of the press market development, in the form 
of theoretical speculations and discussion of single-case studies (e.g. 
Schmitt-Beck, 2004; Santana Pereira, 2007).  
3.2.2 Strength of Public TV 
 
My understanding of PBS strength/commercialization is rooted in 
the concept of state intervention, which is present in the seminal work by 
Siebert, Peterson & Schramm (1956). In fact, the most important difference 
between the libertarian, the social responsibility and the 
authoritarian/soviet models is that the first is characterized by non-formal 
relationship between state and media, whereas the second implies an 
interaction between the two and the latter a strong intervention of the state. 
This factor, renamed degree of state control over mass media organizations, is 
also present in the Blumler & Gurevitch´s (1995) analytical framework. 
According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), the strongest form of state 
intervention in the media system is state ownership, followed by state 
funding and legal regulation as weaker types of intervention. Blumler and 
Gurevitch (1995) also take into account the appointment of governing 
bodies of public service media.  
I will focus my interest on the first two indicators to grasp the 
strength of public television vis-à-vis commercial TV. It is true that state 
regulation, in terms of laws regulating secondary aspects of media content 
(anti-libel, anti-hate speech, pro-political pluralism) and regulations about 
                                                 
42
 These authors adapted the equation at the basis of Laakso & Taagepera’s (1979) 
Effective Number of Parties index, substituting the information on parties’ vote 
share with information about newspapers’ readership share/TV news shows 
audience share. 
 89
media ownership, concentration and competition (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), 
could, theoretically speaking, produce a belief in the fairness of the system 
and lead to high levels of trust in the media, with subsequent effects on 
agenda-setting. Moreover, the degree of government control over PBS 
could be connected with a weaker political impartiality and have also 
impact in terms of media trust.   
However, since legal regulation and PBS ruling bodies’ independence 
are tackled by the concept of press freedom as I operationalize it, this 
section will focus only on the degree of public broadcast funding and 
audience. In turn, ownership and funding are used as indicators of the 
relative strength of public media, or, from the other side of the coin, the 
relative commercialization/privatization of the market. Therefore, my 
interpretation of Hallin & Mancini´s (2004) dimension of state intervention 
is covered by this and the following section.  
The concept of commercialization is strictly connected with the realm 
of broadcasting. To start with, the most important form of state ownership 
of the media is public broadcasting. In Europe, it is not common for the 
state to own news agencies, newspapers and other media companies, either 
directly or through public enterprises (Djankov et al., 2003; Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004; see also Färdigh, 2010). Several authors therefore stress the 
irrelevance of speaking of commercial vs. public ownership and funding of 
the press in Europe. I  follow the same line of reasoning.  
Thirty years ago, the state had a monopoly on broadcasting in the 
majority of European countries, but nowadays commercial broadcasting is 
present all over Europe (Semetko, de Vreese & Peter, 2000; Kelly, 
Mazzoneli & McQuail, 2004), and public service television/radio vary in 
the degree to which they attract audiences. However, the 
commercialization ‘spree’ did not occur simultaneously across Europe: 
while the UK had a private competitor to the BBC since the 1950s, most 
European markets have had a public television monopoly until the 1980s 
(e.g. Italy, the Netherlands) and early 1990s (e.g. Portugal, most Central 
and Eastern European countries) (Aart & Semetko, 2003; Voltmer, 2000; 
Popescu, 2008).   
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In established democracies, state-owned media are seen as 
performing the public service of informing the population in a complete 
and accurate way (e.g.: Kriesi, 2004; Schmitt-Beck, 2004). This is probably 
because they are more or less directly in the hands of a democratically 
appointed power, whereas private media are run by owners without the 
same kind of relationship with, and duties towards, the general population. 
Such a line of reasoning might lead to higher degrees of trust in the media 
in general in democratic systems where public broadcasting is strong, and 
therefore a greater potential for media effects. It is from this assumption 
that the inclusion of this factor in my analysis derives, but with the nuance 
of distinguishing between the symbolic meaning of state ownership in old 
and new democracies in Europe.  
In Europe, the public service broadcasting system would follow a 
model characterized by an ethic of comprehensiveness (information, 
education, entertainment; geographical universality), generalised mandates 
(that bounds them to their mission of catering for al interests and tastes), 
diversity, pluralism and range, non-commercialism and a place in politics 
marked by a contribution to the quality of the democratic process and the 
independence from political and governmental interests (Blumler, 1992; 
BRU, 1986, both quoted in Humphreys, 1996). Of course, there are 
significant differences in how perfectly public broadcasters embody this 
ideal model (see Hanretty, 2011, for a study on the diversity of PBS 
independence in Europe).  
 Nonetheless, if the geographic scope of the research is wider, the 
role of public ownership tends to be interpreted in a different way. In fact, 
Djankov et al. (2003) are less enthusiastic about state ownership. In a study 
of countries far beyond the Western world, they found that countries with 
more prevalent state ownership of the media have less free press, fewer 
political rights for citizens, inferior governance, less developed markets, 
and strikingly inferior outcomes in the areas of education and health. Those 
results were stronger for newspapers than for television ownership. The 
authors also report no detectable evidence of any benefits of stronger state 
ownership of the media. They are defenders of a strong division between 
public and private – in their view, a government monopoly in the media 
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would distort and manipulate information to entrench the incumbent 
government, preclude voters and consumers from making informed 
decisions, and ultimately undermine both democracy and markets. Because 
private and independent media supply alternative views to the public, they 
are believed to enable voters and consumers to choose among political 
candidates, commodities, and securities – with less fear of abuse by 
unscrupulous politicians, producers, and promoters. Of course, these ideas 
are relevant in an international study focusing on established democracies 
and non-democratic countries, but lack relevance in a context where all 
countries are democratic (as is the case in my work) and where state 
newspaper ownership is not a common situation.  
 Accordingly, but in the realm of individual-level studies, Leeson 
(2007) observed a negative relationship between state intervention and 
media effects (other than agenda-setting), but this is most certainly due to 
the fact that the author has not differentiated between consolidated and 
new democracies, and his sample was skewed by a greater number of new 
democracies. 
 In democratic regimes, the public broadcasters seem to have an 
important impact in terms of individual-level dimensions. Curran et al. 
(2009) and Iyengar et al. (2010) found relevant differences in media content 
according to the weight of public service television – namely, public service 
devotes more time to hard news on public affairs and fosters more political 
knowledge. In addition, Aarts & Semetko (2003) suggest that the 
phenomenon of the virtuous circle43 described by Norris (2000, 2002) may be 
found only in European societies in which people rely largely on public 
television news; whereas the spiral of cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997) 
can be a product of commercial television news viewing, because 
commercial news focuses more on framing politics as a tactical power 
game than public television (Patterson, 2000). Accordingly, the spiral of 
Euroskepticism is seen as conditional upon the amount of strategic framing 
present in the news, which varies considerably between countries (de 
                                                 
43 This refers to the fact that people who are more politically aware watch the news 
and current affairs documentaries on public TV more frequently, and, in turn, 
repeated exposure to these programmes will increase their levels of civic 
information (Norris, 2000, 2002).  
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Vreese, 2007) and media outlets (Elenbaas & de Vreese, 2008). Lastly, 
empirical research has shown that the less commercialized a particular 
media system is, the less politics will be portrayed as a game instead of a 
set of issues (Patterson, 2000). Reporting of polls – stressing the idea of 
elections as competitions – will be lower in those conditions (Lavrakas & 
Traugott, 2000, in Strömbäck & Kaid, 2008). 
 The literature presented above would therefore lead us to believe 
that, if TV market commertialization will have an impact on agenda-
setting, that impact will be negative and mediated by trust and quality of 
information. In other words, commercialization would lead to weaker 
agenda-setting effects because it decreases the general levels of trust and 
quality in the system (or the quality of the information conveyed by the TV 
channels in particular). Moreover, the lack of quality in the information 
conveyed by those channels acts as a buffer of agenda-setting effects: either 
because people automatically create barriers against being influenced that 
kind or information or because they believe that these contents, in spite of 
being interesting to watch, are not useful to learn about issue salience. 
Trust in the media is also a moderator of agenda-setting effects.  
3.2.3 Freedom of Press 
 
The freedom of press, one of the pillars of democracy, is a recognized 
human right. Article 19 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
including freedom to hold opinions and to seek, receive, and impart 
information and ideas through any media.44  
Freedom of press has been and still is a concern of the European 
Union and several international organizations (Behmer, 2009; Czepek, 
Hellvig & Novak, 2009); it is present in a considerable amount of 
constitutions throughout the World: even if there are differences in 
terminology or degree, press freedom was guaranteed in 148 out of 160 
                                                 
44 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, produced and proclaimed in 1948 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations, is available online at the United 
Nations website. See http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a19.  
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nations in 1994 (Breunig, 1994, in Behmer, 2009). In 1992, UNESCO 
proclaimed May 3 as the World Press Freedom Day.  
 But what does press freedom mean exactly? Weaver (1977) 
considers that freedom of the press has three components: the relative 
absence of government restraints on the media, the relative absence of 
nongovernmental restraints, and the existence of conditions that guarantee 
the dissemination of diverse opinions and ideas to large audiences. My 
operationalization of press freedom will follow these lines, focusing on 
political, economic and legal constraints on the freedom of press.  
 Press freedom is important because “journalism needs to be 
independent from the state, but also from overwhelming economic 
interests to provide diverse, complete and correct information to the 
citizens and enable universal participation in public discourse” (Czepek, 
2009, p. 37). According to Norris (2004), freedom of press is one of the two 
most politically relevant dimensions of media systems, because it  “can be 
expected to influence whether the impact of the news media promotes 
pluralistic voice and government accountability, or how far it serves to 
reinforce the power of established interest and state control.” (p. 125). In 
fact, freedom of press is negatively related to corruption and political 
longevity of office holders (Besley & Prat, 2001, in Becker, Vlad & Nusser, 
2007; Brunetti & Weder, 2003).  
 In my case, the relevance of press freedom comes from the fact that 
it might impact upon the degree of trust people hold in media; 
consequently, trust can play a role as a moderator of media effects, since 
people are more frequently influenced by messages delivered by what they 
perceive to be trustworthy sources (Hovland, 1954). In fact, the openness of 
the media system – that is to say, the degree to which media are in fact 
independent sources of news and political expression free from the control 
of the government – is believed to be correlated with stronger media effects 
on the public agenda (McCombs, 2004; McCombs et al., 2011). 
The effects seem to be the opposite in the case of persuasion. The 
existence of press freedom, even in a small degree, makes it impossible for 
the media to present a dominant single message – some degree of diversity 
(either internal or external) must be present. Persuasive media effects are 
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larger when there is one dominant message consistently and strongly 
presented over time (a consistent directional bias leading to a one sided 
information flow, in the words of Zaller, 1992, 1996), and fairly small when 
at least two competitive and distinct flows of information are present 
(Zaller, 1996). A study of media effects on EU support, by de Vreese & 
Baoomgaarden (2006a) confirms this assumption. However, an alternative 
but complementary explanation might exist: fluidity. Popescu (2008) 
observed that freedom of press fostered a negative relationship between 
media bias and vote for incumbents in more fluid contexts. The author 
explains this by the fact that, in the case of democratic countries marked by 
some degree of fluidity, partisan bias is spotted, analysed, criticized and 
noted in other media, discussion networks or individual citizens, and 
voters end up turning against the government.  
The history of press freedom varies considerably in Europe, with 
Sweden, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark as pioneers 
(Weibull, 2007), whereas Southern European and Eastern countries were 
only able to get rid of censorship quite recently. Moreover, the current 
legal, economic, historical and social characteristics of each European 
nation are also believed to cause, directly or indirectly, different degrees of 
press freedom (Czepek, Hellvig & Novak, 2009). Therefore, there is reason 
to believe that in 2009 the status quo of press freedom was not uniform 
within the European Union borders.   
3.2.4 Journalist Professionalization 
 
Variations in the degree of journalist professionalization are, 
according to Hallin & Mancini (2004), one of the four most relevant features 
distinguishing between European media systems. But what do these 
authors mean by this expression? Simply put, journalist professionalization 
is the degree by which the practice of journalism reached the level of a 
profession. This is not meant in the traditional sense of being grounded on 
a body of specialized knowledge achieved by means of formal and 
specialized education and training (see Novak, 2009), but essentially in the 
sense of having a relative degree of autonomy within the media 
organization (Siebert, Peterson & Schamm, 1956), a low level of 
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instrumentalization by external actors (political, economical, religious and 
others), an internal code of professional norms (concerning ethical issues 
but also practical routines), an orientation towards an ideal of public 
service, and regulation by the sanction of fellow professionals through 
professional associations.  
Therefore, the more journalists have impersonal rules which govern 
and – more important – are seen to govern their conduct, the more they will 
be able to resist political pressure and stress their independent role as 
information providers.  And this can boost the impact of their work in the 
opinions of the audiences they serve, either by raising levels of trust in the 
media or by increasing the quality of the information that is offered. 
Laitila (1995) undertook an analysis of journalistic codes of ethics 
currently in use in 30 European countries (including all EU member states, 
except for Cyprus, Romania and Lithuania). Most of these documents were 
adopted by the journalists themselves (organized in unions or associations) 
and came into existence (as new or revised documents) in the 1990s. The 
author found that the most common principles present in those documents 
are those that more directly relate to the tripartite nature of media ethics: 
the quest for truth (truthfulness and clarity of information; considerations 
about fair ways of gathering and presenting the information); the desire for 
responsibility (the defence of the rights of the public; journalist and source 
integrity, the responsibility as creators of public opinion) and the quest for 
free expression. Most of these ethical issues are also present in UNESCO’s 
list of professional ethics in journalism (Nordenstreng, 1984).  
Professionalization is, to a certain extent, connected to (or displayed 
by means of) journalistic styles. There are several models of journalism in 
the field of communication studies. Focusing on the United States, Bernard 
Cohen (1963) divided journalists into neutral and participant styles, 
whereas Dobek-Ostrowska & Lódzki (2011) recently analysed the dominant 
style of journalism during the 2009 European Parliament campaign, using a 
descriptive vs. interpretative framework.  
Other studies of national differences in terms of journalist behaviour 
suggest two relevant dimensions of journalism – autonomy/freedom as a 
political actor (passive instrument of political actors vs. active and 
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independent journalist) and position/voice as political actor (neutral vs. 
advocate of specific sides in a consistent and systematic way) (Patterson, 
1998; Donsbach & Patterson, 2004). The first of these dimensions is related 
to Hallin & Mancini´s (2004) conception of journalist professionalization, 
which I adopt here; the second has more to do with the notion of 
journalistic or media partisanship. Professionalization and partisanship are 
related (in quantitative terms, they are probably negatively correlated), and 
often described as being different extremes of the same dimension of 
journalism behaviour – journalists can either be closer to professionalism or 
to partisanship (e.g. Dennis, 1997). However, as the research by Hallin & 
Mancini (2004) and Donsbach & Patterson (2004) show, this relationship is 
not strong enough to make us deal with both concepts as belonging to a 
single construct.  
In Europe, it seems that journalist professionalization – in terms of 
legitimizing creed (Blumler & Gurevicht, 1995) or symbolic role of the 
journalist as an ideal-type professional – varies considerably. German 
journalism follows a model in which this profession is seen as a political 
and intellectual career, and journalists tend to place much value and use 
much space on their opinion and less on the actual news. By contrast, 
British journalists see themselves in the role of transmitter of facts, neutral 
reporters of current affairs (Köcher, 1986). On the other hand, in the French 
media system, the relationship between journalists and candidates is one of 
cooperation, and the politicians have more voice in the news than the news 
professionals (Esser, 2008). The norm and the habit of indexing45 is likely to 
be rather strong in this media system.   
In addition, there can be some degree of intra-system variation in 
terms of journalists’ attitudes and their outcomes in terms of 
professionalization. For instance, considering the US context of the early 
1980s, a researcher hypothesized that journalists evaluate public opinion in 
                                                 
45 Indexing understands variation in elite consensus as the main cause of variation 
in news content (Bennett, 1989). According to indexing, “controversy and debate in 
media content reproduces the debate found among political elites whom 
journalists regard as decisive in the outcomes of the issues in the news” 
(Livingston & Bennett, 2003, p. 366). In 1996, the journal Political Communication 
published a special issue on this matter.  
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different ways, ranging from an elitist perspective (in which public opinion 
is seen as ignorant, foolish and short-sighted) to a simple-democratic 
perspective, which sees people as informed, interested and altruistic 
(Lemert, 1981). Of course, such attitudes must have an impact on how 
professional journalists are. Unfortunately, this possibility will not be dealt 
with in this study, due to the lack of data. The assumption is that this intra-
country diversity will level out at the country level.  
Journalist professionalization is believed to be strongly connected to 
press freedom, and is seen by some researchers as a dimension of this latter 
construct, its cause or its effect (e.g., Czepek, 2009; Novak, 2009). For 
instance, economic constraints to the functions of media workers (i.e. the 
strength of the profit maximization logic due to increasing 
commercialization and concentration), is believed to be eroding journalist 
professionalization in Finland (Salovaara-Moring, 2009).  
3.2.5 Partisanship/Balance 
 
 In most European countries, balance and impartiality are generally 
accepted norms on television, and to a lesser degree, the press (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004; Gunther & Mughan, 2000). However, the degree to which 
this impartiality actually exists is believed to vary considerably even in 
democratic countries such as the EU member states. Media partisanship is 
an undeniable reality in Europe.    
 Why is partisanship important? Because it can, along with other 
media characteristics, contribute to a poor information environment. 
Noelle-Neumann (1973) argues that there are three features of the mass 
media in contemporary democratic societies that can lead to strong media 
persuasive effects – ubiquity, consonance and cumulation. Media are 
ubiquitous because they are available everywhere to everyone interested in 
using them for information and entertainment; cumulation refers to the 
continuous coverage of issues for a long time; whereas consonance refers to 
the tendency of journalists and communicators to use similar viewpoints 
and emphasis when reporting a specific issue or event.  
Why do these factors, in connection with partisan bias, lead to strong 
media effects? According to Shaw (1979), they increase media’s impact on 
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the formation of public opinion “by reducing, if not eliminating, the 
chances people have to practice selective exposure when they use the mass 
media”(p. 103). Peter (2004) has indeed observed that consonant contexts 
led to strong media effects, and stresses the fact that selectivity is a 
possibility in dissonant contexts but that it is much harder to avoid 
undesired messages in consonant contexts.  
 The concept of media political partisanship (or media pluralism, the 
other side of the same coin) is therefore central for the understanding of 
media systems and media effects. It has been present in comparative 
analyses of media communication since the 1970s (Seymour-Ure, 1974, in 
van Kempen, 2007; Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995). It is also a very complex 
concept, whose conceptual interpretations are rich and diverse (see, for 
instance, Klimkiewicz, 2009, for a review of the concept of media 
pluralism). 
Hallin & Mancini (2004) analyse the idea of media partisanship under 
the more general umbrella of political parallelism. Inspired by Seymour-
Ure’s study of the British press, the authors define this latter concept in two 
ways, the first definition being system-focused – “the extent to which the 
media system reflects the major political divisions in society” – and the 
second outlet-focused – “the degree and nature of the links between the 
media and political parties” (p.21).  Since they were conducting an analysis 
of media systems, the outcome of their study is basically the placement of 
the media system (i.e. the country at stake) on a continuum between two 
poles: high and low degree of political parallelism. For instance, Ireland is 
considered to have low levels of parallelism, when compared to Italy, Spain 
or Greece.  
Voltmer’s (2000) understanding of partisanship is more complex. This 
scholar proposes a model of structure of diversity that encompass elements 
(actors and opinions) and types (formal and informal). The question of 
qualitative diversity of news content (i.e. partisanship) is considered to be 
an informal structural characteristic related to the opinions – just one of 
several factors that contribute to diversity, along with regulations about 
balance and ownership control, professional standards, and others 
(Voltmer, 2000).   
 99
Both works agree upon the separation between internal and external 
diversity as distinct features of media partisanship.  Internal diversity 
relates to the presence of different political perspectives in the same outlet; 
whereas external diversity (or segmented pluralism) means that each 
individual channel is biased in some way and in a given political direction, 
which, in a context in which there are several outlets with different 
leanings, results in plurality of viewpoints (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).  
External diversity “is constituted by a plurality of media actors, each 
of them representing a particular part of the entire spectrum of political 
opinions” (Voltmer, 2000, p. 10). Even if individual media are 
systematically imbalanced in favour of a specific political ideology or party, 
diversity emerges from the presence and interaction of these actors at the 
aggregate level. In turn, internal diversity “is realized by any individual 
medium of a system each covering the whole spectrum of the existing 
political viewpoints. Internally diverse media exercise a balanced mode of 
news selection.” (p. 11). How do they manage this? By presenting and 
supporting various viewpoints of a particular issue or not expressing any 
kind of preference at all.  
Voltmer (2000) stresses that internal diversity is a recent phenomenon 
that is more common in television than in newspapers, both due to political 
regulation and the desire to attract large audiences. But there is 
considerable variation in Europe: the public broadcasting systems in 
France, Greece and Italy (except between 1975-1994) are considered to have 
been dominated by the executive, or a single party; whereas countries such 
as the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Germany and Italy 1975-
1994 presented a multiparty or multigroup domination/influence. On the 
other hand, British and Swedish PBS were relatively more independent 
than others (Humphreys, 1996; Hanretty, 2011). Internal diversity is 
believed to be a stronger or more direct indicator of media pluralism than 
external diversity (Klimkiewicz, 2009), probably since each outlet creates a 
plural environment independently of the political stances of its competitors 
in the market.  
In my opinion, the categorization of countries according to the level 
by which the media system mirrors the diversity in the political system – 
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external pluralism – can be enriched by the analysis of the specificities of 
the relationship between the media outlets and the political parties – that is 
to say, how widespread the internal pluralism is (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).  
But how can we tap this concept? Even in democratic societies, the 
media incorporate and display political values and opinions consciously or 
subconsciously, in an overt or veiled way. Television channels and 
newspapers might display a clear right-wing or left-wing position in the 
information they offer, deliberately or not; relationships between 
journalists and politicians, cases in which journalists are also politicians (or 
vice-versa), and situations in which there are clear connections between a 
political party and the outlet (ownership but also sponsorship, 
collaboration, etc.) contribute to create an image of partisanship for the 
outlet. At the other extreme, media outlets can try to reach a status of 
internal pluralism, both by avoiding connections with political groups and 
by fostering, if not neutrality, then at least balance in their content.  
In short, media partisanship is about clarity of party-media ties. 
Readers can spot partisanship when what they are reading is not 
objectively written, but there are a series of other relevant indicators, such 
as ownership or the existence of clear connections between media and 
political parties or political/politicized organizations (e.g. trade unions, 
churches; see also Baek, 2009), how common it is for media personnel to be 
politically active (i.e. serving in public offices or even in parties), or to what 
degree the career development of journalists depends on their political 
affiliation (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
How clear is the relationship between partisanship and strict 
ownership? Media partisanship seems not to be a direct consequence of 
ownership by political parties. For instance, if in Italy the newspapers and 
TV channels owned by the Berlusconi family tend to display a right-wing 
bias, in Spain the political colour of different press outlets is fairly blatant 
but none are owned officially by any of the political parties that they 
support (Czepek, Hellvig & Novak, 2009). Moreover, if the media logic 
were overthrowing the political logic in the newsrooms (Mazzoleni & 
Schulz, 1999; Voltmer, 2006), one would not expect a direct effect of 
ownership on bias.  
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However, media concentration is often seen as a threat to plurality 
of viewpoints/external diversity. In the case of contemporary Italy, the fact 
that the former prime-minister was also a media mogul caused an informal 
concentration of channels that gathered around 85% of the TV audiences, 
and leaded to events such as directors of public and private channels 
secretly consulting each other to decide the alignment of the news bulletins 
and strategies to conceal negative results in local elections/improve the 
general image of the prime minister (Padovani, 2009). In Europe, Austria or 
Britain present relevant patterns of monomedia concentration, i.e. the 
ownership of a specific sector of activity – radio, press, television – is 
concentrated in few hands (Humphreys, 2009; Thiele, 2009). In turn, 
Portugal or Italy would be examples of countries in which cross-media 
concentrations can be observed (newspapers and TV), being exemplified by 
the business corporation Impresa and the Berlusconi family holdings 
(Padovani, 2009). Concentration can have a negative impact in media 
freedom and plurality, as well as on the quality of the information 
conveyed, even if this relationship can be much more complex 
(Humphreys, 1996; Doyle, 2002; Czepek, Hellvig & Novak, 2009, 
Klimkiewicz, 2009). Testing the relationship between economic constraints 
to press freedom and political balance of media outlets will shed some 
empirical light on how these two aspects work together in Europe.   
Media partisanship is, theoretically speaking, independent from 
journalist professionalization, since it can be either a sign of journalists 
being used as peons by owners, editors and politicians, or a sign of the 
independence of the journalists themselves. Indeed, Noelle-Neumann 
stressed that the left-wing leaning of journalists is a source of media bias 
leading to distortions in the perceptions that citizens have of the political 
world, while George Gerbner attributes media content bias to pressures by 
conservative owners and their commercial interests (see Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2007).  Gerbner (1964) found that, in France of 50 years ago, 
there was no evidence of independent and non-ideological, apolitical and 
non-partisan news gathering processes in the commercial press, the so-
called independent newspapers being closer to the right-wing than to the 
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left-wing. Other authors (e.g., Novak, 2009) see journalist 
professionalization as a correlate of media pluralism.  
I also believe that, normatively speaking, media partisanship should 
not be very strongly associated with freedom of press, since it should refer 
to political influences and exchanges that do not break the rules of 
democratic societies in terms of press freedom. It would simply be 
«business as usual» in the marketplace of ideas. However, other authors are 
not of the same opinion, and use media content pluralism as an indicator of 
freedom of press (e.g. Czepek, 2009).  
The relevance of media partisanship in my research comes from the 
fact that, hypothetically, if a given outlet has strong and clear links to a 
given political party, its cognitive effects may be weaker for the audience, 
because it may be seen as not being trustworthy. Moreover, blatant 
partisanship in the system can lead to lower levels of trust in the media.46  
Unfortunately there are not many studies on the impact that media 
partisanship has for the strength of media effects. In 2004, in a four-
countries/five-contexts comparison, Schmitt-Beck noticed that “conditions 
for the influence of the mass media are particularly favourable in media 
systems that are characterised by a significant, though moderate ‘press-
party parallelism’, where reporting by a particular media organisation 
tends to advantage specific parties, but not in such a blatant way that it 
becomes strikingly obvious for each and every recipient” (p. 318).  
My understanding differs from these findings essentially because 
Schmitt-Beck (2004) derives his conclusions from the study of three 
countries in which partisanship is high and one in which it is low (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004), which is clearly not enough to generalize about the whole 
European Union. In fact, his conclusion about the nature of press-
parallelism effects is based on the fact that he did not find persuasive 
effects from American newspapers (categorized as non-partisan after a 
content analysis), but just from European newspapers (moderately 
partisan). 
                                                 
46 Of course, this may not hold if the majority of the audience is highly partisan and 
shares the political leaning displayed by the newspaper/TV channel. In the USA, 
where political polarization is very strong, selective exposure is a common reality; 
in other media systems, however, it may vary considerably.  
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3.3 Information Environment 
 
 The concept of information environment refers mainly to the 
characteristics of the information provided by the media in a specific 
country.47Aside from impartiality (achieved either against media 
concentration or partisan bias in the way the news are reported), news 
quality (policy-relevant information) is one of the normative standards that 
Gunther & Mughan (2000) suggest using in analysis of media performance 
in democratic societies. This dimension will be considered here as one of 
the most relevant factors describing the informational context, along with 
the diversity of the media agendas in the national markets.  
 In addition, the relationship between citizens and the media is also a 
relevant factor in the informational context. Therefore, my analysis of the 
informational environment will also deal with trust in the media and 
patterns of information consumption (or exposure to the news). 
 Information environments are, of course, much more complex than 
the picture portrayed by these four dimensions; but unlike my focus on the 
media systems, the analysis of information environments done in this 
thesis does not pretend to be exhaustive. Instead, it aims at being 
parsimonious, focusing only on those features of the informational context 
that can, according to my theoretical reasoning, have a mediating impact 
on the relationship between media systems and strength of agenda-setting.  
3.3.1 Information Quality 
 
Popescu (2008) defines information quality as the volume, depth and 
complexity of political information that the media convey. Schmitt-Beck 
(1998, in Popescu, 2008) refers to this concept in a similar way, stressing the 
amount and degree of intellectuality in their style of presentation. The 
potential for audiences to learn from the media is the ultimate criterion of 
information quality.  
 
                                                 
47
 This use is different from the one proposed by Jerit, Barabas & Bolsen (2006), 
who focus directly in the information that people are exposed to in the media, i.e., 
to the volume of coverage of specific issues in a given time/spacial setting.  
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Scholars often differentiate between the information quality of the 
contents broadcasted by public and commercial (private) television, as well 
as between the content of quality/reference and tabloid newspapers 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Schmitt-Beck, 2004; Popescu & Toka, 2008). This 
seems to be in line with the structure underlying people’s use of these 
kinds of media – factor analysis has shown that watching television varies 
along a dimension contrasting public and commercial television news, 
whereas newspaper reading is structured according to a heavy vs. light, or 
high-brow vs. low-brow dimension (see Aarts & Semetko, 2003). 
Reference newspapers across Europe offer more quantity of news 
about current affairs (instead of opinion or advertisement) than ‘budget’ (or 
tabloid) newspapers, but there are considerable differences between outlets 
and countries (Heinderyckx, 1999). Accordingly, the visibility of the EU 
during European election campaigns tends to be bigger in reference 
newspapers than in tabloids (de Vreese et al., 2006).  
 In the case of television, the differentiation between public and 
private is made because state-owned broadcasting is generally understood 
as providing a service to the community (Kriesi, 2004; Schmitt-Beck, 2004; 
Popescu, 2008; Jenssen, Aalberg & Aarts, 2012). Therefore, it is more 
trustworthy than the commercial media, whose levels of trust will vary 
according to the style adopted by the editorial boards.  
 There is a considerable amount of empirical support to the idea that 
public channels provide a better service to the citizens. For instance, the 
two principal TV channels in Denmark (both public) encompass a greater 
amount of hard news and a smaller focus on domestic events than the two 
principal TV channels in the USA (both private); in the UK and 
Scandinavia, the amount of hard news is indeed higher in public channels 
than in private ones (Curran, et al., 2009; Aalberg et al., 2010; Iyengar et al., 
2010; Aalberg & Curran, 2012a). On the same note, the amount of time 
dedicated to election coverage and the length of candidate and journalist 
sound bytes48 are greater in public channels that in commercial 
                                                 
48
 Esser (2008) adopts Daniel Hallin’s definition of sound bytes as film segments 
within a news story that show someone speak without interruption. 
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broadcasters (Esser, 2008; van Aelst, Thorbjørnsrud & Aalberg, 2012).49 
Interesting enough, de Vreese et al. (2006) observed that the visibility of the 
EU in the news during the electoral campaigns of 1999 and 2004 was higher 
in public broadcasters than in commercial televisions. Finally, Aalberg, van 
Aelst & Curran (2012) note that in several northern European countries, 
commercial TV channels offer less prime time news compared to the public 
channels, and while the latter have maintained or increased the amount of 
time dedicated to news in peak times between 1987 and 2007, private 
broadcasters either maintained the low results from the 1980s or further 
decreased the share of airtime dedicated to news and current affairs.  
However, as Schmitt-Beck (1998, in Popescu, 2008) points out, there 
are some cases in which public broadcasting is not a synonym of quality. 
For instance, during the 2009 EP election campaign in Poland, an 
interpretative journalism style was more common in private broadcasters 
than in the public channel, whose depictions of the EU campaign are 
mainly descriptive. Moreover, the public broadcaster openly took sides and 
adopted a militant role, while the other commercial channels displayed a 
less blatant political bias (Dobek-Ostrowska & Lódzki, 2011). Such patterns 
– strongly biased public broadcasters and less clearly politicized 
commercial channels (at least from the perspective of the public) – are a 
strong characteristic of the Polish television (Filas & Planeta, 2009; Dobek-
Ostrowska, 2012). Norris (2009) also considers that “the simple bright 
distinction between commercial versus state broadcasters became 
increasingly fuzzy with the growing commercialization of European public 
broadcasting” (p. 329). Therefore, I prefer not to use this public-private 
dichotomy, which may hide important differences within each category 
(Schudson, 2002, in Norris & Inglehart, 2007). Instead, I will focus on the 
quality of information in the news, using a common set of criteria. 
Some of those criteria refer to the hard/soft news dichotomy. In 
terms of information quality, the terms «soft news» and «hard news» are 
often used. Tuchmann (1972) defines hard news as those that possess a 
high level of newsworthiness and demand immediate publication (such 
                                                 
49 In this last study, the UK was clearly an exception, with small differences 
between public and commercial broadcasters.  
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news is usually associated with politics, the economy or social matters), 
whereas soft news contains a lower lever of substantive information; in 
other words, hard news reports are policy-relevant, while soft news reports 
cover policy-irrelevant matters. Several authors (e.g.: Curran et al., 2009; 
Brekken, Thordbjørnsrud & Aalberg, 2012) have followed this distinction.  
However, since the focus of this study is on information quality, I 
decided to use the traditional definition of hard news but consider soft 
news (or soft framing of news, to be more precise) to be not the other side 
of the coin, but a specific type of framing that political issues (and, in 
general, relevant hard news) get from the media. Hard news tends to be 
more common in public than in commercial channels and (except for the 
Netherlands) in elite newspapers than in tabloids (Brekken, 
Thordbjørnsrud & Aalberg, 2012). In other words, the opportunity costs of 
exposure to hard news are significantly lower for citizens living under 
public-service-oriented systems (Iyengar et al., 2010).  
Interestingly enough, the preponderance of a specific set of frames is 
sometimes seen under the light of an evolutionary theory of political 
journalism. In fact, journalism focusing on political issues is believed to 
have known three phases in the USA: issue coverage (descriptive, neutral, 
focused on policies and politicians as main sources), strategic coverage 
(essentially form 1972 onwards; interpretative, assertive politics seen as a 
game, focus on campaign controversies, journalists as main sources), and 
metacoverage (since 1988;  self-reflexive, self-analytical, focus on media 
manipulation and the behind-the-scenes, spin doctors as main news 
sources50).  Strategic coverage is still dominant in most Western Countries, 
                                                 
50
 Metacommunication is defined as the media self-referential reflections on the 
nature of the relations between political journalism and political public relations, 
and can take two forms: self-referential news (when journalists turn the spotlights 
on themselves, treating themselves as the subjects of their political stories – news 
about media performance, impact, and coverage) and process news (focusing on 
the strategies and personalities that, at the backstage, try to guide or influence 
journalists – stories on the campaign behaviour of politicians and efforts to stage 
problematics, about candidate motivations to act in a given way, or about the 
relationship between candidates and the press). There is substantial variation in 
the amount of process news on campaign strategists in reference newspapers in 
Britain, Germany and the USA –  being much lower in Germany than in the other 
countries, which is explained by the fact that the press is less aggressive, strong 
and autonomous than the UK press (Esser, Reinemann & Fan, 2001). 
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whereas metacoverage is stronger in the USA that in European countries 
such as Britain or Germany (see Esser, Reinemann & Fan, 2001, for a review 
of this literature).   
What is the impact of information quality? First of all, it is expected to 
have a positive impact on political knowledge. Aarts & Semetko (2003) 
found that, in the Netherlands, exposure to public television (rich in 
frequency and intensity of news content) was associated with higher levels 
of political knowledge (candidate recognition, position of parties on issues, 
composition of incumbent coalition), and, to a lesser extent, turnout, 
whereas exposure to commercial television (with lower levels of political 
coverage, specially during prime time) had a negative impact. In the same 
vein, preference for public television (rich in hard news) is associated with 
greater knowledge of EU affairs; in fact, in the EU15 as a whole, even 
exposure to PBS entertainment shows are associated with higher levels of 
knowledge than commercial TV viewing; however, this does not hold in 
Greece, Portugal, Germany, Italy and Ireland (Holtz-Bacha & Norris, 2001). 
As regards newspapers, Newton (1999) observed that reading British 
quality newspapers (i.e. broadsheets such as The Guardian) had a positive 
effect on mobilization. In the Netherlands, type of press use (quality vs. 
popular) is not connected with gains in terms of information, but in terms 
of both internal and external political efficacy (Aarts & Semetko, 2003).  
Quality of information is expected to have an impact on media 
agenda-setting power, because people use the media for different reasons 
(Blumler & Katz, 1974). Exposure to media is sought in order to fulfil needs 
as different as entertainment (to escape from routine and daily problems), 
interpersonal relations (media offers matters for conversation), or 
surveillance (media offers information about things that are important for 
the person, and/or that will help him achieve a certain goal or perform a 
certain task – like creating/calibrating his personal agenda of issues).  
Infotainment-based television and tabloids are probably used most 
often for entertainment and interpersonal relations motives, whereas 
quality outlets (both newspapers and television) are certainly more prone 
to being used for information-gathering. On the other hand, if we assume 
that agenda-setting is not about active learning but a cognitive, 
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subconscious phenomenon, the relationship between quality and agenda-
setting would be due to the fact that low quality buffers the information’s 
power to influence issue salience judgements. Therefore, the hypothesis is 
that high-quality media outlets will have a bigger impact on its users’ 
agendas.   
In the agenda-setting literature, just a few studies have assessed the 
impact of information quality. There is a case study of agenda-setting in 
Portugal, which discovered that the now extinct sensationalistic/tabloid 24 
Horas did not have any agenda-setting power whatsoever, and attributed 
this to its style – in other words, to the low quality of the information  that 
was offered to its readers (Santana Pereira, 2007). In a television agenda-
setting study carried out in the 1980s, there was a negative relationship 
between agenda-setting and participants saying that the main reason why 
they watched television was to relax and to escape daily life worries. In 
other words, people exposed to TV with entertainment purposes (and 
probably consumed low-information products) were less influenced by the 
TV channel’s agenda (Hill, 1985). Since it is hard to forget the problems of 
mankind watching an in-dept quality news show, it is plausible to assume 
that media consumers seeking to escape such things will be more likely to 
seek exposure to infotainment-like television programmes, or low-brow 
news shows.  
In the broader umbrella of media persuasion effects research, it is 
possible to find a study from Schmitt-Beck (2004), which observed no 
differences in the persuasive power of media with high (quality press and 
public television) and low information quality (tabloids and private 
television). However, my doubts concerning the generalizability of the 
results of this study, already expressed in a previous section, as well as the 
fact that persuasion and agenda-setting are different in nature, prevent me 
from taking its conclusions as completely valid.   
How strongly is quality of information connected with bias? From a 
normative point of view, quality information is bias-free. However, high-
quality information does not necessarily mean neutral information. Recent 
research shows that people can find useful information in the news even 
when the tone is negative – they are able to identify negative tones in the 
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news, but their judgments about the quality of the information are 
independent of the tone used in the campaign (Sides, Lipsitz & Grossmann, 
2010).  
3.3.2 Media Agenda Diversity 
 
There is no consensus on how diversity of media agendas can have 
an impact on agenda-setting. In the words of Maxwell McCombs, “a central 
assumption in this prediction about the demise of the agenda-setting role of 
journalism is that the media agendas to which members of the public 
routinely and habitually attend will be highly heterogeneous. This would 
be a situation almost 180 degrees from the media agendas of the past when 
members of the public received highly redundant presentations from the 
news media. For example, the original Chapel Hill study found a median 
correlation of/.71 among the nine news media agendas that were those 
voters’ dominant sources of news and information” (McCombs, 2005, p. 
544). This would be in line with the findings coming from research on 
persuasion, where environments characterized by similar, one-sided 
messages tend to produce stronger media effects (Zaller, 1992, 1996; Peter, 
2004).  
However, if readers of different newspapers and viewers of different 
TV channels are exposed to the exact same agenda, how can we be sure 
that exposure to a particular medium makes a difference or not? Some 
degree of variety in the outlet’s agendas may be a condition sine qua non for 
effects, because if all the media outlets display similar agendas, and the 
public agenda is very diverse, the grounds for media impact are not met 
(Asp, 1983).  
Independently of the direction of the relationship between agenda-
setting and media agenda diversity, I believe that this is a relevant 
mediator of the relationship between the development of the media 
markets and agenda-setting occurrence.  
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3.3.3 Trust in the Media 
 
 Trust in the media is directly linked to the relationship between 
users and the media. To trust is to have a high estimation of the 
competence, honesty, or reliability of the one who is trusted, according to 
the expectations or norms of the beholder (Kleinnijenhuis, van Hoof & 
Oegema, 2006). On the contrary, media distrust, or skepticism, is “a 
subjective feeling of alienation and mistrust toward the mainstream news 
media. For example, media skepticism is the feeling that journalist are not 
fair or objective in their reports about society and that they do not always 
tell the whole story. It is the feeling that mainstream news outlets will 
sacrifice accuracy and precision for personal and commercial gains. It is the 
perception that one cannot believe what one reads in the newspaper or sees 
on television news“ (Tsfati, 2003, p. 160).  
Source credibility was, in the classical persuasion studies, a 
fundamental condition for the occurrence of media influence (Hovland, 
1954; Zaller; 1992; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), especially in areas in which 
people lack deep knowledge and strong motivation – such as politics. Trust 
can be a cue that helps interpret the messages conveyed by the media 
(Iyengar & Kinder, 1985). The more an individual trusts the media, the 
more the media can have an effect, whereas media distrust acts as a barrier 
against new information and causes people to rely on their predispositions. 
A recent study has asserted that media distrust leads to weaker economic 
voting and stronger partisan voting in the USA presidential and 
congressional elections (Ladd, 2012) – a hint on how the issue economy or its 
coverage in the media may have had a weak impact on vote choice when 
the media is not trusted. 
 Trust can be an important moderator of agenda-setting effects, 
because those will only take place if the media outlets are seen as 
trustworthy (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, Kinder, 2003; Wanta & Hu, 1994b; 
Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Tsfati, 2003).  
 In this study, trust is not studied at the audience level (i.e. as trust 
towards specific media channels). This is mainly due to the absence of data, 
but follows Tsfati’s (2003) definition of mistrust as being a subjective 
appraisal of the media as a whole. Therefore, trust is defined here as the 
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existence of a general common understanding of the media as being 
credible, reliable and trustworthy in a specific country. I am aware that 
trust is not a systemic factor, but believe that the national levels of trust are 
a reliable proxy of the same construct at lower levels of analysis.  
 Trust towards different media subsystems such as press and 
television can be different in particular countries. For instance, in the 
contemporary USA, newspapers are believed to be more credible than 
television; the reverse phenomenon was observed in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Kiousis, 2001). Differences can also be found within the subsystem: 
according to Newton (2006), tabloids are generally trusted less than 
broadsheets, but they do sell much more than reference newspapers.  
 In the United States, trust in the media has been in free-fall during 
the last decades (Cook & Gronke, 2001; Jones, 2004; Prior, 2007). 
Conservative Republicans express more pronounced levels of distrust. 
Distrust in the media is, however, mostly explained by a decay in general 
levels of trust in the government (Bennett et al., 1999; Jones, 2004), and use 
of non-mainstream conservative radio which often accuse the other media 
of being biased and liberal. In the USA, media trust is also negatively 
related to tabloid-like news coverage (i.e. a focus on soft news) and media 
criticism coming from political elites from the party people identify with 
(Ladd, 2012). In Europe, however, there are no comparative or longitudinal 
studies on media trust, as far as I know, nor studies focusing of the causes 
of media trust and distrust.  
  Trust in the media is believed to be a consequence of press 
freedom. On the one hand, the current status of freedom of the press might 
have an impact on how much people rely on the information conveyed by 
the media; on the other hand, the history of press freedom might also have 
an important role in shaping trust in the media. For instance, in a social 
context where people experienced actual censorship from the state, and 
then democracy came to expose the misdeeds of the previous system, the 
levels of trust in media are probably lower than in countries that banished 
censorship a long time ago. Journalist professionalization and political 
balance may also play a role here.  
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3.3.4 Exposure 
 
Exposure can be more than a condition sine qua non for agenda-
setting effects to occur. In fact, the literature points out that the intensity of 
exposure to the media agenda has a positive impact on agenda-setting, 
either because it further reinforces the availability of the issue-related 
nodes that are activated when people watch newsshows or read 
newspapers, or because it augments the number of occasions to learn about 
issue salience (see, for instance, Wanta & Hu, 1994a, 1994b).  
A considerable amount of research on exposure effects observed 
that it is not only positively related to stronger learning effects, civic 
engagement but also to agenda-setting effects, but attention can be more 
important that exposure (Hill, 1985; Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986; Wanta & 
Hu, 1994a; Zhao & Chaffee, 1995; Norris, 2002; Drew & Weaver, 2006).  
The effect of exposure is, however, often discredited. For instance, 
Price & Zaller (1993) assert that both exposure and attention are poor 
measures, because they do not tell us who actually received the news – 
they were empirically proven to perform poorly as indicators of news 
reception. Message reception is, of course, more important than mere 
exposure/attention. According to the authors: “given an equal duration of 
exposure and equivalent levels of attention to comparable media content, 
some people always will acquire more information than others, due, for 
instance, to differences in intelligence, motivation or education” (p. 137). 
Therefore, the role of frequency of exposure may depend on individual 
characteristics.  
Due to the nature of the present research, exposure is measured at 
the country and at the audience levels. Therefore, the variables use in the 
statistical models will represent the intensity of news exposure in general 
(for media users) and the intensity of exposure to specific media outlets. As 
in the case of trust, I am fully aware that exposure is not a systemic 
dimension, but believe that exposure measured at these levels are good 
proxies for individual levels of exposure. Moreover, this is the most 
appropriate way to address the moderating impact of exposure on agenda-
setting as a whole, aggregate, phenomenon.  
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3.4 Final Notes 
 
 In this chapter, the grounds for the analysis of media systems and 
informational environments, as well as the basis for their potential role as 
agenda-setting moderators were presented. In the next chapter, several 
hypotheses about the patterns of media market development, 
commercialization, press freedom, journalist professionalization, media 
partisanship, information quality, diversity of media agendas, exposure, 
and trust in the media, are specified. The data used to measure these 
dimensions is then presented and the operationalization of each dimension 
explained. The panorama of the media systems in Europe is presented 
straight after, opening the way for the empirical test of hypothesis 
concerning its role in the occurrence and strength of agenda-setting effects.  
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PART III – MEDIA SYSTEMS AND 
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
 
 
 
 
 117
4 
 
STUDYING MEDIA SYSTEMS AND 
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS 
IN EUROPE, 2009: HYPOTHESES AND DATA 
 
 
 
 As stated in Chapter One, the impact of the media environment on 
agenda-setting is believed to rest on five broad-range dimensions (press 
freedom, public broadcasting system’s strength, development of media 
markets, journalist professionalization, partisanship) through their 
immediate correlates – exposure, trust in the media, media agendas’ 
diversity and informative quality of the news. But before testing the 
relationship between agenda-setting and those contextual factors, it is 
important to identify the nature of those features of media systems and 
information contexts, as well as their interdependency, drawing on a set of 
new data created and collected for this purpose, under the theoretical 
guidance of Hallin & Mancini´s (2004) work.  
 In this chapter, the hypotheses related to inter-relations between 
broad-range media system characteristics and their immediate effects are 
set out, the media system and media outlet data sources are presented, and 
a description of the variable operationalization procedures is offered.  
 
 
 
 
118 
4.1 Hypotheses 
 
 In this section, I will present some generic hypotheses that 
structured the analysis of a multitude of new data on media systems and 
associated environments. The hypotheses are not exhaustive, but constitute 
an interesting point of departure for the descriptive and inferential analysis 
of this data. Inspired by Hallin & Mancini (2004) and others, I hypothesize 
that the patterns of development of media markets, journalist 
professionalization and commercialization will vary considerably within 
Europe. I expect to find the patterns described bellow: 
 
• Development of press markets will be greater in Liberal and Democratic 
Corporative countries than in Polarized Pluralist nations and, possibly, 
the 12 new EU member states51, but development of TV markets will be 
rather similar troughout Europe (Hypothesis 4.1). Research has shown 
that the press market in Northern and Western European countries 
developed before and to a greater extent than in the South, due to 
historical and political reasons (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). In Eastern 
Europe, I expect that, due to their recent history of democracy, the 
press markets will be no more developed than in Southern Europe. 
A competing hypothesis would be stating that there is a correlation 
between length of the democratic regime and development of the press 
market in 2009 (Hypothesis 4.2). 
• Public Broadcasting Systems will be weaker in Liberal, Polarized Pluralist 
and Eastern Countries (Hypothesis 4.3). Commercialization (in terms 
of amount of audience share of commercial TVs vis-à-vis public 
broadcasters) is expected to be higher in the East and South, in 
which public TV has a history of censorship or, at least, the idea of 
state ownership might be associated with state control and 
                                                 
51 These geographical categories are always subject to criticism, and therefore I feel 
it necessary to declare the reasoning behind their selection. In short, they refer to 
the categories that derive from Hallin & Mancini (2004) results and a new category 
including the twelve new-member States (NMS12). As in Hallin & Mancini (2004), 
France is placed amongst the southern European countries that belong to the 
Polarized Pluralist model. These categories are used for merely descriptive 
reasons, and the division of the EU in sub-groups according to their media 
systems´ characteristics will be empirically addressed in the following chapter.  
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manipulation, as well as on Liberal countries in which the laws of 
the market and a weaker state intervention might have not 
protected the public channels as much as in Democratic Corporatist 
countries. The degree of commercialization can be, however, connected 
with the age of the democratic regime and the date of creation of a private 
TV market in the country (Hypothesis 4.4), in the sense that new 
democracies and new markets will display weaker PBS.  
• Freedom of Press will be stronger in older democracies (Hypothesis 4.5). 
Older, mature democracies are expected to create the basis for a free 
media, both in legal, economic and political terms, whereas recent 
democracies might still have the tics of autocracy and some 
remaining elite trying to restrain press freedom. 
• Journalist professionalization will be stronger in older than in new 
democracies (Hypothesis 4.6), or in Liberal and Democratic Corporatist 
nations than in the rest of the continent (Hypothesis 4.7), as a by-
product of an older and stronger press tradition and market, as well 
as a stronger tradition of respect of the rights of workers.   
• Lastly, Media partisanship (in the form of lack of neutrality or lack of 
internal diversity) is expected to be lower in Liberal systems than in the 
other groups (Hypothesis 4.8). According to Hallin & Mancini (2004), 
the British and Irish broadcasting systems have a long story of 
neutrality; moreover, the press panorama is close to neutrality in 
Ireland and to external diversity in the UK (but see Voltmer, 2000). 
It is not paradoxical to propose a different hypothesis, stating that 
bias will be higher in new than in old democracies (Hypothesis 4.9).   
  
These hypotheses suggest a common pattern, i.e., a normatively more 
positive situation of media markets in the North and Western Europe than 
in the other European countries under analysis. However, this does not 
mean that the four dimensions tackle a single concept, in the sense that one 
variable would be enough to describe the media systems in the 27 
countries. On the contrary, I believe that even if these merely descriptive 
hypotheses prove to be true, they just refer to a relative structure of 
relationships between these dimensions – for instance, it can be true that 
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journalist professionalization and development of media markets is higher 
in the North than in the South, but the situation of the journalists in 
Scandinavia can be worse/better than the degree of press development in 
those countries. Moreover, I expect that a) region will explain just a small 
amount of the variation in the four dimensions of media systems in Europe, 
i.e., considerable variation within region is expected; and b) these 
dimensions will have differential impacts in the informational 
environment. Regarding the latter assumption, I expect the following 
patterns (see also Table 4.1): 
 
• Development of press markets will be linked, on average, with more 
newspaper reading, while development of TV markets will have a negative 
effect on broadcast news exposure; both indicators of market development 
will be associated with more media agenda diversity (Hypothesis 4.10). 
• Commercialization will have a negative impact of information quality and 
trust (Hypothesis 4.11). As stated before, public media are usually 
seen both by lay people and experts as being responsible for the 
public service of informing the population in a complete and 
accurate way (e.g. Kriesi, 2004; Schmitt-Beck, 2004), because they 
are indirectly in the hands of a democratically appointed power, 
whereas private media are ruled by entities that do not have the 
same kind of relationship and duties towards the citizens.  
• Constraints on Freedom of Press, especially those that might be more 
easily spotted by the average citizen (political constraints), will be 
linked with lower levels of trust (Hypothesis 4.12). 
• Journalist professionalization will be linked to more trust in the media 
(Hypothesis 4.13) and more information quality (Hypothesis 4.14). It is 
reasonable to expect that the more professionalized the information 
providers are seen to be, the more people will trust the quality of 
the media content. If journalists are seen as relatively autonomous, 
ethic-driven professionals, oriented towards the goal of informing 
people (the public service norm), their actions and affirmations will 
merit more credit from the audience than if they are seen as mere 
peons instrumentalized by interest groups. In addition, 
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professionals in general are believed to create products with better 
quality, hence the hypothesis on the relationship between journalist 
professionalization and information quality. 
 
Table 4.1 – Hypotheses concerning Media System dimensions’ impact on the 
Information Environment 
 
 Quality Media 
Agenda 
Diversity 
Trust Exposure 
Development of 
Press Markets 
Positive 
Impact 
Positive 
Impact 
--- --- 
Development of TV 
Markets 
--- Positive 
Impact 
--- Negative 
Impact 
Strength of PBS  Positive 
Impact 
--- Positive 
Impact 
--- 
Freedom  of Press --- --- Positive 
Impact 
--- 
Professionalization Positive 
Impact 
--- Positive 
Impact 
--- 
Partisanship --- --- Negative 
impact 
--- 
     
  
  
4.2. Data Sources 
 
Most of the media system and information environment variables 
(especially those concerned with partisanship and quality) were 
operationalized with data collected by the expert survey Media Systems in 
Europe, carried out by a group of researchers composed of Marina Popescu 
(University of Essex), Tania Gosselin (Universitè du Quebec a Montreal) 
and myself. The purpose of the expert survey was to gather data about the 
media systems in European countries, posing a relevant set of questions to 
experts in communication studies, public opinion, political communication 
and electoral behaviour. The questions were posed either at the national 
level, or in connection with specific media outlets: the most relevant 
newspapers and TV channels in each country. A detailed description of this 
expert survey is presented in Appendix 1.  
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Some other national-level variables – namely, ownership structures, 
press market development and freedom of press – are measured by data 
coming from secondary sources (Freedom House, European Audiovisual 
Observatory, and World Association of Newspapers). The relative 
contributions of these sources for the set of data used in this research will 
be explained as each individual dimension is operationalized. Lastly, trust 
was measured using Eurobarometer data collected in the Summer/Fall of 
2009 (TNS Opinion & GESIS, 2010). 
4.3 Variable Operationalization 
4.3.1 Development of Media Markets 
 
In this dissertation, the concept of development of press markets in 
the European Union is operationalized through the use of measures of 
quantitative and qualitative development for the newspaper market. The 
most relevant indicators of development of media markets are suggested 
by Hallin & Mancini (2004) – diversity of choices, balance between use of 
press and electronic media, the whole population as a target of press 
products, differences in content and style between reference newspapers 
and tabloids, and absence of gender gap in newspaper consumption.  
Data about the newspaper market in 2009 was retrieved from the 
World Press Trends report, published by the World Association of 
Newspapers (WAN, 2010), whereas the data about the TV market in 2009 
was collected from the European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO, 2010). 
Four measures were built from these two sources: the Number of 
Newspapers which is a simple indicator of the number of alternatives from 
which citizens can choose (see Voltmer, 2000); the Average Circulation of 
Daily Newspapers per Million Citizens (a proxy for the focus of the press 
market, i.e. the general population vs. the elite); Gender Differences, 
regarding newspaper reach, and, finally, the Imbalance between time 
watching TV and time reading newspapers. This last variable, inspired by 
the work of Norris (2000), is fairly similar to Shehata & Strömbäck’s (2011a) 
measures of newspaper vs. television centrism at the country level, and to 
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the measure used by Aalberg & Curran (2012a) in their most-different cases 
study of media information environments in Europe.  
The qualitative dimension of press market development was 
operationalized using data collected through the expert survey (Popescu, 
Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010) about the existence of differences 
between tabloids and reference newspapers. This was measured by a single 
item (“There is little difference between the way tabloid and quality newspapers 
cover public affairs”).52 
In the end, this study tackles five components of the development of 
press markets (Table 4.2; see descriptive statistics on Appendix 2). In 
another setting, a strategy of data reduction would be used to reduce the 
number of variables, and the final variable resulting from that might be 
used in subsequent analysis. However, considering the exploratory nature 
of the research presented here, all the specific measures will be used. 
The raw variables are used to depict the picture of European media 
markets from a descriptive perspective, while a condensed version of the 
media system variables will be used for the inferential statistical analysis. 
This is so because it is assumed that the effects are small, not dependent of 
a unit change in the number of outlets, but on a broader difference in the 
media market structures. For instance, a market in which the number of 
different titles is low will have a different informational environment than 
one where the number of choices is high, but the difference between having 
12 or 13 titles in the newsstand will be too small to be properly estimated; 
on the contrary, the difference between having 12 and 120 titles on the 
market is expected to produce stronger, more visible, effects. The variables 
were recoded in order to vary between 0 and 1 (by dividing each case´s 
value by the highest value in the empirical range).   
 Regarding the development of the TV market,53 two variables are 
used: the Number of Choices (the number of national, regional and 
                                                 
52
 This sentence was presented to the experts with a scale of 0 (Untrue) to 10 (True). 
The reliability of this measure is particularly high (.86, in a scale from 0 to 1; see 
Popescu, 2011).  
53 It is worth stressing that the division between indexes of development of 
television and newspaper markets is theory-driven and related to the specific goals 
and hypotheses of this dissertation. A purely empirical perspective, based on factor 
analysis, would suggest that the variables under study belong to two different 
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cable/satellite TV channels available in the country) and the Proportion of 
Cable Dissemination (which reports the percentage of households served by 
cable or digital cable in the country). Both variables are computed with 
data coming from the European Audiovisual Observatory Yearbook (EAO, 
2010).  
The descriptive statistics and normality tests for these two variables 
are made available on Appendix 2. For the inferential tests, these variables 
were also recoded in order to vary between 0 and 1.  
 
Table 4.2 – Dimensions of Press Market Development 
 
 Variable  Theoretical 
 Range 
Empirical 
Range 
 
 
 
 
Quantitative 54 
Number of (daily) 
newspapers 
 
0- ∞ 
 
8 to 357 
Average number of 
daily newspapers 
circulating each 
day per million 
citizens. 
 
0- ∞ 
 
82.52 to 
457.2 
Consumption 
Imbalance (Minutes 
watching TV minus 
Minutes Reading 
Newspapers)  
0 (equal amount of time 
reading newspaper and 
watching TV) to 1440 
(24 hours watching TV 
and 0 minutes reading 
newspapers) 
 
 
104 to 220 
Gender Gap in 
Newspaper 
Readership 
 
0% (equality)  
to 100% (full gap) 
 
 
0 to 20 
 
Qualitative 
 
Difference 
tabloids/reference 
papers 
0 (not different) to 10 
(completely different) 
 
3.13  
to 8.31 
    
 
                                                                                                                            
clusters: the first regards the amount of choice in the market (both in terms of daily 
titles and TV channels), while the second encompasses information about the size 
of the audiences (newspaper readers and cable subscribers). These two factors, 
whose eigenvalues are greater than 1, account for 72.5% in the variance of the 
variables under analysis. Varimax rotation was used.  
54 There is not information about newspaper readership for all the 27 contexts 
under analysis. In fact, the 2010 WAN report on World Press Trends just offers 
such information for 15 countries. Moreover, information on gender consumption 
is only available for 23 countries. Therefore, these indicators will be used for 
descriptive purposes, but not in the inferential models, in order to avoid loss of 
cases or the use of missing data replacement strategies that would involve 
imputation of data for a considerable proportion of the cases under study.  
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4.3.2 Public TV Strength  
 
Voltmer (2000) proposes an interesting way of measuring strength of 
public-service orientation in broadcasting systems, using information about 
the percentage of public TVs funding coming directly from the state, and 
the number of public and private broadcasters. The first measure is an 
indicator of how public state-owned broadcasters are, whereas the second 
one tackles the existence of a monopoly or competition in the market. 
The first indicator proposed above is accurately reproduced in this 
thesis, but the second one was built in a different way. Why? The analysis 
carried out by Voltmer (2000) focuses on 1990, a time when several 
countries were still without private TV stations; therefore, the author’s goal 
was to contrast monopolistic systems (i.e., those served by public 
broadcasters only) with dual systems (those in which commercial TV had 
been introduced). Nowadays, private broadcasters exist in virtually all 
European countries (see Hardy, 2008, p. 58), and what varies considerably 
is the capability of public broadcasters to attract audiences in a liberalized 
market (see Djankov et al, 2003). Therefore, my second measure of public-
service orientation is the relative PBS audience, measured by difference 
between the audience share of public and private (freely accessible) 
television channels in 2009, varying theoretically from - 100% (fully 
commercialized market) to 100% (fully public market). The information 
about audience shares and funding of public broadcasters in the European 
Union was found in the 2010 yearbook published by the European 
Audiovisual Observatory (EAO, 2010).  
General descriptive statistics and normality tests of these two 
variables are presented on Appendix 2. For the inferential tests, these 
variables were also recoded in order to vary between 0 and 1.  
4.3.3 Freedom of Press 
 
Due to its complexity, the concept of freedom of press is usually 
operationalized in cross-country research through the employ of ready-to-
use indexes of press freedom (Norris, 2004; Norris & Inglehart, 2007; 
Popescu, 2008). Behmer (2009) and Becker, Vlad & Nusser (2007) offer a 
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rather complete perspective on the several sources of information about 
press freedom available to scholars and the general public.  
The Press Freedom Survey is one of the oldest and most often used 
ways of measuring press freedom. It is an annual assessment of the level of 
media freedom carried out by Freedom House since 1980, and covers 
around 200 countries and independent territories. It is based on analysis of 
status quo and events by regional specialists and scholars (Freedom House, 
2010). The Freedom House index is derived from a fairly comprehensive 
definition of freedom of press which includes legal, political and 
economical restrains, and varies from 0 (totally free press) to 100 (totally 
not free press). Usually, Freedom House reports divide countries in three 
categories: free press (from 0 to 30); partially free press (from 31 to 60) and 
not free press (from 61 to 100). The Freedom of Press 2010 data release, 
which is used in this study, analyses 196 countries and refers to the year of 
2009 (that is to say, covers the events that took place in that year).  
An alternative measure of press freedom would be the index made 
available by Reporters Without Borders, a NGO aimed at the research of 
journalist’s working conditions. This index also varies from 0 to 100; and 
higher values also represent greater constraints to press freedom. The 2009 
dataset on freedom of press includes 173 countries and refers to events 
taking place between September 2008 and September 2009. When 
compared with the Freedom House index, this indicator presents some 
differences in the way it is built; however, both measures seem to be 
strongly correlated.  
Taking as an example the year of 2009, in the case of the 26 member-
States of the European Union studied here55, the correlation between the 
two indexes is very high (Pearson’s r= .83). Differences in the 
methodological assessment of press freedom used by these two institutions 
probably are the reason why this association is not as strong as one would 
                                                 
55 Luxembourg was excluded from the analysis due to lack of data on several 
media system dimensions (see Appendix 1).   
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expect, considering that they supposedly tap the same concept in the same 
set of countries.56 
The descriptive statistics displayed in Appendix 2 show that these 
two indicators have different means and medians – it seems that Reporters 
Without Borders tend to display a more positive picture of the European 
context, when compared to the Freedom House data. For instance, the 
Freedom House index presents Romania as an outlier case in which the 
number of constraints to press freedom is much higher than in other 
European countries, but its depiction by Reporters without Borders is, in 
absolute terms, more positive. The fact that most EU countries are very 
close to the “totally free” extreme of both scales is very positive from a 
substantive point of view, but can be problematic in methodological terms, 
because they might not provide the necessary degree of variation in this 
independent variable. 
From a substantive perspective, both indexes are also problematic in 
the sense that that they try to summarize in one single figure all the 
conditions that have an impact on the work of the press, sometimes 
confusing (or assembling) control, regulation and influence. On this side, 
the Freedom House index has the advantage of being broken down into three 
individual indexes, portraying the legal, political and economic constraints 
to freedom of press. Therefore, I decided use this index as a measure of 
Constrains to Press Freedom. The analysis will include either the General 
Constraints measure (the general Freedom of Press index), or the Political, 
Legal and Economic Constraints indexes.  
Under the political constraints category, Freedom House evaluates 
the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues 
examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and 
privately owned media; access to information and sources; official 
censorship and self-censorship; the ability of both foreign and local 
reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the 
                                                 
56 In the past, similar degrees of correlation were found between the two scales for 
a wider set of countries (Becker, Vlad & Nusser, 2007). This is seen as an empirical 
support to the argument that those indexes, even if measured with different 
techniques, tap the same construct and provide similar perspectives of the reality 
in terms of press freedom.  
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intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary 
detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. The 
political environment measure varies between 0 and 40 in the full World 
sample, and between 3 and 15 in the European Union (Luxembourg 
excluded; Appendix 2).  
The legal constraints category of the Freedom House Index 
encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could 
influence media content and the government’s inclination to use these laws 
and legal institutions to restrict the media’s ability to operate. This index 
tackles the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for 
freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security 
legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel 
and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information 
legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media 
regulatory bodies; registration requirements for media outlets and 
journalists; and the ability of journalists to operate freely (Freedom House, 
2010). The legal environment index varies, theoretically, between 0 and 30; 
in the European sample the range goes from 2 to 13.  
Finally, the third category examines the economic constraints that the 
media have to face. This includes the structure of media ownership; 
transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing 
media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding 
of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of 
corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic 
situation in a country impacts the development and sustainability of the 
media (Freedom House, 2010). This measure also varies between 0 and 30, 
but in empirical terms the variation is less wide (from 4 to 15). This and the 
other variables were recoded before their inclusion in inferential models.  
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4.3.4 Journalist Professionalization 
 
Professionalization of journalists is usually analysed on the basis of 
two kinds of information: hard statistical data and survey data. Regarding 
the first, some authors argue that the year of first foundation of a Union of 
Journalists seems to be a good operationalization of professionalizarion 
(e.g.: Curry, 1990, in Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Hanretty, 2011). However, I 
do not believe that this is the best measure of professionalization available. 
Some unions may have their roots in communist regimes (and their 
positive effect in terms of building ethical codes and a sense of profession 
amongst journalists can be questioned) or may have been proclaimed 
illegal due to political reasons, even in contexts in which journalism was a 
strong profession in terms of ethics and legitimizing creed. Moreover, 
relatively recent unions and organizations might have been active and 
successful in terms of implementing rules of conduct and professionalism, 
whereas old, historical associations might have lost this role, having 
become journalist clubs or journalism museums.  
Therefore, other measures are needed. IREX offers a measure of 
journalist professionalization as a part of its Media Sustainability Index.57 
The goal of this sub-dimension is to assess if the journalists meet the 
professional standards of quality, mixing indicators related to 
professionalization (journalists follow recognized and accepted ethical 
standards, do not practice self-censorship, are sufficiently well-paid to 
discourage corruption) with indicators of information quality (coverage of 
key events and issues, fair, objective and well sourced reporting, balance 
between entertainment and information programming, and so on). 
However, the Europe and Eurasia report does not cover all the 
European countries, but just those where media has not yet achieved 
sustainability, and thus still needs monitoring. Out of the 27 systems 
analysed in this thesis, just two – Romania and Bulgaria – are covered by 
the IREX report portraying the status quo in 2009 (IREX, 2010).  
                                                 
57 IREX, founded in 1968, is an international non-profit organization aimed at 
improving the quality of education, strengthening independent media, and 
fostering pluralistic civil society development (IREX, 2010). The methodological 
report of the Media Sustainability Index (MSI) is available at 
http://www.irex.org/resource/media-sustainability-index-msi-methodology. 
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The Worlds of Journalism research project, based at the University of 
Munich (Germany), offers data on journalism cultures in 18 countries, 
collected by its pilot study between 2007 and 2009. However, and once 
again, this pilot study covers only 4 out of the 27 media systems studied in 
this thesis. The full study will cover the European Union as a whole (as 
well as several other countries in the World), which means that in the near 
future it will be a relevant source of information about journalism.58  
Subjective appraisals of journalist professionalization from experts in 
communication and public opinion are also used, and – in my opinion – 
probably offer a more direct measure of professionalization. The expert 
survey on media systems in Europe (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 
2010) included the following items concerning this matter: “Journalists in 
[COUNTRY] are motivated by an ethic of serving the public interest”, 
“Journalists in [COUNTRY] agree on the criteria for judging excellence in their 
profession regardless of their political orientations”, and “Journalists have 
sufficient training to ensure that basic professional norms like accuracy, relevance, 
completeness, balance, timeliness, double-checking and source confidentiality are 
respected in news-making practices”.59  
Those bits of information are used in a complementary way, in order 
to fully capture the underlying concept of professionalization.  I therefore 
created an index of journalist professionalization, by averaging the values 
of those three variables. The Cronbach’s Alpha (a widely used measure of 
internal consistency) supports the decision of using these items in an 
aggregate way (α =.86). Appendix 2 presents the descriptive statistics for 
this index: the analysis of the histogram and boxplot charts showed that 
there is a slight skewness in the distribution towards the lower extreme of 
the scale; which, from a substantive point of view, is not very flattering to 
the European journalistic community. The index, which varies between 0 
and 10, was recoded in order to vary between 0 and 1 with the same 
procedure used for the measures presented earlier in this chapter.   
                                                 
58 The description of this research project is available online at 
http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/index.htm.   
59 These sentences were presented to the experts with a scale of 0 (Untrue) to 10 
(True). The reliability indexes vary between .88 and .91 (see Popescu, 2011).  
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4.3.5 Partisanship/Balance 
 
 How can partisanship be operationalized? For instance, van 
Kempen (2007) measured media party parallelism at the system level by 
regressing party preference (propensities to vote – PTVs) on television and 
newspaper exposure, and then used the weighted mean of explained 
variances for party preference. This is, according to me, a complicated and 
biased way of measuring press-party parallelism – a newspaper is not 
biased because it explains party preferences, but party preferences may 
lead to the use of a specific newspaper. What van Kempen (2007) was 
measuring was the average persuasive strength of television and 
newspapers.  
A more standard way by which it is possible to analyse partisanship 
is to look at the content of newspapers or TV channels in search of media 
bias or media leaning (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Popescu, 2008; Baek, 2009). 
Through a comprehensive content analysis (including perhaps also 
discourse analysis techniques), it is possible to understand if a specific 
outlet is neutral, ideological (i.e., clearly left-wing, centre, or right-wing) or 
partisan (i.e. connected to a specific political party). In the context of this 
research, such an analysis is not possible, since I am dealing with 228 news 
media outlets, publishing/broadcasting in more than twenty languages.  
Therefore, I will use information collected by the expert survey on 
media systems (Popescu, Santana-Pereira & Gosselin, 2010), which, in fact 
allows for a two-fold analysis of partisanship. This dimension is measured 
at the national and at the outlet level – a strategy that allows the 
understanding of this dimension and its impact in the classical way (the 
media-system centered definition of Hallin and Mancini) or in a more 
innovative way, by identifying links between parties and media outlets.  
It is worth noticing that there are two relevant samples of outlets in 
the present work – the general sample of 228 media outlets (104 
newspapers and 124 TV channels) analysed by the expert survey (Popescu, 
Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010), and the 138 outlets (81 newspapers and 
57 TV channels) about which the PIREDEU Media Study (EES, 2009b) has 
collected information on content. Both samples will be described, both for 
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relevance, but also to see if the PIREDEU sample is in some way different 
from the more comprehensive set of outlets analysed by Popescu, Santana 
Pereira & Gosselin (2010). 
 The expert survey questionnaire contained four questions about 
partisanship.  At the national level, there were two questions: 1 – “Would 
you say that all major political opinions in [COUNTRY] are present in the 
newspapers or rather that only some opinions are present?” and 2 – “And how 
about television, would you say that all major political opinions or that only some 
political opinions in [COUNTRY] are present in broadcasting?”. At the media 
outlet level, we have questions 3 – “How far is the political coverage of each of 
the following media outlets influenced by a party or parties to which it is close?”, 
and 4 – “How would you characterize the political colour of each of these media 
outlets in [COUNTRY]?”. 60  
 The data collected by the battery of questions described above was 
used to create five measures (Table 4.3). The first two questions constitute 
two general measures of general Balance in TV and Newspapers in a specific 
country, varying from 0 (biased towards some political views) and 10 (all 
political views present). Recoded versions of these two variables follow the 
categorization criteria presented for the other variables.   
 
Table 4.3 – Dimensions of Partisanship/Balance 
 
 National Level61 Outlet Level 
 
Internal Diversity 
 
Balance in TV  
Balance in Newspapers 
 
Amount of bias in Outlet 
Type (Neutral, Internal 
Diverse, Partisan, Strongly 
Partisan) 
 
External Diversity 
 
Left vs. Right 
Incumbent vs. Opposition 
 
 
--------------- 
   
                                                 
60
 The first two questions were presented with an eleven-point scale, whose 
anchors were “Only some” at point 0 and “All” at point 10). In the third question, 
the scale varies from 0 (“not at all”) to 10 (“strongly”). In the question about links 
between media outlets and parties, the experts were invited to match a list of 
parties with the most important media outlets in the country. Reliability varies 
between .77 and .92 (see Popescu, 2011).  
61 Factor analysis supports the organization of these four indicators along two 
dimensions: external and internal diversity. These two factors account for 75% of 
the total variance of the four variables under study. Varimax rotation was used.  
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 The third question constitutes a measure of bias of specific outlets, 
which varies between 0 (unbiased) to 10 (completely biased). The amount 
of bias at the outlet level has a mean of 4.80 (standard deviation=1.99) for 
the whole sample and 4.90 (standard deviation= 1.95) for the PIREDEU 
sample. 
 Question 4 is useful to operationalize the concept of External 
Diversity, in particular the degree by which, in a given country, the outlets 
that present a strong bias support at least two parties that are not coalition 
partners nor at the same side of the ideological divide (left/right). The 
measures used here refer to the difference between the percentages of 
partisan outlets favouring left-wing or right-wing parties (External Diversity 
Ideology), as well as between the proportions of outlets favoring incumbent 
vs. opposition parties (External Diversity Status). These variables would 
vary between -100% and 100%, but since the direction of the bias is not 
relevant in terms of measuring how externally diverse the media market is 
in terms of political leaning, the signs were deleted. Therefore, the variables 
range between 0 and 100, and refer to the amount of distance to the ideal 
situation where the difference between the proportions of outlets biased 
towards different political sides would be null. Recoded versions of those 
variables vary 0 and 1. These and the other two variables created at the 
national level are described on Appendix 2. 
 The fourth question is also used to create a typology of media 
outlets, with four categories – neutral (when the amount of bias is lower 
than 3); internal diverse (when the amount of bias is higher than three, but 
the experts mentioned several parties that are from diverse sides of the 
left/right dichotomy and that are not coalition partners), moderately 
partisan (when the amount of bias varies between 3 and 7, but at least 50% 
of the experts referred a single party or coalition) and strongly partisan 
(when the scores for bias towards a single party or coalition are higher than 
7).  
 The type of outlet is a nominal variable built with information based 
on intensity of party bias and political colour of TV channels and 
newspapers. In the whole sample, 20% of the outlets are neutral, 10% are 
internally diverse, 58% are biased and the remaining 12% are strongly 
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biased. In the PIREDEU sample, the proportion of neutral outlets is smaller 
(16%), whereas the percentage of partisan newspapers and channels is a bit 
higher (62%).  
4.3.6 Information Quality 
 
 Information quality is measured with data collected by the expert 
survey (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010), both at the country and 
the media outlet level (Table 4.4). 
 I started by creating indexes of the amount of hard news and soft 
news (or soft frames) in each country. The hard news index was composed 
of the aggregation of four items “Do the news media in [COUNTRY] focus too 
much, just enough or too little on… information about economic issues facing 
[COUNTRY]; information about international affairs; information about policy 
differences between competing parties and politicians; information about 
investigative reports on important issues”; which varied between 0 (too little) 
and 10 (too much); the middle point means “enough”. These variables were 
later transformed in order to create an index in which the middle-point is 
taken as the ideal situation, and the distance from this point is computed. 
Therefore, it varies between -5 (deficiency) and 5 (exaggeration). The 
internal consistency of this index indicates a considerable degree of inter-
relation between these items (Cronbach’s Alpha= .66).  
 The soft frames index was created by aggregating the following 
three items “Do the news media in [COUNTRY] focus too much, just enough or 
too little on information about individual politicians, their character and 
motivations?; information about the sensational aspects of events and stories?; 
information about politics seen as a game, a horse-race, just a competition for 
power?”. This index is measured by the same scale, and also presents a 
modest, but satisfactory, internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha= .61).  
 The other measures are more specific and refer to the accuracy and 
amount of analysis in the television and newspapers.  At the national level, 
the specific wording of those questions was “Independently of the above, 
would you say that on the whole newspapers/television in [COUNTRY] provide an 
accurate representation of the facts in public affairs or not at all?” and “Thinking 
now about the analysis of the causes, contextual circumstances, consequences and 
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implications of important developments in public affairs, would you say that 
newspapers provide a lot, enough or rather too little analysis?”. At the media 
outlet level, a list of outlets was presented alongside the question “To what 
extent do these media provide accurate information on facts backed by credible 
sources and expertise?”. 
 
Table 4.4 – Dimensions of Information Quality 
 
 Variable Name Theoretical Range 
 
National Level Hard  News -5 (deficiency) to 5 (exaggeration) 
Soft Frames -5 (deficiency) to 5 (exaggeration) 
Accuracy (TV and 
Newspapers) 
0 (low) to10 (high) 
Analysis (TV and 
Newspapers) 
0 (low) to10 (high) 
 
Outlet Level  
Accuracy 
 
 
0 (low) to10 (high) 
   
 
 Five out of the six national-level indicators of information quality 
are normally distributed. The exception is the index of hard content news, 
which seems to be slightly skewed towards the left-hand extreme of the 
distribution, meaning insufficiency of hard content in news outlets 
(Appendix 2).  
 At the media outlet level, the distribution of the accuracy measure 
across the 228 media outlets (mean= 5.68; standard deviation= 1.62; 
median= 5.89) is skewed towards higher levels of accuracy. In the case of 
the smaller PIREDEU sample, the mean accuracy is somewhat higher 
(mean=5.84; standard deviation=1.66; median=6.18), and the distribution is 
also skewed towards higher levels of information accuracy. 
4.3.7 Media Agenda Diversity 
 
 The diversity of the media agenda is operationalized in a rather 
straightforward way. For each country, I computed the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the amount of coverage devoted to 15 major issues in 
the media outlets for which there is content information available (in most 
cases, three newspapers and two television channels; see more information 
on this procedure and the PIREDEU Media Study Data on Chapter Six). 
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The values were recoded so that a higher score would mean a stronger 
degree of diversity in the media agendas, or, in other words, a lower degree 
of homogeneity (in quantitative terms). The descriptive statistics used to 
characterize this variable are presented in Appendix 2.  
4.3.8 Trust 
 
 In the model of media effects I explore in this research, trust in the 
media is considered to be a very important factor, bridging the hardcore 
media system characteristics and the impact that media content has on 
public opinion.  
 The operationalization of trust was one of the main problems of this 
research design, since the 2009 PIREDEU Voter Study (my primary data 
source for information on public opinion) does not include questions that 
would allow for a direct62 or indirect63 operationalization of this variable.  
 There would be two ways to deal with this shortcoming, both 
including the use of Eurobarometer data. In recent years, Eurobarometer 
waves regularly included questions about the trust in television, press and 
radio64, and the wave EB 72 (whose data was collected in the autumn of 
2009, actually includes these questions. This data can be used to 
operationalize trust in my model by means of data fusion through 
statistical matching; this way, I could add individual-level data about 
media trust to the PIREDEU voter study datasets. Statistical matching is a 
procedure that allows the fusion of two sets of data, when there is a 
sufficient number of common variables which allow for a relatively secure 
inference about the values to import from the donor (in this case, the 
Eurobarometer dataset) to the recipient (in this case, the PIREDEU voter 
                                                 
62 For instance, the question “How much do you trust the following institutions?” 
followed by a list including the media in general or specific media formats. This is 
a common operationalization in the Eurobarometer studies.  
63 For instance, the question “Do you think that the newspapers/television 
channels you watch were biased in favor of a specific candidate or party?” This is a 
common operationalization in the Portuguese National Election Studies.  
64 It is possible to find data on media trust for all the 27 European Union member-
States in the waves EB57.1 and CCEB2002.02 (2002); EB59.1, EB60.1 and 
CCEB2003.02 (2003); EB61 and EB62 (2004); EB64.2 (2005); EB66.1 (2006);  EB69.2 
(2008), EB72.4 (2009). EB71.1 (2009) also includes some data on trust in the media, 
but presented in terms of relative trust (i.e., “which one do you trust the most”), 
instead of absolute trust. See ZACAT (http://zacat.gesis.org/).  
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study dataset) (e.g. van der Putten, Kok & Gupta, 2002; Rässler, 2002; 
Vantaggi, 2008). However, this is a very unusual procedure both in the 
fields of political science and communication research, and the imputation 
of 100% of missing cases based on similarities between individual 
interviewees could reduce substantially the validity of any results 
concerning trust in the media.  
The second method consists in operationalizing trust at the national 
level, creating a Media Trust variable based on the average percent of 
people that affirmed trust the media in the most relevant Eurobarometer 
wave. In fact, and quoting Popescu (2008), “differences among citizens 
regarding how much trust they place in the mass media and/or how much 
credibility various media outlets enjoy with the audience, as well as cross-
country differences in overall levels or trust in mass media, are expected to 
be consequential for the likelihood of media effects” (p. 102). A system-
level operationalization of this variable is not, therefore, totally out of the 
question, even if the results must be read and interpreted differently in 
order to not incur in ecological fallacy.  
Due to the relevance of this factor and the risks of imputing 100% of 
missing values to the PIREDEU voter survey dataset, I decided to 
operationalize it at the national level, using the information collected by the 
Eurobarometer (wave 72.4, implemented in the Fall of 2009; TNS Opinion 
& GESIS, 2010), but also by the expert survey on media systems (Popescu, 
Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010). 
 The Expert Survey started by presenting the following sentence 
“News media enjoy a lot of credibility in [COUNTRY]” alongside an 11-point 
scale (0=untrue; 10= true). This variable needed no transformation for the 
purposes of this research. On the other hand, the Eurobarometer 
questionnaire included questions about whether the respondents tend to 
trust or not to trust a series of institutions, amongst which television, radio 
and the press. These three indicators, that originally varied from 0 to 100 
(depicting the percentage of respondents that trust the TV/press/radio in a 
given country)65 were transformed (i.e., multiplied by a factor of .1) in order 
                                                 
65 The percentages that I used to compute the variables are not the ‘valid’ 
percentages, but the raw percentages, so this measure is quite conservative. If 
 
 
138 
to vary in a scale from 0 to 10. This was done in order to facilitate the 
comparison between this measure of trust and the one described above. For 
substantive and methodological reasons, both variables will be kept in the 
analysis. 
 Correlations between those three items are very high (between .63 
and .85), and the internal consistency measures suggest that they can be 
employed in a single index (Cronbach’s Alpha= .88). Therefore, the average 
of those three items was computed, in order to create a general index of 
trust in the news media. Descriptive statistics are available in Appendix 2.  
4.3.9 Exposure 
 
Measures of media exposure based on survey self-reports are usually 
criticized, being viewed by several scholars (see Zaller, 1992, 1996; Price & 
Zaller, 1993) as less good than direct observations, media use diaries (as in 
Hill, 1985), or political knowledge as indicator of propensity to receive 
media messages (Zaller, 1996). There is usually some measurement error 
associated with self-reports in surveys, due to memory issues related to the 
fact that media use are low-saliency behaviours (Price & Zaller, 1993) In 
fact, how perfectly do people recall the frequency, extent and variety of 
such an ordinary activity as watching TV, reading a newspaper, or 
browsing through a news magazine in a waiting room? People then tend to 
guess, and usually over-estimate their levels of exposure66 (Bechtel et al., 
1972, in Price & Zaller, 1993; Zaller, 2002; Prior, 2005). In the American case, 
over-reporting is not random, but explained by factors like age – younger 
people are usually less accurate in their reports of media exposure (Prior, 
2009a).  
On a positive note, previous research has shown that questions 
concerning reporting regular behaviour using the terminology “typical 
                                                                                                                            
missing cases were ignored in the computation of relative frequencies, the trust 
indexes would display higher values.  
66 Social desirability and satisficing could also play a role – newspaper reporting 
can be overstated and TV watching understated due to a wish to make a good 
impression to the interviewer; on the other hand, people might feel that an effort to 
give an accurate estimate of news exposure is not worthy. Prior (2009b) tested this 
hypothesis and showed that these factors do not explain inaccuracy in self-reports 
of media exposure.   
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week” have more predictive validity that those using other wordings (e.g. 
past week, etc.) (Chang & Krosnick, 2003). Fortunately enough, those who 
make decisions on question wording in cross-country public opinion 
surveys are aware of this, a the 2009 PIREDEU Voter Study  demonstrates. 
 At the country level, my measure of exposure was constructed using 
PIREDEU (EES, 2009a) data collected by the question – “Q7 – In a typical 
week, how many days do you follow the news?” – and varies between 1 and 7. 67 
Descriptive statistics of this variable are presented on Appendix 2.  
The PIREDEU Voter Survey questionnaire also includes other specific 
questions on the degree of exposure to specific outlets. Data collected with 
those questions is used to operationalize the intensity of exposure of each 
particular audience. This variable also varies between 1 and 7, since the 
respondents who answered “zero days” do not belong to the outlet’s 
audience.  
4.4 Final Notes 
 
 In this chapter, the amount, variety and complexity of information 
collected with the purpose of characterizing media systems and 
informational environments in Europe have been explored. Either by 
reproducing and adapting previous indicators, or by creating new ones, all 
the relevant measures were operationalized at the levels of analysis 
considered pertinent; moreover, basic statistical tests have shown that, 
grosso modo, these indexes are consistent and vary in the required degree. In 
the next chapter, all the dimensions presented here are used to create a 
picture of media systems and information environments in the European 
Union member states in 2009.  
                                                 
67 The original scale varies between 0 and 7, but respondents answering 0 (i.e., that 
did not use the news media) are not part of this study, since exposure is a sine qua 
non condition for agenda-setting occurrence to take place. This question has a 
considerably high response rate – only 0.7 of the interviewees refused to answer or 
confessed they would not know how to answer it, and 2.5% do not use the media 
at all. The average number of days people follow the media is 6 (more precisely, 
6.11) and the standard deviation is close to two days (1.61). 
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5 
 
MEDIA SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION 
ENVIRONMENTS IN EUROPE, 2009 
 
 
 
In this chapter, the 27 European media systems under analysis are 
described, and the relationship between media systems and informational 
environments is tested. The focus will be put both in the communalities 
and differences between countries, and I will try to provide a convincing 
test of the general hypotheses presented in Chapter Four. The following 
chapters will deal with the relationship between those effects and agenda-
setting occurrence and strength. 
The chapter is organized in three sections. I start by presenting the 
general panorama of media systems in Europe, through the use of 
quantitative data coming from multiple data sources. This section therefore 
presents a systematic operationalization of Hallin & Mancini’s (2004) 
theoretical and qualitative analysis of media systems in Europe, and is 
partially inspired by Voltmer (2000); moreover, it allows testing for 
hypotheses concerning within-Europe differences regarding each 
dimension and the relationship between media systems and democratic 
stability.  
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In the second section, the relationship between the different media 
system dimensions (development of press markets, journalism 
professionalization, ownership, freedom of press, press partisanship) is 
tested. The third and last section of this chapter presents the general 
patterns of trust, exposure, media agenda diversity and information quality 
in Europe, and tests hypotheses about the impact of media systems on 
these measures of the information environment.  
5.1 Descriptive Analysis of Media Systems 
5.1.1  Development of Press  Markets 
 
Let us start by tackling the qualitative dimension of development of 
press markets. On average, there are substantial differences in the way 
tabloids and reference newspapers address reality (mean of 6.01 in an 
eleven-point scale). As shown by Figure 5.1, it seems like the panorama 
varies considerably from country to country – for instance, Germany and, 
to a lesser degree, the UK and Ireland are countries in which the difference 
in the content and style of reference and tabloid newspapers is greater.  
This is not surprising if one considers how vibrant the tabloid press is in 
Britain (Humphreys, 2009), as well as how particular the style of the 
German tabloid Bild is, vis-à-vis the quality press in these countries, which 
is consumed and seen as reference by most of their neighbours. 
 The results in Latvia, as well as in Estonia and Lithuania, which also 
present low levels of qualitative diversity, are in line with what Balcytiene 
(2009, 2012) describes as the penetration of market-oriented discourse in the 
print (as well as audiovisual) media, which might have lowered the quality 
of reference newspapers in a setting where tabloids have a strong stance.   
What about quantitative diversity? We know from previous research 
that, as a whole, Europe is characterized by a high number of newspapers 
and newspaper readers, compared with the rest of the World (Elvestad & 
Blekesaune, 2008). In fact, on average, in 2009 there were 58 different daily 
newspapers in each European country. However, the situation differs 
considerably from nation to nation (Figure 5.2). On the one hand, in small 
countries from the South and East of Europe (Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia) the 
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number of daily titles is lower than 10. On the other hand, Germany has a 
considerable number of daily newspapers in circulation (357). The 
landscape in Spain, Italy, France and the UK is also characterized by a great 
diversity of titles in the newsstands.68  
 
Figure 5.1 – Qualitative Diversity of Press Markets in Europe, 200969 
 
Notes: 
1. Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 
2010). Calculations made by the author.  
2. The scale varies between 0 (no differences between reference newspapers and 
tabloids) and 10 (strong differences between reference newspapers and tabloids).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Nevertheless, if we weight the number of titles by the size of population, the 
relative diversity is, of course, much higher in small countries such as Cyprus (but 
also Finland or Malta), and quite modest in the most populated countries of the 
European Union (Italy, Germany, Poland, etc.).  
69
 Except for Belgium, the national codes present in this and other pictures and 
tables are the ISO 3166 Alpha Codes proposed by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO). The codes are Austria (AT), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), 
Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), 
Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), 
Lithuania (LT), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), 
Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), United 
Kingdom (GB). In the case of Belgium, I use BE-F for Flanders and BE-W for 
Walloon. 
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The average circulation of daily newspapers per million citizens gives 
us an insight into how widespread the habit of newspaper readership is 
across different European countries, since the publishing houses print and 
distribute a specific number of newspapers that varies accordingly to their 
previous sales and current expectations towards their audience.  
In 2009, the amount of newspaper circulation in countries in the 
South and East of Europe was modest, letting us think that the publishers 
are aware that the number of daily readers (and buyers) of newspapers will 
not be much different than some figure between 8.3% (Portugal) and 20% 
(Slovenia) of the entire population. Readership seems to be much stronger 
in countries such as Austria, Finland, Sweden or the French community in 
Belgium – here, the values of average circulation vary between 342 and 457 
thousand copies per million citizens (Figure 5.2).  
Economic wellbeing seems to play a role here: in 2006, there was a 
correlation of .43 between GDP per capita and newspaper circulation in 45 
European countries (Färdigh, 2010). In 2009, and in the 26 EC countries 
studied here, this relationship is even stronger (Pearson’s r = .64; p<.001; 
N=27).70 
 Gender gaps are absent in three European countries – Ireland, 
Sweden and Latvia – and very low in the majority of the other member-
states for which we have information.71 Romania, Slovakia and Spain are 
the countries in which the printed press reaches women to a considerably 
lower degree than it reaches men. There is also considerable variance in the 
balance between consumption of electronic and printed media in the 15 
countries for which there is data. At one of the extremes, we find Austria, 
where the balance is considerably superior to the one found amongst the 
Polish citizens (Figure 5.2).  
  
                                                 
70
 Data on GDP per capita in 2009 was collected in the Eurostat website: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.  
71 As stated earlier, it was not possible to find data for four systems: Cyprus, 
Finland, Italy, and Malta.  
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These results are similar to those reported by Shehata & Stömbäck 
(2011) based on data collected before 2007, even if the pools of countries are 
dissimilar. In fact, Austria, Finland and Sweden, which are displayed here 
as relatively balanced in terms of time spent watching the TV and reading 
newspapers, are amongst the group of countries that those authors define 
as having lower levels of television-centrism. Moreover, Greece and Spain, 
two of the most imbalanced countries in this study, are also those that are 
portrayed by Shehata & Stömbäck (2011) as being strongly television-
centric.  
Regarding the television panorama, the results do not support the 
expectation that in Europe, the degree of development of the television 
market would be more equitative than the development of the press (Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004), at least in what concerns number of channels available 
and proportion of households with access to cable TV. In fact, even if Italy 
and Spain (two outliers from the point of view of number of choices) are 
excluded, there is still great variation in the number of channels someone 
can access from the couch every night. For instance, in three island-States 
(Ireland, Malta and Cyprus) this figure is considerably smaller than in 
France, the UK, Hungary or Germany (Figure 5.3). In addition, cable 
coverage arrives to almost 100% of the population with television access in 
Malta, the Netherlands and Belgium, while it is much less widespread in 
Cyprus (Figure 5.3). Interestingly enough, the number of channels and the 
proportion of households with cable are not significantly correlated (r=-.23; 
p=.23).  
The number of daily titles is correlated with qualitative diversity – it 
seems that the amount of choice in the newsstands can be translated into 
more space for differences in style. The size of press market, measured by 
the average circulation of daily newspapers per million citizens, is, not 
surprisingly, inversely related to gender gap and imbalance in media 
consumption – larger markets are also more gender-balanced and result in 
a smaller predominance of the TV as the mass medium par excellance (Table 
5.1).  
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Figure 5.3 – Development of the TV Market in Europe, 2009 
 
 
Source: EAO (2010). Calculations made by the author.  
 
The imbalance in the use of newspapers and TV, as well as gender 
gaps in newspaper use, are associated with higher numbers of TV channels 
available in the market. Lastly, it is interesting to note that market features 
associated with amount of choice in both submarkets are correlated: 
countries with high number of daily titles also have TV panoramas that 
allow for more choice; in the same vein, the number of cable households is 
positively associated with the size of the press market (Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1 – Correlations between Indicators of Press Market Development 
 
 Diff. 
Tabloid/ 
Reference 
N  Daily 
Titles 
Average 
Circulation
/ Million 
Gender 
Gap 
Imbalance Choice TV 
N Daily 
Titles 
   .40**      
Av. Circ./ 
Million 
.28 .03     
Gender 
Gap 
.01 .03 -.46**    
Imbalance  -.18 .26   -.80*** .52**   
Choice TV .28 .47** -.17 .35* .39*  
Cable 
Dissem. 
.17 -.16 .56** -.15 .25 -.24 
       
 
Notes:  
1. Source: WAN (2010), EAO (2010); Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, 
Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010).  Calculations made by the author.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. Ns are of 23 for gender gap, 15 for imbalance, and 27 for the other variables.  
 
Hypothesis 4.1 postulated differences in the degree of press market 
development in Europe, with the Liberal and Democratic Corporatist 
countries in a better situation when compared with the Polarized Pluralist 
and the new EU member states (NMS12). The size of the press market is 
indeed considerably bigger in the North and West European Countries 
than in the South and East of Europe (F(3,26)= 18.85; p=.000). However, as 
for differences between newspapers and tabloids, even if the means display 
the hypothesized pattern, the only significant difference is found between 
the Liberal countries and the Eastern/Southern cluster composed by recent 
EU members (F(3,26)=7.67; p= .001). Moreover, the degree of imbalance 
between the use of newspapers and television is only lower in the 
Democratic Corporatist countries, being the Liberal cluster close to the 
other groups (F(3,14)= 3.512; p=.053) (Table 5.2).  
In the same vein, there are no significant differences in terms of 
number of titles between the four regions (F(3,26)= .935; p =.440), even if the 
number of choices is clearly lower in Eastern Europe than in the other 
regions. The same can be said about the gender gap – women read 
newspapers to a much lesser degree than men in Polarized Pluralist 
 149
countries and the NMS12 than in the rest of the EU, but these differences 
are not statistically significant (F(3,22)= 1.65; p=.211) (Table 5.2). 
Regarding the realm of television, the four systems are not uniform. 
In fact, it seems that choice is higher in Liberal and Polarized pluralistic 
systems than in the rest of Europe (F(3,26)= 3.79; p=.024), but standard 
deviations suggest that there are considerable differences within these 
groups. On the other hand, the proportion of households with access to 
cable TV is much higher in Democratic Corporativist systems than in the 
rest of Europe (F(3,26)= 5.56; p=.005) (Table 5.2).  
 
Table 5.2 – Differences in Development of Media Markets in Europe, 2009 
 
 Liberal  
(Ireland, UK) 
Dem. 
Corporatist 
 (Austria,  
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
Germany, 
Netherlands, 
Sweden) 
Polarized 
Pluralist 
(France, 
Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, 
Spain) 
NMS12 
(Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania, Poland, 
Slovakia, 
Slovenia) 
 
 Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Difference 
Newspapers 
7.46 .20 6.80 .74 6.31 .44 5.06 1.20 
Number  
of Titles 
60.5 70.0 79.25 114.47 83.20 51.03 33.25 28.49 
Average 
Circulation 
223.80 42.41 334.27 85.48 127.70 28.61 149.92 48.39 
Gender  
Gap 
2 2.82 4.85 2.78 9.78 3.93 7.24 5.89 
Imbalance 
18572 -- 147.48 27.36 189.50 18.84 171.93 21.97 
Choice TV 
303 403.1 168.4 118.9 569.2 496.5 131.83 145.3 
Cable Diss. 
42.75 21.56 79.29 20.55 36.26 17.94 46.63 22.88 
     
 
Source: WAN (2010); EAO (2010); Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana 
Pereira & Gosselin, 2010).  Calculations made by the author.  
 
  
                                                 
72 This value is not actually a mean but the raw value for one of the two cases in 
this group; I found no information about time spent watching TV vs. reading 
newspapers in Ireland.  
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In turn, hypothesis 4.2 postulated that development of press markets 
would be stronger in older democracies. I use three measures associated 
with democracy in order to test this, all of them collected from Polity IV.  
The age and state of democracy are assessed by using the data present on 
the country reports of the Polity IV research project, which present trends 
and an analysis of the current situation. The "Polity Score" captures the 
regime variance in the world on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). This project also 
offers information about the behavior of this indicator since 1946 (which 
can be used as a measure of stability) and the date of latest political 
transition in each country.73  
 The results support this hypothesis only partially (Table 5.3). Age of 
democracy is indeed positively connected with the size of the media 
market (measured by the average circulation of newspapers per million 
citizens and the proportion of households with cable television), but not 
with other indicators of press market development. Moreover, stable 
democratic regimes are not only associated with bigger markets but also 
with more qualitative diversity in the newsstands. The current state of 
things in terms of quality of democracy is not connected with the features 
of the press market.   
In sum, even if not all differences between the four regions of Europe 
reached statistical significance, some of the comparisons made above 
support the idea that the press market is more strongly developed in the 
North and the Western European countries. However, the standard 
deviations of some of these groups attest the existence of considerable 
variability within the four regions, which supports the argument that it is 
better to analyse each country individually instead of creating clusters. It is 
also worth mentioning that age of democracy and democratic stability are 
associated with the development of the press market, at least in terms of 
size of the press market.  
 
                                                 
73
 The Polity IV data used in this chapter is available online at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. There is not much variance in 
terms of degree of democracy in the EU27, but there is some variation in terms of 
age of democracy in those countries. 
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Table 5.3 – Correlations between Indicators of Press Market Development and 
Democracy Indexes 
 
 Polity IV  
Score 
Polity IV Stability 
Index 
Polity IV date of 
last transition 
Diff. Tabloid/ Reference .24 .50** -.39 
N Daily  Titles .08 -.02 .11 
Av. Circulation/ Million -.06 .63** -.68*** 
Gender Gap .01 -.35 .23 
Imbalance  -.02 -.42 .41 
Choice TV .25 .14 .01 
Cable Dissemination -.19 .31 -.61*** 
    
 
Notes:  
1. Source: WAN (2010), EAO (2010); Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, 
Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010), Polity IV.  Calculations made by the author.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. Ns are of 23 for gender gap, 15 for imbalance, and 27 for the other variables.  
 
5.1.2 Strength of Public TV 
 
In 1990, several European countries presented a TV panorama in 
which public broadcasters detained at least 50% of the audience shares, but 
in countries like Portugal or most Eastern European countries, commercial 
TV did not exist yet (Voltmer, 2000). In 2009, all European Union countries 
had private TV channels, a sign that the monopoly of public broadcasters is 
a thing of the (recent) past. Nonetheless, the relative situation of public and 
private broadcasters seems to vary considerably in their ability to attract 
audiences.  
The central tendency measures indicate that, in our sample of 
European media systems, there is a general trend for private channels to 
have more audience than public broadcasters (Appendix 2). In fact, Figure 
5.4 shows that the countries in which public television is stronger than the 
commercial channels in the audience market are a minority – Denmark, 
and to a lesser extent, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium-Wallonia, 
and Malta.74  
                                                 
74 In some of these countries a significant part of the shares goes to foreign 
channels, either broadcasted directly for those countries or in countries where the 
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Figure 5.4 – Television Market in Europe, 2009: Public vs. Private  
Audience Shares 
 
      Notes: 
1. Source: EAO (2010). Calculations made by the author. 
2. The scale varies between -100 (commercial channels have 100% of audience share 
in the country) and 100 (PBS channels have 100% of audience share in the 
country).  
 
 
 Then, we have several European countries where there seems to be 
an equilibrium between the audiences of public and private broadcasters – 
Italy, Finland and Flanders are the stronger example of dualism, but the 
same can be said about audience markets in Sweden, the UK and Poland. 
The polish TV market is actually the most dual system of the CEE countries 
under study; the Polish PBS has been able to compete side by side with 
commercial broadcasters since the early 2000s (Filas & Planeta, 2009).  
The Italian case deserves special attention due to its unusual 
historical developments. Television in Italy was entirely public until the 
1970s, when the proliferation of small commercial TVs offered more 
diversity of choice to the audiences. However, when Silvio Berlusconi 
purchased almost the entire commercial network, the result was the 
creation of a duopoly and a strong division of the audience between private 
and public (Ricolfi, 1997; Padovani, 2009) that it still observed in the current 
days, as Figure 5.4 attests.  
                                                                                                                            
same/a similar language is spoken (e.g.: German channels in Austria; French 
channels in Wallonia; British channels in Ireland; Italian channels in Malta).  
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In the other 15 countries, the television market is tendentially 
commercial. Bulgaria, Romania and Greece are at the extremes of the 
distribution, characterized by the fact that their private channels have at 
least more 50 percent points of audience share than the public channels put 
together.  
But how commercial is public television in Europe? A way of 
establishing this is by seeing how much of the total revenues of the public 
broadcasters actually come from the State. In the end, a public broadcaster 
that depends considerably on advertising and private funding is, 
theoretically speaking, less likely to be different from private networks, 
since it needs to respond to the same market needs and constraints. In 2009, 
the majority of the states contributed to at least two-thirds of the total 
revenues of public broadcasters (Figure 5.5).  
 The exceptions are Ireland, Austria, Italy and Spain (where there is a 
greater balance between the amounts of public and private funding) and 
Poland and Malta, where the public-owned channels are mainly funded by 
private sources (Figure 5.5).  
 
Figure 5.5 – Television Market in Europe, 2009: State Funding of Public TV 
 
Notes: 
1. Source: EAO (2010). Calculations made by the author. 
2. The scale varies between 0 (no funding from the state) and 100 (PBS is 
completely funded by the state).  
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These two dimensions – audience and funding – are negatively but 
not significantly correlated (Pearson’s r= - .22; p= .287), which means that 
there is a slight tendency for public broadcasters to depend more on public 
funding when the audience market privileges commercial TV channels.  
As predicted by Hypothesis 4.3, the television audience panorama in 
the Democratic Corporatist countries is much less commercialized than in 
the two clusters formed by Southern and Eastern European nations 
(F(3,26)= 8.09; p=.001); but the UK and Ireland are closer to the former 
group of countries than to the latter. In fact, audience markets in the Liberal 
and Democratic Corporatist countries are a save haven for public 
television, with their PBS channels presenting, on average, 10 and 13 
percentage points of advantage vis-à-vis the free private channels. 
Commercial TV, which entered the market in most Southern and Eastern 
European countries in the last few decades, is stronger than the public 
broadcasters in the audience market (Table 5.4).  
There are no statistically significant differences between the amount 
of state funding of public broadcasters in these four regions of Europe, 
even if there is a tendency for funding to be weaker in Liberal countries, 
when compared to the Democratic Corporatist and, to a lesser extent, the 
other clusters (F(2,26)= .985; p= .388) (Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4 – Differences in the Television Market in Europe, 2009 
 
 Liberal  
(Ireland, UK) 
Dem. 
Corporatist 
 (Austria, 
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
Germany, 
Netherlands, 
Sweden) 
Polarized 
Pluralist 
(France, 
Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, 
Spain) 
NMS12 
(Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania, Poland, 
Slovakia, 
Slovenia) 
 
 Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Relative 
Audience 
9.90 19.09 12.95 22.96 -25.62 19.04 -30.60 21.01 
Funding 
62 12.73 84 14.46 71.40 11.10 71.71 26.05 
     
 
   Source: EAO (2010). Calculations made by the author.  
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In sum, it seems that Scandinavian and Western EU countries do 
present stronger public television panoramas in terms of audience share 
and independence from advertising, but that Liberal contexts such as 
Ireland and the UK present broadcasting channels that, even though they 
operate in a situation of lower state intervention (Hallin & Mancini 2004) 
and lower funding (Table 5.4), are able to attract, as a whole, a larger 
audience than the private channels.  
The history of introduction of commercial TV in the country does not 
seem to be related to the relative audiences of public and private channels, 
or to the amount of funding that the PBS gets from the state. However, 
public broadcasters do have bigger audiences in stable and older 
democracies (Table 5.5).  
 
Table 5.5 – Correlations between Indicators of PBS Strength, Date of 
Introduction of Commercial Channels and Democracy Indexes 
 
 Polity IV  
Score 
Polity IV 
Stability 
Index 
Polity IV 
date of last 
transition 
Date of 
Introduction 
Commercial 
TV  
Relative Audience .14 .64** -.65** -.15 
Funding -.10 -.04 -.03 -.17 
     
 
Notes:  
1. Source: EAO (2010); Polity IV.  Calculations made by the author.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. N=27.  
 
5.1.3 Freedom of Press 
 
Europe, as a whole, is a subset of countries in which press freedom is 
strong, but there are disparities that are worth highlighting. For instance, 
the Freedom House experts consider that media systems in Italy, Romania 
and Bulgaria are only partially free, and that Greece is close to the 
threshold differentiating freedom and partial freedom of press. Romania is 
the top country in terms of constrains to press freedom both in terms of 
legal framework, political functioning and economic structure, whereas 
Scandinavian countries are usually at the other extreme of the distribution. 
On the other hand, Spain is an interesting case, scoring fairly low in the 
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assessment of legal and economic problems impacting freedom, but being 
amongst the countries where the political sphere interferes more with the 
way the press works (Figure 5.6).  
 At the middle point of the distribution, we find countries such as 
Malta, Cyprus, Hungary, France and Great Britain. These latter two 
countries are also interesting on their own, since the differences in their 
objective situation of press freedom assessed by experts (Britain in a 
slightly better situation than France) are also observed in public opinion 
data about how free people think that media in their home country are 
(Kull et al., 2008).  
 
But why are the results for Romania, Bulgaria and Italy so negative? Media 
elites in Romania are accused of being highly corrupt, even after the 
accession of the country to the EU (Gross, 2008). The Romanian media 
system is considered to be just partially free, and marked by things such as 
attacks against press freedom by state institutions, high number of attacks 
and threats against journalists, and consolidation of media concentration, 
instrumentalization of the press, attempts of political control over the 
National Audiovisual Council, self-censorship and other maladies (Gross, 
2008).  This is, of course, and fortunately enough, a panorama that is not 
common in most European countries.  
 In the case of Bulgaria, intimidation of journalists – by means of 
legal and illegal actions – was an issue in 2009. Lastly, in Italy, the major 
problem seems to have been the tremendously high media concentration 
during the Berlusconi government (while in cabinet, Berlusconi controlled 
almost all of the broadcast media: the private channels that he owned and 
the public broadcaster RAI), as well as a difficult relationship between this 
prime-minister and the press, which occasioned the presentation to the 
Parliament of legislative initiatives which would have had a limiting 
impact on media freedom (Padovani, 2009; Freedom House, 2010).  
 15
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  The legal, political and economic aspects of press freedom are 
obviously correlated. Legal and political aspects present the strongest 
relationship (Pearson r = .82; p = .000), but the correlations between 
political and economical constraints (Pearson r= .66; p =.000), or legal and 
economical instances (Pearson r= .71; p=.000) are also considerably strong. 
 Hypothesis 4.5 postulated a relationship between freedom of press 
and age of democracy. The results are in accordance with the hypothesis – 
the general situation of freedom of press is worse in less stable, recent 
democracies. However, the current situation of the democracies in Europe 
does not explain the press freedom situation, perhaps because it does not 
vary as much as the other two dimensions (Table 5.6).  
 
Table 5.6 – Pearson Correlations between Press Freedom and Democracy 
Indexes, 2009 
 
 Polity IV  
Score 
Polity IV 
Stability Index 
Polity IV date of 
last transition 
General Index -.05 -.43** .51** 
Legal Constraints .05 -.37** .47** 
Political Constraints .06 -.45** .55** 
Economic Constraints -.28 -.50** .49** 
    
 
Notes:  
1. Source: Freedom House (2010), Polity IV. Calculations made by the author.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
 
5.1.4 Journalist Professionalization 
  
 Levels of journalist professionalization vary considerably in the 27 
countries under study. On a scale from 0 to 10, the average value of 
professionalization for the entire sample is of just 4.87, a little below the 
mean point of the scale. This means that, grosso modo, levels of journalism 
professionalization in Europe are not particularly high. However, there is a 
substantial difference between the situation in the EU Scandinavian 
countries – where the levels of reported professionalization are very high – 
and the patterns observed for Italy and several CEE states, where the 
experts were pessimistic about the condition of journalism as a profession 
(Figure 5.7).  
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 Figure 5.7 – Journalist Professionalization in Europe, 2009 
 
      Notes: 
1. Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 
2010). Calculations made by the author. 
2. The scale varies between 0 (no journalist professionalization at all) and 10 
(journalists are strongly professionalized).  
 
Differences in professionalization are probably not related to 
differences in educational background, but with style and the relationship 
with the realms of culture and politics (Papathanassospoulos, 2007). Italian 
journalists are described in the literature as close to an ideal-type marked 
by passivity in their relation with the world of politics, and open support 
for specific political positions (Patterson, 1998; Donsbach & Patterson, 
2004). This is in line with the low degree of professionalization portrayed in 
Figure 5.7. By contrast, Swedish journalists are rather active – especially in 
their role of critics of government – but tend to stay away from partisan 
disputes (Patterson, 1998; Donsbach & Patterson, 2004).  
 In Poland, where journalists as a profession tend to focus on their 
own interests, advocate specific ideologies, take sides or at least adopt an 
entrenched style (Filas & Planeta, 2009; Dobek-Ostrowska & Lódzki, 2011; 
Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012), journalism professionalization is rated as rather 
low by the experts. However, some observers do contest that there are two 
kinds of journalism in Poland: one is strongly professionalized and 
therefore closer to the Liberal or Democratic Corporativist models and the 
other – which is majoritarian and, according to some, strongly present in 
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the public media (Filas & Planeta, 2009) – is weaker in terms of 
professionalization and puts the country closer to the Mediterranean 
systems (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012).  
 In the same vein, journalists in Romania display low levels of 
professionalization, which may be due to a lack of organization and 
solidarity between professionals, weak and inefficient ethic codes, an 
inadequate professional culture and poor pay for journalists (especially 
when compared with media managers) (Gross, 2008; Coman, 2009). 
Accordingly, the evaluation of Czech journalists by the experts resembles 
the image of incomplete professionalization described by Volek (2010).  
 On the other hand, the French news environment has been recently 
characterized as possessing a weakly professionalized, less independently 
minded journalistic community: “a journalism that fits the state-centered 
type of French democracy but may be regarded as inadequate by adherents 
of a different type of democracy” (Esser, 2008, p. 423), whereas German 
journalists are described as being actively independent and advocating 
specific positions, assuming the role of social and political analysts (Köcher, 
1986; Patterson, 1998; Donsbach & Patterson, 2004). The measure of 
journalist professionalization used in this thesis does not support the 
existence of a different degree of professionalization between French and 
German journalists. The difference lies probably in the style than in the 
independence and ethical values shared by such professionals. British 
journalists are portrayed as neutral and passive, the straightforward type 
(Patterson, 1998; Donsbach & Patterson, 2004), but they only score average 
in the journalism professionalization index used here.  
 Is there a relationship between the current situation of journalism 
professionalization and the tradition of journalistic codes of ethics? Laitila 
(1995) provides some information about the date in which the first 
journalistic codes of ethics were implemented in 18 out of the 27 EU 
countries. The dates are sometimes directly displayed in the article; in some 
other cases, the author just refers to the decade of implementation. For 
instance, the French code was implemented between the World Wars, the 
British, Czech, Belgian and Dutch documents came to exist in the late 
1940s-early 1950s, those of the Iberian countries in the late 1970s (during 
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the transition to democracy), and most CEE countries substituted the codes 
of ethics drawn under communist rule with rules mirroring the new 
democratic context (Laitila, 1995). I performed correlation tests to assess the 
relationship between the history of ethic codes (measured by a variable 
displaying the decade in which the first document came into being, in a 
democratic context) and the current state of journalist professionalization in 
this sub-set of 18 EU countries (measured by the expert survey index). The 
results show that these variables are not correlated.  
 To finish this section on journalist professionalization, I will test the 
hypotheses proposed in the previous chapter. Based on Hallin & Mancini’s 
(2004) considerations about the situation of journalism professionalization 
in the transition to the 21st century, it was hypothesized that journalists 
would be much more professionalized in Liberal and Democratic 
Corporatist countries than in the rest of the continent. This is only partially 
true: on the one hand, this last cluster presents a much more positive 
situation in terms of journalism ethics and rules of conduct than the 
Southern or Eastern Europe; on the other, journalist professionalization in 
the Liberal countries is not stronger than in the Mediterranean systems or 
the NMS12 (F(3,26)= 8.27; p= .001) (Figure 5.8).  
 
Figure 5.8 – Differences in Journalism Professionalization in Europe, 2009 
 
      Notes: 
1. Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 
2010). Calculations made by the author. 
2. The scale varies between 0 (no journalist professionalization at all) and 10 
(journalists are strongly professionalized).  
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 It was also hypothesized that journalism professionalization would 
be weaker in new democracies, which is confirmed by the data – the 
correlation between the year of last transition and the degree of journalism 
professionalization is of .48 (p=.013, N=26). Democratic stability is also 
positively associated with professionalization (Pearson’s r=.39< p=.047; 
N=26). 
5.1.5 Partisanship/Balance 
 
In Europe, the perception of political balance is stronger for 
newspapers than for the television, a result that goes against the common 
idea that broadcasters are politically less biased than their printed 
counterparts. There are a few countries where there is no significant 
difference between these two perceptions – Ireland and the UK, where the 
perception of balance of both types of media is relatively low, and Latvia 
and Lithuania, where such perceptions are equally and comparatively 
higher (Figure 5.9).  
Italian television is, along with the Irish, French and Czech 
broadcasters, at the bottom of the distribution in terms of the presentation 
of different political sides and spheres, a situation that cannot be unrelated 
to the fact that, in 2009, the Italian prime-minister was also the owner of the 
biggest private broadcasting company in the country – Mediaset. Even if 
political interference has always been high in the realm of Italian TV, it has 
given positive fruits in the past – the lotizzatione tradition assured pluralism 
of information and promoted a variety of voices and perspectives in the TV 
(Padovani, 2009). However, the panorama in 2009 is much more negative 
that (presumably) it was in the past.  
The Danish enjoy more of a balanced television panorama (Figure 
5.9). The Polish broadcasters score low and newspapers score high in terms 
of political balance. This is unsurprising if we bear in mind Dobek-
Ostrowska’s (2012) recent picture of the Polish media system in the last two 
decades, in which she describes PBS as “politics over broadcasting system” 
and newspapers – especially tabloids – as trying “to be neutral because it is 
better for business” (pp. 34 and 38 respectively).  
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Figure 5.9 – Political Balance of Television and Newspapers in Europe, 2009 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1. Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 
2010). Calculations made by the author. 
2. The scale varies between 0 (strong bias, no political balance at all) and 10 (no 
bias, strong political balance).  
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of newspaper balance is higher, followed by Denmark and the 
Netherlands. As regards Belgium, the situation in Wallonia is tendentially 
more positive than in Flanders; finally, Finland is no longer amongst the 
countries in which newspaper diversity is stronger (Figure 5.9). 
 On the other hand, in 1990 the Italian press system had low 
diversity of content and was marked by almost no internal diversity – the 
weight of neutral newspapers was close to zero (Voltmer, 2000). The 
situation seems to have improved considerably since then – even if Italian 
TV is considered to be poorly balanced, newspapers in Italy were granted a 
considerably high grade in terms of political balance.   
 In the UK, during the 1970s and 1980s, most viewers considered that 
British television was not biased towards a specific political party (Gunter 
& Svennevig, 1988). On the other hand, the British press from the early 
1990s is considered to be partisan: most of the newspapers are traditionally 
pro-Conservative, but seem to have just a marginal impact in the political 
sphere (Curtice, 1997; Voltmer, 2000). The experts do see newspapers as 
biased, but their perceptions on television bias in Britain show that the 
panorama may have become worse since the 1980s – in fact, there is no 
difference between the average assessments of the two kinds of outlets in 
the case of the UK (Figure 5.9).  
 Lastly, the situation in Ireland is fairly similar to what it was twenty 
years ago in terms of the degree of political internal diversity in the press; 
on the other hand, Danish and, to a lesser extent, Swedish, Greek and 
Spanish newspapers seem to be more politically balanced now than twenty 
years ago (Voltmer, 2000; Figure 5.9).  
 What about external diversity?75 In 1990, Ireland and Greece were at 
the top of the scale in terms of press diversity (in ideological terms), 
whereas Sweden and Belgium presented more modest patterns (Voltmer, 
2000). The measures of external diversity used here do not refer only to 
newspapers, so the degree of comparability is compromised. However, 
Greece is still close to a panorama of external diversity, whereas Ireland is 
                                                 
75
 External diversity refers to the existence of different partisan outlets in the 
country, but that are leaned towards different political parties and ideologies, 
therefore creating pluralism at the system level.  
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amongst the three European countries where the distance from a balanced 
situation is greater – in fact, Sweden and Belgium (both communities) now 
score better in the measure of ideological external diversity than Ireland 
(Figure 5.10).  
 
Figure 5.10 – External Diversity in Europe, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1. Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 
2010). Calculations made by the author. 
2. The scale varies between 0 (diversity is present) and 100 (no external diversity at 
all).  
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Hungary seems to be fairly balanced from an external point of view – 
there is no difference between the number of partisan outlets supporting 
left and right-wing parties, as well as between those pro-incumbent or pro-
opposition parties. Bulgaria, on the other hand, scores quite low on both 
measures of internal diversity (Figure 5.10).  
In Figure 5.11, I present data on external diversity in the 27 European 
polities, in terms of ideological positions and also incumbent vs. opposition 
support by partisan outlets. In this figure, the values were not yet 
transformed in order to represent the distance from an ideal situation (zero 
difference between the two sides of the spectrum, irrespective of which 
sides). Therefore, it is possible to see that in most countries the majority of 
partisan newspapers/channels are to the side of centre-right or right-wing 
parties – the exceptions are Belgium and Greece. Hungary, Slovakia and 
Slovenia are too close to the ideal point of this scale (0, meaning 
equilibrium) to be considered biased.  
 
Figure 5.11 – External diversity of media outlets in Europe, 2009 
 
 
 
Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010) 
  
  
 
SK
SI
SE RO
PT
PL
NL
MT
LV
LT
IT IE
HU
GR
GB
FR
FI
ES
EE
DK
DECZ
CY
BG
BE-W
BE-F
AT
-110
-88
-66
-44
-22
0
22
44
66
88
110
-110 -88 -66 -44 -22 0 22 44 66 88 110
Difference Left/Right         
D
iff
e
re
n
c
e 
O
pp
o
s
iti
o
n
/In
cu
m
be
n
t
 167 
 In terms of the incumbent/opposition divide, there are a greater 
number of countries in which the partisan media support the incumbent. 
Wallonia is a true example of this, whereas Bulgaria is an interesting case 
where all the partisan media identified in this study – including the public 
broadcaster – presented a bias towards the opposition parties (Figure 5.11).   
Unlike what was hypothesized, political balance is considerably 
lower on TV channels operating in Liberal countries than in Democratic 
Corporatist nations (F(3,26)= 6.13; p= .003); in fact, taken together, the UK 
and Ireland are similar to the Polarized Pluralist cluster in terms of TV 
political bias. Moreover, the political bias in newspapers seems to be 
stronger in the Liberal countries than in the other groups (F(3,26)= 3.46; p= 
.000). There are no statistically significant differences between the four 
groups in what regards external diversity, either from the point of view of 
ideology (F(3,26)= .517; p= .675) or status (F(3,26)= .221; p= .881), but the 
means suggest that ideological diversity is less common in Liberal systems 
(Table 5.7). These four indicators of media partisanship are not related with 
current status, stability or age of democracy.  
 
Table 5.7 – Differences in the Political Balance of the European Media, 2009 
 
 Liberal  
(Ireland, UK) 
Dem. 
Corporatist 
 (Austria,  
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
Germany, 
Netherlands, 
Sweden) 
Polarized 
Pluralist 
(France, 
Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, 
Spain) 
NMS12 
(Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania, Poland, 
Slovakia, 
Slovenia) 
 
 Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Balance  
TV  
4.37 .52 5.96 .68 4.49 .46 5.22 .76 
Balance 
Newspapers 
4.43 .15 6.81 .79 6.76 .34 6.13 .60 
External Div. 
Ideology 
45.14 24.55 27.76 15.27 27.22 9.70 34.30 25.71 
External Div. 
Status 
26.39 1.97 36.29 34.36 24.99 4.81 31.57 25.42 
     
 
Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010) 
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 The last paragraphs of this section will be used in the description of 
media partisanship at the outlet level, based on information about content 
imbalance for two samples: the general sample portrayed by the expert 
survey (on average, 7 outlets per country) and the smaller PIREDEU 
sample (on average, 4 outlets per country). In the larger sample, the 
intensity of bias is just slightly higher amongst the sample of newspapers 
(mean= 5.03; standard deviation= 1.86) than both private (mean= 4.65; 
standard deviation= 2.19) and public channels (mean= 4.53; standard 
deviation= 1.97). These averages are not, however, statistically different 
(F(2,227)= 1.366; p= 257). The same pattern is found in the PIREDEU 
sample.76  
 In terms of type of partisan bias, no statistical differences were 
found between groups (Cramer’s V= 1.56; p= .086), but it is clear that the 
number of neutral public and private TV channels is considerably higher 
than the proportion of neutrality amongst newspapers (Figure 5.12). The 
same pattern of results is observed in the smaller PIREDEU set of outlets, 
with the difference that there are no internally diverse public broadcasters 
in this sample.77  
   
Figure 5.12 – Partisan bias by media outlet type, 2009 (Full sample) 
 
 
Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010) 
                                                 
76
 Newspapers score 5.02 (standard deviation= 1.93), whereas public channels score 
4.82 (standard deviation= 1.96) and private channels score 4.62 (standard 
deviation= 2.03). The differences are not statistically significant (F(2,137)=.464; 
p=.630).  
77
 The overall differences are not statistically significant – Cramer’s V= .138; 
p=.510).  
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5.1.5 Relationship between Media System Dimensions 
 
 In this section, I will address the possibility that the five media 
system characteristics are not fully independent dimensions (as Hallin & 
Mancini tend to define them in 2004), but interrelated constructs. I start by 
analysing correlations between the dimensions under analysis and then 
focus on specific patterns of relationship. I chose to use correlations for the 
system-level analysis, instead of regression analysis, because I do not want 
to establish hierarchical relationships between the dimensions at stake, i.e., 
decide which ones would be independent variables or causes and which 
ones would be consequences, or dependent variables. Therefore, no 
assumptions are made about the directions of causality in this section of the 
present chapter. 
 Let us start with journalist professionalization. Legal, political and 
economic constraints seem to be associated with a lower degree of 
journalism professionalization, but settings where public broadcasters are 
able to attract relatively larger audience shares foster professionalization of 
media workers. Journalist professionalization also seems to be moderately 
related to political balance in TV and newspapers, degree of cable 
dissemination in the country and qualitative diversity of the press market 
(Table 5.8). There are no statistically significant relationships between 
journalism professionalization and imbalance in use of audiovisual vs. 
print media, gender gaps, external diversity or number of newspapers.  
 The relationship between freedom of press and journalism 
professionalization deserves to be illustrated in more detail. For purposes 
of parsimony, I will use the general index of press freedom, instead of the 
three sub-indexes; its correlation with journalism professionalization is – of 
course – strong and similar to the ones reported for legal, political and 
economic aspects of freedom (Pearson’s r = -.73; p=000). Romania, Italy and 
Bulgaria do present similar patterns of low professionalization and an only 
partially free press, whereas Scandinavian countries – which are considered 
to have particularly free presses – present high levels of professionalization 
(Figure 5.13).  
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Table 5.8 – Correlations between journalist professionalization and other 
dimensions of media systems 
 
 Journalism Professionalization 
Legal Constraints -.70*** 
Political Constraints -.72*** 
Economic Constraints -.62** 
Balance TV .50** 
Balance Newspapers .32* 
Relative Audience .60** 
Cable Dissemination .48** 
Differences Tabloids/Reference NP .39** 
Average Circulation/Million People .70*** 
 
 
Notes: 
1. Only statistically significant correlations are reported in the table.  
2. Sources: EAO (2010); WAN (2010); Freedom House (2010); Expert Survey on Media 
Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010). Calculations made by the 
author 
3. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
4. N= 27.  
 
  What about the relationship between market size and 
professionalization? Hanretty (2011) reports a relationship between 
professionalization (measured by year of union formation) and size of press 
market: bigger – and therefore richer – press companies can afford to 
contribute to the creation of a well-paid, autonomous journalistic 
profession. The same pattern is observed with my measures of journalism 
professionalization (expert opinions) and size of press market 
(operationalized by the average newspaper circulation per million citizens): 
bigger markets – such as Finland or Sweden – are indeed associated with 
more professionalized journalist communities than smaller markets such as 
Poland or Romania (Table 5.8; Figure 5.13). 
 Let us now move to the analysis of the relationship between 
freedom of press and other dimensions. Aside from journalism 
professionalization, press freedom is also strongly associated with 
commercialization of the TV market (political, legal and economic 
constraints are stronger in settings where PBS fail to attract audiences), and 
market size (greater constraints in smaller markets – a pattern already seen 
by Nixon in 1960, as reported by Becker, Vlad & Nusser, 2007) (Table 5.9).  
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Figure 5.13 – Journalism Professionalization, Market Size and Press Freedom, 
2009 
 
 
 
Sources: WAN (2010); Freedom House (2010); Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, 
Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010).  Calculations made by the author.  
 
 The differentiation between legal, political and economic aspects of 
press freedom not only produces differences in the intensity of the 
relationship between press freedom and other dimensions, but also allows 
one to see that those aspects might have different correlates. For instance, 
economic constraints are associated with lower print media qualitative 
diversity, but political and legal constraints seem not to be connected with 
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this phenomenon. Therefore, diversity (always in the sense of a stronger 
investment on quality and depth) may be possible only when there are no 
economic limits to the work of journalists. Moreover, political interferences 
in the realm of the press are associated with gender gaps and a stronger 
imbalance in terms of newspaper reading vs. TV exposure – this may mean 
that political pressures on the press are easier in less developed media 
markets, where hard news consumption via print media is not a 
widespread habit. Lastly, legal and political constraints are moderately and 
negatively associated with market size and political balance in television, 
whereas legal impositions are connected with less external diversity (Table 
5.9).  
 
Table 5.9 – Correlations between press freedom and other dimensions of media 
systems 
 
 Legal 
Constraints 
Political 
Constraints 
Economic 
Constraints 
Journalism professionalization -70*** -.72*** -.62** 
Relative Audience -.56** -.67*** -.54** 
Balance TV -.34* -.37* --- 
External Diversity Ideology .34* --- --- 
Differences Tabloid/Reference --- --- -.60** 
Gender Gap --- .41* --- 
Average Circulation/Million -.55** -.67*** -57** 
Imbalance  --- .57** --- 
Choice TV --- --- --- 
Cable Dissemination -.33* -.44** --- 
    
Notes: 
1. Only statistically significant correlations are reported in the table.  
2. Sources: EAO (2010); WAN (2010); Freedom House (2010); Expert Survey on Media 
Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010). Calculations made by the 
author 
3. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
4. N= 15 to 27.  
 
 
 The strength of PBS in the audience market seems to be correlated to 
journalism professionalization and some indicators of market development, 
and negatively associated with threats to freedom of press, gender gaps in 
newspaper readership and imbalance in the use of audiovisual and printed 
outlets (Table 5.10).   
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Table 5.10 – Correlations between TV Market Commercialization and other 
dimensions of media systems 
 
 Public 
Funding 
Relative 
Audience 
Journalism professionalization --- .60** 
Legal Constraints --- -.56** 
Political Constraints --- -.67*** 
Economic Constraints --- -.54** 
Differences Tabloids/Reference --- .37* 
Average Circulation/Million --- .63*** 
Number of Titles --- --- 
Gender Gap --- -.37* 
Imbalance --- -.46* 
Balance TV .48** --- 
External Diversity Ideology -32* --- 
Cable Dissemination  .52** 
   
 
Notes: 
1. Only statistically significant correlations are reported in the table.  
2. Sources: EAO (2010); WAN (2010); Freedom House (2010); Expert Survey on Media 
Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010). Calculations made by the 
author 
3. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
4. N =15 to 27.  
 
 In the case of partisanship, journalism professionalization is the 
only – and, I would argue, feeble – correlate of newspaper internal 
diversity (Table 5.11). However, absence of bias in television news is 
associated with several other features, such as strong journalism 
professionalization, minor legal and political constraints, wide press 
markers and substantial public funding, as well as with deeper differences 
in content and style by commercial and state-owned broadcasters. Figure 
5.14 illustrates the relationship between balance in TV and its two stronger 
correlates – journalism professionalization and public funding – and shows 
that, effectively, if outlier cases such as Poland or Malta (which have very 
low state funding of public channels) were taken from the analysis, the 
relationship between funding and balance could be even stronger.  
 The distance from an equilibrium between left- and right-wing 
outlets is lower in settings where there are few legal constraints to press 
freedom and higher state funding; external diversity seems to be connected 
with a lower degree of TV use vis-à-vis newspaper consumption (Table 
5.11). External diversity in terms of press support for incumbent or 
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opposition parties seems not to be correlated with the other dimensions of 
media systems analysed here.  
 
Figure 5.14 – Balance in TV, Journalist Professionalization and Public TV 
Funding, 2009 
 
 
 
Sources: WAN (2010); Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 
2010).  Calculations made by the author.  
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Table 5.11 – Correlations between Partisanship and other dimensions of media 
systems 
 
  
 
Balance  
TV 
 
 
Balance  
NP 
Distance 
from 
External 
Div. LR 
Distance 
from 
External 
Div. 
Status 
Journalism professionalization .50** .32* --- --- 
Legal constraints -.34* --- .34* --- 
Political constraints -.37* --- --- --- 
Funding TV .48** --- -.32* --- 
Imbalance --- --- .47* --- 
Average Circ./Million People .38* --- --- --- 
Cable Dissemination .41** --- --- --- 
     
Notes: 
1. Only statistically significant correlations are reported in the table.  
2. Sources: EAO (2010); WAN (2010); Freedom House (2010); Expert Survey on Media 
Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010). Calculations made by the 
author 
3. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
  
5.2 Analysis of Information Environments 
 
 
 Having analysed the variability that the dimensions used to analyse 
European media systems present in each European country, and explored 
the relationship between such dimensions, is now time to see if journalist 
professionalization, development of press markets, strength of TV market, 
freedom of press and political partisanship shape, at least to some degree, 
the informational environment, namely the dimensions which are believed 
to mediate the impact that some media system characteristics may have of 
agenda-setting strength/occurrence: exposure, trust, quality and diversity.  
 The analysis will start with a description of the European panorama 
in terms of information quality, media agendas’ diversity, exposure, and 
media trust, but – since these dimensions are believed to be, to some 
degree, a consequence of the media system’s features in a specific setting – 
more advanced analytical tools are used to make inferences about their 
relationship with media system characteristics.  
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5.2.1 Quality 
 
 Let us start by analysing the amount of hard news and soft frames 
concerning the political realm in each of the 27 polities under analysis. Soft 
frames in news reports vary considerably from country to country 
(Strömbäck et al., 2011), but Figure 5.15 shows that in most countries 
experts have reported some degree of dissatisfaction with the amount of 
hard news and an excessive focus of the media in soft frames when 
reporting about politics. The only two exceptions to this pattern are Greece 
and Spain, where, on average, the experts reported a sufficient amount of 
hard news. It is also worth underlining that there are no countries in which 
the experts reported soft frames’ underrepresentation – there is either 
enough (as seems to be the case in Latvia) or too much (as in Romania).  
 Latvia and, to a lesser extent, Germany, Cyprus, the Netherlands 
and Wallonia are the countries that are the closest to the ideal type in terms 
of the quality of news situation, displaying at the same time some of the 
highest amounts of hard news and the lowest presence of soft frames. On 
the other hand, Romania, Italy and Ireland are characterized by a strong 
overrepresentation of the soft side of political events, and lack of coverage 
of hard issues.  
 The relationship between hard news and soft frames is not linear, as 
one might expect, but follows more of a U-shaped curvilinear trend. On the 
one hand, there is Romania, Czech Republic or Poland, where the amount 
of hard news is highly insufficient and the use of superficial frames 
strongly present; then we have Latvia or Germany where the amount of 
soft framing is slightly excessive and the quantity of hard information 
slightly insufficient; and finally there is Malta, Greece and Spain, were the 
hard news are enough but there is too much soft content (Figure 5.15). A 
test of the linear relationship between these two variables produces 
disappointing results (see Table 5.12).  
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Figure 5.15 – Hard and Soft Content in the News Media in Europe, 2009 
 
 
Notes: 
1. Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 
2010). Calculations made by the author. 
2. The scale varies between -5 (the amount of this content is not enough) and 5 (the 
amount of this kind of content is excessive).  
 
 
 
 Previous research showed that the amount of news covering 
electoral campaigns in Britain is greater than in France or Germany (Esser, 
2008; Semetko, 2008). However, with my measure of hard news, the pattern 
observed is different: in fact, the situation in Germany is much more 
positive than in the other two countries. Since the amount of soft news 
related to the political realm is much higher in Britain than in Germany, it 
can be hypothesized that the difference between these two countries in 
terms of the amount of electoral coverage is due to time spent with soft 
news pieces depicting the candidates.  
 A recent study by Brekken, Thordbjørnsrud & Aalberg (2012) allows 
us to validate and understand better our results for Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Belgium (Flanders) and the UK. In my analysis, the 
Netherlands appears next to the ideal point regarding amount of hard 
news, whereas Sweden and Belgium are a bit below and Britain is close to 
the countries where the quantity of hard news is insufficient. In the same 
vein, Brekken and colleagues show that the space dedicated to hard news 
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in the Netherlands is bigger than in Flanders and Sweden (where it 
corresponds to around 1/3 of the estimated number of pages) and UK 
(where it would correspond to 25% of the newspaper).  
 What about other countries? For instance, in Sweden, the framing of 
political news as issues is as common as the framing of politics as a 
strategic game (Strömbäch & Dimitrova, 2006). If we translate these results 
into actual content of political news, we would expect Swedish scores on 
the measures of hard news and soft frames to be fairly similar – and 
indeed, they are. The Swedish news media are characterized by a small 
under-representation of hard issues and a small overrepresentation of soft 
issues (Figure 5.15).  
 On the other hand, Strömbäck & Luengo (2008) observed that 
national election coverage in Sweden and Spain does present similar 
patterns in terms of framing elections as a game. This is also confirmed 
here, since those country’s indexes of soft news are quite similar. The most 
important difference is that Spain is portrayed here as having much more 
focus on hard news than in Strömbäck & Luengo (2008). This might be due 
both to the difference in time frame (these authors study Spain in 2004, and 
here the picture was taken in 2009), but also to the fact that my measures of 
hard news are somewhat different from theirs and – more importantly – 
independent from the soft news measure.78  
 The second measure of information quality used in this work is a 
measure of accuracy of the information displayed in the newspapers and 
television news programmes. Accuracy is not connected with the amount 
of hard news, but it is inversely correlated with the strong use of soft 
frames and focus on superficial aspects of politics (Table 5.12).  
 The third indicator measures the depth and completeness of the 
analysis offered by the media in Europe. This feature is related to the other 
measures of information quality, but only partially: the amount of analysis 
                                                 
78
 The authors use the terms “game framing” (the definition of which is quite 
similar to my definition of soft news) and “issue framing”, referring to stories that 
were coded as focusing on issues and issue positions. The measure of issue 
framing is not independent from the measure of game framing; in fact, both 
categories are considered to be mutually exclusive, since they take as a unit of 
analysis a single story. In this dissertation, however, the unit of analysis is the 
common trend in the general pool of news (assessed by experts).  
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is just moderately correlated with the quantity of hard news and 
information accuracy, and not related at all to soft news/frames (Table 
5.12).  
 
Table 5.12 – Pearson Correlations between Indicators of Information Quality, 
2009 
 
 Hard News Soft News Accuracy 
Hard News    
Soft News  -.33*   
Accuracy .24    -.58**  
Analysis  .47** -.20 .51** 
    
 
Notes:  
1. Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 
2010)  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
  
 There is considerable variation in the degree of information 
accuracy in the European media systems – Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and Czech 
Republic offer, on average, relatively inaccurate information, whereas 
information in Denmark is the most accurate in Europe (Figure 5.16).  
 In terms of analysis, the general impression is that the quantity of 
analysis is low across Europe, the degree of superficiality being more 
problematic in some countries (several of them in Eastern Europe) than 
others (most of them in Western and Southern Europe). The Bulgarian, 
Czech and Estonian settings are characterized by very low amounts of 
analysis of daily events by their media, while Netherlands, Greece and 
Germany present the higher averages, even if they do not go much above 
the mean point of the scale.  
 The relationship between these two variables is rather interesting; 
especially since one ranges much more widely than the other. Several 
countries appear as interesting cases in this context – Greece, where levels 
of accuracy and analysis are similar, and close to the mean point of the 
scale; and Slovenia, where the information is accurate but superficial; 
Germany, where the information is accurate and the degree of analysis is 
satisfactory, and Bulgaria and Czech Republic, where the information 
offered is both superficial and not very accurate (Figure 5.16).  
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Figure 5.16 – Accuracy and Analysis in the News Media in Europe, 2009 
 
Notes: 
1. Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 
2010). Calculations made by the author. 
2. The scales vary between 0 (absence of analysis/accuracy) and 10 (strong presence 
of analysis/accuracy).  
 
 How powerful are media systems characteristics in predicting the 
amount of information quality in the European media? At the national 
level, six models were tested, one for each dependent variable. The media 
system model behaved poorly in explaining the amount of hard and soft 
news and, to some degree, the depth of the analyses offered to the 
audiences, but explains a considerably higher amount of the variance in 
information accuracy (Table 5.13).  
 Before discussing the results, it is necessary to underline that the 
models where the dependent variable depicts the press or the TV 
panorama include only the independent variables dealing with structure 
and partisanship that are specifically related to those subsystems. For 
instance, in the analysis of TV accuracy, measures of press market 
development or newspapers’ political balance are not used.  
 Hard news are more frequently present, everything else considered, 
in media systems in which economic constraints on the work of the press 
are lower, the press market is homogeneous and there are political 
influences on the functioning of the press. This latter relationship makes 
sense if we consider that, irrespectively of the bias, political influence may 
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mean more time and space dedicated to political affairs. This does not 
mean that partisan news are hard news by definition, but that the political 
influence seems to create more space for hard news – probably related to 
the realm of politics – in the system. On the other hand, the quantity of soft 
news is not explained by the media system features analysed in this chapter 
except for balance in TV – it seems that contexts where broadcasts are 
highly balanced are also characterized by a weaker use of soft frames 
(Table 5.13). This may mean that biased outlets tend to use these frames 
more frequently, perhaps as a way to express their political preferences to 
the audience.  
 Journalist professionalization and political balance explain 
information accuracy in newspapers and TV channels. The absence of 
economic constraints to press freedom also leads to higher levels of 
accuracy and analysis in the TV realm. The quantity of analysis on 
newspapers is explained both by political balance and the inexistence of 
economic constraints to the work of journalists – in other words, balance 
leads to more analysis, whereas economic menaces tend to reduce the 
amount of analysis of issues and events in newspapers (Table 5.13).  
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 At the media outlet level, the only piece of data available is about 
the accuracy of the information offered by each newspaper or TV channel, 
and its analysis is made by focusing only at the smaller PIREDEU sample, 
which will be at the core of the analysis presented on Chapter Seven. Public 
broadcasters appear to convey more accurate information (mean=6.72; 
standard deviation= 1.05) than newspapers (mean=5.70; standard 
deviation= 1.88) or commercial TV channels (mean= 5.33; standard 
deviation= 1.05) (F(2,136)=6.161; p= .003).  
 What is the impact of the media systems on accuracy? Tables 5.14 
and 5.15 present several models of factors of information accuracy at the 
outlet level. The first table focus on television channels and the second on 
newspapers. After the empty model, Model 2 introduces the system-level 
dimensions of the media realm, Model 3 introduces a measure of political 
bias of the outlet, and Model 4 controls for outlet characteristics, namely its 
target79, age and (in the case of the TV) public/private nature.  
In the case of TV channels, information accuracy is a function of 
journalist professionalization and political balance of the TV panorama – a 
pattern of results that confirm the country-level analysis presented above. 
The inclusion of outlet-level information about political bias erases the 
explaining capacity of bias at the country level, but not the impact of 
journalism (Table 5.14). This may suggest that a subsystem panorama 
characterized by political balance leads to less bias in each single channel, 
and therefore more accuracy in the information that they provide.  
In the country-level regression reported on Table 5.13, I have not 
observed that the opportunity costs of exposure to quality news are 
significantly lower for citizens living under public-service-oriented systems 
(i.e., that quality is higher in those contexts), as Iyengar et al. (2010) or 
Curran et al. (2012) have. However, the results reported in Table 5.14 
confirm that public TVs offer more quality/accurate information than 
newspapers and private TV’s, which is in line with that line of reasoning. 
                                                 
79
 The variable Target differentiates between those outlets that have a small/niche, 
medium or broad/mainstream target. In the case of TV, it is computed with 
information about audience share (lower than 5; 5 to 20; more than 20% of share), 
whereas in the case of newspapers the base information is the circulation per 
million people (lower than 10 thousand; 10 to 33 thousand; more than 33 thousand 
copies). 
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Moreover, accuracy of public broadcasters depend on the depth of 
economic constraints to press freedom  in the country (Table 5.14). 
 
Table 5.14 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level MLE Regression of Television 
Information Quality on Media System and Outlet Characteristics (PIREDEU 
Sample) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed     
Intercept 6.04*** 
(.16) 
4.10** 
(2.02) 
6.05** 
 (1.85) 
7,65*** 
(1.74) 
Journalist  Prof.   3.18* 
(1.97) 
6.47*** 
(2.24) 
2.87** 
(1.11) 
Economic constraints  -2.56 
(1.36) 
-2.01 
 (1.76) 
-2.59** 
(1.29) 
Political constraints  1.04 
(1.81) 
1.65 
(1.79) 
1.89 
(1.28) 
Public Funding  -.51  
(1.18) 
-1.22 
(1.22) 
-1.87 
(1.87) 
Relative Audience  -.37 
(.78) 
-.47  
(.77) 
-.96 
(.64) 
Choice TV  -1.18 
(.97) 
-1.10 
(..96) 
-1.18 
(.72) 
Cable Dissemination  .03 
(.92) 
.34 
(.93) 
.67 
(.65) 
Balance TV 
 
 2.66* 
(1.58) 
1.32 
(2.06) 
.80 
(1.251) 
Political Bias Outlet   -2.44**  
(1.33) 
-3.36** 
(.99) 
Target    .20 
(.27) 
Outlet Age    2.86 
(3.01) 
Private TV    -1.45*** 
(.43) 
Random     
Country-level (sigma_u2) .01 (.16) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
Individual-level (sigma_e2) 1.58 (.24) 1.58 (.25) 1.23 (.24) .85 (.18) 
Wald chi-square -- 21.20** 25.59** 103.04*** 
Model Fit     
Log-likelihood -94.43 - 79.43 -74.21 - 63.11 
AIC 868.92 859.33 766.34 715.52 
BIC 879.21 887.12 834.55 777.15 
N Countries/Outlets 27/57 27/57 27/57 27/57 
 
Notes: 
1. Standard linear regressions were computed in order to obtain information about possible 
multicollinearity. Some degree of multicollinearity is expected, but in all models the VIF 
values for each variable are always lower than 4.  Correlation between Balance in the TV 
panorama and political bias of the outlet is of only -.57. 
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. All independent variables vary between 0 (low quantity of the dimension) and 1 (high 
quantity). The dependent variable varies between 0 and 10.  
4. Legal menaces to press freedom are not included because they increase multicollinearity in 
the models.  
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The results concerning the accuracy of the information provided by 
the most important newspapers in Europe are presented on Table 5.15. As 
in the country-level analysis, journalist professionalization is the most 
relevant factor of quality in the newspapers, but political balance is 
replaced by political constraints to press freedom. When other things are 
controlled for, it seems that the existence of political constraints lead to a 
higher level of accuracy in newspapers – perhaps as a reaction towards the 
attempted interventions from the political realm? This pattern of results 
does not change considerably with the introduction of outlet-level variables 
that also explain accuracy, such as target and age (niche and older 
newspapers tend to be more accurate than mainstream and more recent 
titles).  
 5.2.2 Trust 
 
 Media trust /credibility is the second dimension of the information 
environments studied here. As far as news media credibility goes, most 
countries are positioned slightly above the mean point of the scale80 – in 
fact, the aggregate average is of 5.78. Finland is the country whose news 
media are considered to be more trustworthy by their experts (mean=7.90), 
whereas Italy presents the lower values (mean=3.61). The Eurobarometer 
data presents a slightly different picture, which is not completely 
unexpected, since the respondents are different (lay people, instead of 
experts) and the concepts under measure difer too (credibility of news 
media in general vs. trust in specific types of media – TV, radio and press).  
The aggregate trust index presents, on average, slightly lower 
values (mean=5.46), and the relationship between the two measures is not 
as high as one could expect (Pearson’s r= .57, p= .002). Italy and Finland are 
still at the extremes of this distribution, but now the lowest mean value is 
observed in Hungary (mean=3.59) and the higher mean value in Slovakia 
(mean=6.82) (Figure 5.17). 
 
                                                 
80 The scales vary from 0 to 10; therefore, the mean point is 5.  
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Table 5.15 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level MLE Regression of Newspaper 
Information Quality on Media System and Outlet Characteristics (PIREDEU 
Sample) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed     
Intercept 5.70*** 
(.21) 
-3.16 
(2.42) 
-2.53 
 (2.70) 
-1.32 
(2.30) 
Journalist  Prof.   6.86** 
(2.25) 
6.40** 
(2.32) 
6.62** 
(1.96) 
Economic constraints  1.37  
(2.05) 
1.14 
 (2.07) 
1.05 
(1.66) 
Political constraints  3.00* 
(1.64) 
3.05*  
(1.70) 
3.08* 
(1.40) 
Average Circ./Million   .03 
(1.29) 
.23 
(1.30) 
.07 
(1.13) 
Number of Titles  -.58 
(1.14) 
-.51  
(1.15)) 
-.75 
(.93) 
Diff. Tabloids/Reference   2.46 
(1.82) 
2.00 
(1.89) 
-.37 
(1.63) 
Balance Newspapers 
 
 .76 
(2.14) 
.66 
(2.14) 
-.19 
(1.75) 
Political Bias Outlet   -1.09  
(1.19) 
-1.69 
(1.07)) 
Target    -1.43*** 
(.29) 
Outlet Age    2.81* 
(1.11) 
Random     
Country-level (sigma_u2) .01 (.16) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
Individual-level (sigma_e2) 3.55 (.24) 2.99 (.49) 2.99 (.49) 1.91 (.33) 
Wald chi-square -- 22.22*** 23.0** 72.52*** 
Model Fit     
Log-likelihood -166.48 - 146.98 -145.46 - 118.62 
AIC 338.97 313.96 312.92 263.24 
BIC 346.15 337.90 339.27 293.54 
N Countries/Outlets 27/81 27/81 27/81 27/76 
 
Notes: 
1. Standard linear regressions were computed in order to obtain information about possible 
multicollinearity. Some degree of multicollinearity is expected, but in all models the VIF 
values for each variable are always lower than 4.  Correlation between Balance in the 
Newspaper panorama and political bias of the outlet is of only -.17. 
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. All independent variables vary between 0 (low quantity of the dimension) and 1 (high 
quantity). The dependent variable varies between 0 and 10.  
4. Variables related with legal menaces to press freedom and external diversity are not 
included because they increase multicollinearity in the models. Variables related with 
gender gaps in newspaper reading and imbalance between newspaper and TV consumption 
are not used due to lack of data for all the 27 polities under study.  
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 It seems that the experts might have underestimated the levels of 
news media credibility in Bulgaria, Estonia and Czech Republic, whereas 
the evaluations made for Northern Europe, Germany, the UK, Greece, 
Malta and Latvia are much higher than the Eurobarometer survey data 
results (Figure 5.17).  
 
Figure 5.17– News Media Credibility and Trust in Media in the EU, 2009 
 
Notes: 
1. Source: Expert Survey on Media Systems (Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010) 
and Eurobarometer 72.4 (Fall 2009; TNS Opinion & GESIS, 2010). Calculations made by 
the author. 
2. The scales vary between 0 (absence of trust/credibility) and 10 (strong 
trust/credibility).  
 
 The results of the two regression models displayed in Table 5.16 
suggest that the idea that political communication experts have of media 
credibility may be based on different grounds than the feelings of media 
trust reported by lay people. But let us start from the first models, which 
regress trust and credibility on the general levels of trust in the political 
institutions of the country,81 which is believed to be one major factor of 
trust in the media (Bennett et al., 1999; Jones, 2004). Indeed, trust in the 
                                                 
81 This variable is an index composed with data from EB 72.4 relative to trust in 
political parties, the national government and the national parliament. The raw 
values, representing the percentage of respondents that “tend to agree” were 
recoded (i.e., divided by 100) in order to vary between 0 and 1, like the other 
independent variables in the model.  The Cronbach´s Alpha of this index is very 
satisfactory (α = .84).  
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institutions has an impact on media trust and media credibility, even if the 
amount of variance explained by this single factor is very low.  
 The model that includes media system dimensions explains more 
than two thirds of the variance in the credibility index. The media are more 
highly credited when journalists are more professional and TV is weakly 
biased towards political parties; the inclusion of these variables erased the 
explanatory power of trust in the political institutions. The same model 
explains less variance in the trust index created with survey data, and the 
relevant variables are different – the media is trusted more strongly when, 
all other things controlled for, there are few political constraints on the 
work of journalists82 (Table 5.16).  
 
 Table 5.16 – Parameter Estimates for OLS Regression of Media Trust on 
Media System Characteristics – Country Level 
 
 Credibility Trust 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Intercept 4.99 (.51)*** .74 (1.33) 4.56 (.43)*** 5.90 (1.82)** 
Trust Pol. Institutions 2.58 (1.25)* .23 (1.12) 2.99 (1.31)** 2.81 (1.54)* 
Diff Tab-Ref.  .79 (1.09)  -.75 (1.50) 
Number Titles  .09 (.70)  -.80 (.96) 
Average Circ.  -.08 (.83)  -1.53 (1.13) 
Relative Audience  -.36 (.54)  -.16 (.74) 
Public Funding  -1.20 (.87)  .53 (1.20) 
Legal Constraints  .14 (1.02)  1.30 (1.40) 
Pol. Constraints  -.92 (1.17)  -3.73 (1.61)** 
Journalism Prof.  4.08 (1.35)**  1.09 (1.85) 
Balance TV  3.90 (1.23)**  .53 (1.68) 
Adj. R2 6.4 70.6 13.7 28.9 
N  27 27 27 27 
 
Notes: 
1. The variables relative to external diversity, as well as with economic constraints to press 
freedom, were removed of the model due to multicolinearity issues. In all models the 
VIF values for each variable are always lower than 4.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
 
 
                                                 
82 A separate analysis of trust in the press and in TV shows that the former is not 
explained by any of the variables under study, whereas the separate regression of 
TV trust on media systems reproduces the pattern exposed above: over and above 
their general patterns of trust in political institutions, people tend to trust the TV 
more in countries where there are less political interference in the realm of 
journalism.  
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 5.2.3 Exposure 
 
At the aggregate level, the levels of exposure to the news media do 
not vary significantly in the European Union member-States. In fact, the 
difference between the average intensity of news consumption in Finland 
(the country whose respondent’s are closer to the ideal-type of news 
junkies; see Prior, 2007) and Belgium-Wallonia (the context where these 
junkies are less easily found) is of only 1.2 days per week (Figure 5.18).  
 
Figure 5.18– Exposure to news in the EU, 2009 
 
 
Notes: 
1. Source: PIREDEU Voter Study (EES, 2009a). Calculations made by the author. 
2. The scale varies between 1 (one day per week) and 7 (seven days per week).  
 
 
But are these (small) differences explained by media system 
characteristics? The answer is yes, but only to a certain degree. In Table 
5.17, I present the results of a statistical model that regresses intensity of 
(aggregate) exposure on the media system characteristics that have been 
used in the previous models. The results show that the explaining capacity 
of this set of variables is quite low (the model accounts for a small amount 
of the variance on levels of exposure). In fact, only the factors related with 
the TV system have an impact on intensity of exposure: in contexts where 
the levels of public financing of PBS are the highest, the average number of 
days in which people follow the news is almost one unit higher than in 
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contexts where PBS is poorly financed by the state. Moreover, when 
everything else is held constant, commercialized TV settings are associated 
with lower levels of exposure to news. Unexpectedly, the development of 
the press market has no impact on general levels of exposure to news.  
 
 Table 5.17 – Parameter Estimates for OLS Regression of Exposure to 
News on Media System Characteristics – Country Level 
 
 Exposure 
  
Intercept 6.05 
(.79) 
Journalist  Prof.  -.13 
(.71) 
Economic constraints -.03 
(.72) 
Political constraints .36 
(.67) 
Public Funding PBS .84** 
(.43) 
Relative Audience .54** 
(.28) 
Diff. Tabloids/Reference  -.55 
(.66) 
Number of Titles .30 
(.41) 
Average Circ./Million .10 
(.47) 
Choice TV .29 
(.38) 
Cable Dissemination -.38 
(.37) 
Balance TV 
 
-.16 
(.71) 
Balance Newspapers -.14 
(.89) 
Adj. R2 4.1 
N  27 
Notes: 
1. The variables relative to external diversity and legal constraints to 
press freedom, were removed of the model due to multicolinearity 
issues. The VIF values for each variable are always lower than 4.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
 
 
Since there is individual-level data available on exposure, it is 
possible to run the same model in a multilevel context, crossing country-
level factors with individual-level patterns of news exposure. This 
approach also allows for a stronger test of the relationship between media 
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systems and exposure through the inclusion of control variables: known 
factors of news exposure such as age, gender, social class, interest in 
electoral campaigns, habits of discussion and need for orientation (see 
Atkin, 1972; Prior, 2007; Mattes, 2008; Santana Pereira, 2009). The results of 
this analysis are reported in Table 5.18.  
Model 1 (the empty model) shows that there is a small degree of 
variance at the country level, whereas the second model that includes our 
media system variables does not do a good job in terms of explaining that 
variance. However, Model 2 confirms and reinforces the country-level 
regression results – news exposure is still associated with lower 
commercialization of the TV sub-system and higher state financing of 
public channels; moreover, the magnitude of its impact is similar to what 
was reported for the aggregate analysis (Tables 5.17 and 5.18). 
Model 3 includes socio-demographic correlates of exposure to the media 
during election campaigns: age (in years), gender (dummy, 1 being female) 
and social class.83 Lastly, Model 4 adds attitudinal and behavioral factors of 
exposure, such as need for orientation84, interest in the campaign85 and 
habits of discussion of political affairs86.  
                                                 
83 These factors are measured with PIREDEU Voter Study data (EES, 2009a). Social 
class is operationalized with data collected with the question “Taking everything 
into account, at about what level is your family’s standard of living? If you think of 
a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means a poor family, 7 a rich family, and the other 
numbers are for the positions in between, about where would you place your 
family?”. This index varies between 1 (respondent belongs to a poor family) and 7 
(respondent belongs to a rich family).  
84 Need for orientation is operationalized with data on interest in politics and vote 
intention in general elections offered by the PIREDEU Voter Study (EES, 2009a). 
Two questions are used: “Q28 – And if there was a general election tomorrow, which 
party would you vote for?”, which had 14.3% of the respondents answering that they 
didn’t know, and “Q78 – To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? 
Very, somewhat, a little or not at all?”, which had 53% of respondents saying that 
they are very or somewhat interested in politics. In the sample, 6.1% of the 
respondents are considered to display a strong need for orientation. In the model, 
the variable is a dummy differentiating between those respondents and the other 
media users.  
85 The original question wording is “Q23 - Thinking back to just before the elections for 
the European Parliament were held, how interested were you in the campaign for those 
elections: very, somewhat, a little or not at all?”. The variable was recoded so that 
higher values mean stronger interest in the campaign; it therefore varies between 
1(not at all) and 4 (very).  
86 This variable was measured by a proxy – a question about discussion of the 
European Parliament election (“Q18 – How often did you talk to friends or family about 
the election?”), which was recoded in order to vary between 1 (never) and 3 (often). 
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Table 5.18 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level MLE Regression of Exposure to 
News on Media System and Individual Characteristics 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed     
Intercept 6.08*** (.68) 6.35*** (.79) 4.83*** (.69) 4.03*** (.65) 
Journalist  Prof.   -.12 (.70) .01 (.61) .05 (.58) 
Economic constraints  -.44 (.66) -.57 (.58) -.59 (.54) 
Political constraints  .73 (.61) .78 (.53) .69 (.50) 
Public Funding PBS  .93* (.42) .83* (.37) .90* (.35) 
Relative Audience  .60* (.27) .54* (.24) .46* (.23) 
Diff. Tabloids/Reference   -.71 (.66) -.82 (.58) -.77 (.54) 
Number of Titles  .55 (.37) .48 (.32) .45 (.30) 
Average Circ./Million  -.09 (.43) -.20 (.38) -.31 (.35) 
Choice TV  .19 (.28) .21 (.25) .18 (.22) 
Cable Dissemination  -.33 (.30) -.40 (.54) -.39 (.44) 
Balance TV  -.27 (.71) -.34 (.62) -.34 (.58) 
Balance Newspapers  -.40 (.76) -.37 (.67) -.26 (.63) 
Age   .03*** (.00) .03*** (.00) 
Gender (Female)   -.11*** (.02) -.10*** (.02) 
Social Class   .07*** (.01) .05*** (.01) 
Need for Orientation    .13*** (.04) 
Interest in Campaign    .23 (.01) 
Discussion Political Affairs    .19 (.01) 
Random     
Country-level (sigma_u2) .09 
(.03) 
.09 
(.03) 
.07 
(.03) 
.06 
(.02) 
Individual-level (sigma_e2) 2.50 
(.02) 
2.50 
(.02) 
2.27 
(.02) 
2.18 
(.02) 
Wald chi-square  9.04 2546.58*** 3526.27*** 
Model Fit     
Log-likelihood -47428.86 -47423.59 -44955.27 -44174.49 
AIC 94863.72 94978.19 89942.53 88386.98 
BIC 94888.13 94978.95 90072.27 88540.91 
N Countries/Respondents 27/25230 27/25230 27/24563 27/24384 
 
Notes: 
1. Standard linear regressions were computed in order to obtain information about possible 
multicollinearity. Some degree of multicollinearity is expected, but in all models the VIF 
values for each variable are always lower than 4.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. All independent variables vary between 0 (low quantity of the dimension) and 1 (high 
quantity). The dependent variable varies between 1 and 7.  
4. Variables related with legal menaces to press freedom and external diversity are not 
included because they increase multicollinearity in the models. Variables related with 
gender gaps in newspaper reading and imbalance between newspaper and TV consumption 
are not used due to lack of data for all the 27 polities under study.  
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The impact of the individual-level factors is in accordance with the 
results reported by previous research: news exposure is less intense in the 
case of women, younger citizens and people belonging to less advantaged 
social groups, and more intense in the case of people that like to discuss 
political events, were interested in the EP campaign and display 
considerable levels of need for orientation. Interesting enough, the 
inclusion of these variables does not erase the impact of the TV subsystem 
factors on the habits of news exposure (Table 5.18).  
What about intensity of exposure to specific outlets? Table 5.22 
shows that, in fact, some media system characteristics have an impact on 
how intense is exposure to newscasts within each TV channels’ audience. 
What seems to matter the most is press freedom, state intervention in PBS 
by means of funding and amount of choice in the TV subsystem. In fact, 
when everything else is controlled for, intensity of exposure is stronger in 
countries where press freedom is less menaced by the actions of politicians. 
It seems that people tend to watch TV newscasts more often if they feel that 
there is no political meddling going on, and in contexts where the state 
strongly finances the PBS.  
The effect of cable TV dissemination on network (terrestrial) 
newscasts exposure is unexpected. Borrowing and adapting the convincing 
argument exposed and empirically supported by Prior (2007) about the 
relationship between amount of choices available and news consumption, I 
expected that less offer in terms of alternatives to news-focused content 
would lead to stronger habits of exposure to the newscasts.  However, the 
relationship between proportion of households with cable TV and news 
shows watching is positive. This is probably due to the fact that there is a 
variable missing in the equation. In fact, the relationship between cable 
access and news exposure is shaped by relative preference for 
entertainment – a factor that I cannot insert in the model due to lack of 
data.   
This pattern of results holds even when we control for outlet 
characteristics such as target, age and nature (public/private). Interesting 
enough, it seems that private newscasts are associated with lower intensity 
of exposure vis-à-vis public channels (Table 5.19).  
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Table 5.19 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level MLE Regression of Exposure 
to TV News on Media System and Outlet Characteristics 
 Exposure to TV News 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed     
Intercept 4.42*** 
(.09) 
5.43*** 
(.82) 
5.31*** 
(.95) 
5.40*** 
(1.05) 
Journalist  Prof.  
 
-.49 
(.80) 
-.49 
(.81) 
-.52 
(.82) 
Economic constraints 
 
-.02 
(.48) 
-.02 
(.52) 
-.11 
(.51) 
Political constraints 
 
-1.51** 
(.73) 
-1.55** 
(.75) 
-1.03* 
(.86) 
Public Funding PBS 
 
2.14*** 
(.62) 
2.11** 
(.74) 
2.04** 
(.73) 
Relative Audience 
 
-.20 
(.31) 
-.18 
(.29) 
-.18 
(.32) 
Choice TV 
 
.19 
(.40) 
.18 
(.40) 
.39 
(.43) 
Cable Dissemination 
 
.67** 
(.38) 
.65** 
(.39) 
.63** 
(.39) 
Balance TV 
  
-.58 
(.79) 
-.94 
(.84) 
-1.08 
(.89) 
Political Bias Outlet 
  
.15 
(.56) 
-.06 
(.58) 
Target    .52 
(.56) 
Outlet Age    -.64 
(1.62) 
Private TV    -.36* 
(.21) 
Random     
Country-level (sigma_u2) .08 
(.07) 
.01 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
Individual-level (sigma_e2) .31 
(.08) 
.30 
(.06) 
.31 
(.06) 
.29 
(.06) 
Wald chi-square  24.81** 24.41** 30.32*** 
Model Fit     
Log-likelihood -54.50 -43.04 -42.66 -39.56 
AIC 177.24 174.78 173.65 149.34 
BIC 184.43 195.42 196.43 177.31 
N Countries/Outlets 27/57 27/57 27/57 27/57 
Notes: 
1. Standard linear regressions were computed in order to obtain information about possible 
multicollinearity. Some degree of multicollinearity is expected, but in all models the VIF 
values for each variable are always lower than 4.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. All independent variables vary between 0 (low quantity of the dimension) and 1 (high 
quantity). The dependent variable varies between 1 and 7.  
4. Variables related with legal menaces to press freedom and external diversity are not 
included because they increase multicollinearity in the models.  
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There is not much to say about the media system’s impact on 
frequency of newspaper readership. Once again, the absence of political 
constraints to press freedom is the most relevant factor of exposure; 
interestingly enough, newspapers that hold larger shares of the market are 
also more frequently read by their audiences (Table 5.20).  
 
Table 5.20 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level MLE Regression of Exposure 
to Newspapers on Media System and Outlet Characteristics 
 
 Exposure to Newspapers 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed     
Intercept 3.58*** 
(.10) 
3.58** 
(1.21) 
2.98** 
(1.31) 
2.93** 
(1.31) 
Journalist  Prof.  
 
-.42 
(1.12) 
-.16 
(1.15) 
-.46 
(1.16) 
Economic constraints 
 
.70 
(1.02) 
.84 
(1.03) 
.74 
(1.02) 
Political constraints 
 
-1.22* 
(.72) 
-1.42* 
(.84) 
-1.19* 
(.74) 
Diff. Tabloids/Reference  
 
-.48 
(.91) 
-.23 
(.94) 
-.37 
(.96) 
Number of Titles 
 
-.07 
(.57) 
-.10 
(.58) 
-.01 
(.57) 
Average Circ./Million 
 
.88 
(.64) 
.77 
(.65) 
.43 
(.66) 
Balance Newspapers 
 
.76 
(1.07) 
.81 
(1.07) 
1.45 
(1.07) 
Political Bias Outlet 
  
.60 
(.46) 
.50 
(.43) 
Target    .34** 
(.11) 
Outlet Age    .21 
(.43) 
Random     
Country-level (sigma_u2) .17 (.08) .13 (.08) .13 (.09) .13 (.09) 
Individual-level (sigma_e2) .35 (.07) .35 (.07) .35 (.07) .25 (.05) 
Wald chi-square  10.79 12.26 24.50** 
Model Fit     
Log-likelihood -85.62 -76.18 -75.19 -61.56 
AIC 177.24 172.36 172.37 149.11 
BIC 184.43 196.31 198.72 179.41 
N Countries/Outlets 27/81 27/81 27/81 27/76 
Notes: 
1. Standard linear regressions were computed in order to obtain information about possible 
multicollinearity. Some degree of multicollinearity is expected, but in all models the VIF 
values for each variable are always lower than 4.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. All independent variables vary between 0 (low quantity of the dimension) and 1 (high 
quantity). The dependent variable varies between 1 and 7.  
4. Variables related with legal menaces to press freedom and external diversity are not 
included because they increase multicollinearity in the models.  
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 5.2.4 Media Agenda Diversity 
 
In each country, the relationship between the agendas of the major 
media outlets gives us an interesting insight on how diverse these agendas 
are. Throughout Europe, the intra-country diversity of media agendas 
varies considerably (Figure 5.19). For instance, in the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Germany, the agendas of the major TV newscasts and newspapers are 
quite similar in what regards space devoted to different issues, while in 
Denmark and two Baltic countries (Estonia and Lithuania) media agendas 
were considerable more diverse. It is worth noting that, as a whole, media 
agendas tend to be rather homogeneous in the majority of the European 
Union member-States (Figure 5.19).  
 
Figure 5.5 – Correlation between Media Outlet Agendas in Europe, 2009 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study (EES, 2009b). Calculations made by the author.  
 
 
The media system characteristics do not explain a great deal of the 
degrees of diversity or homogeneity of media agendas in the European 
countries under study. In fact, the only variable that is significantly 
associated with agenda diversity is relative audience of public 
broadcasters. In contexts where public channels are stronger than their 
private competitors, media agendas are more diverse than those produced 
in highly commercialized systems (Table 5.21).  
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Table 5.21 – Parameter Estimates for OLS Regression of Media Agenda Diversity 
on Media System Characteristics – Country Level 
 
 Agenda Diversity 
Intercept .41 
(.36) 
Journalist  Prof.  .12 
(.33) 
Economic constraints -.16 
(.31) 
Political constraints .23 
(.29) 
Public Funding PBS .16 
(.19) 
Relative Audience .28* 
(.12) 
Diff. Tabloids/Reference  -.37 
(.29) 
Number of Titles -.16 
(.18) 
Average Circ./Million -.05 
(.21) 
Choice TV -.06 
(.17) 
Cable Dissemination -.18 
(.31) 
Balance TV .20 
(.31) 
Balance Newspapers .01 
(.39) 
Adj. R2 3.3 
N  27 
 
Notes: 
1. The variables relative to external diversity, as well as with legal constraints 
to press freedom, were removed of the model due to multicolinearity 
issues. The VIF values for each variable are lower than 4.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
 
 
 
5.3 Final Comments 
 
 In this chapter, the main features of media systems, and their 
correlates in terms of the informational environment, were described and 
their interrelations analysed. The most relevant conclusions are that there is 
substantial variation in the media systems in Europe, and that the polities 
under study tend to come together in a way that is not completely different 
nor completely identical to that postulated by Hallin & Mancini (2004). This 
is exemplified, for instance, by the fact that the majority of the hypothesis 
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trying to extrapolate from this theoretical model the description of media 
system variability are only partially confirmed (Table 5.22).  
   
Table 5.22 – Hypotheses Tested: Media System Dimensions 
 
  
Hypotheses Results 
4.1 Development of press 
markets will be greater in Liberal 
and Democratic Corporatist 
countries than in Polarized 
Pluralist nations and, possibly, 
the 12 new EU member states, 
but development of TV markets 
will be rather similar throughout 
Europe 
Partial support: Press markets are indeed 
larger in Liberal and Democratic Corporatist 
countries. Consumption imbalance is lower in 
Democratic Corporatist countries than in the 
rest of Europe (Liberal systems included).  
TV markets are not equally developed within 
the EU: number of choices are lower in the 
NMS12 and in Liberal countries than in the rest 
of the continent; Cable dissemination is higher 
in Democratic Corporative markets 
4.2 Development of press 
markets is correlated with age 
and stability of democracy  
Partial support: This is only true for what 
regards size of press and cable markets and, in 
the case of stability, qualitative diversity.  
4.3 Public Broadcasting Systems 
will be stronger in Democratic 
Corporatist countries than in the 
other groups 
Partial support: Audience for commercial 
channels is much lower in those countries, but 
also in the Liberal countries. No significant 
differences in terms of funding.  
4.4 Commercialization is related 
with the age of the democratic 
regime and of the private TV 
market: New democracies and 
new markets will have weaker 
PBS.  
Partial support: No relationship between age 
of private TV market and PBS strength. Public 
broadcasters seem to be able to attract more 
audience than private channels in stable and in 
older democracies.  
4.5 Freedom of Press will be 
stronger in older democracies 
Support: Freedom of press is indeed greater in 
older and more stable democracies. Current 
state of things in terms of democratic quality is 
not connected to freedom of press 
4.6 Journalist professionalization 
will be stronger in older than in 
new democracies 
Support: Journalist professionalization is 
indeed stronger in older and more stable 
democracies 
4.7 Journalist professionalization 
will be stronger in Liberal and 
Democratic Corporatist countries 
than in Southern and Eastern 
Europe 
Partial Support: The divide is between 
Democratic Corporatist countries and the rest 
of the continent 
4.8 Media partisanship is 
expected to be lower in Liberal 
systems than in other groups.  
No Support: External diversity does not vary 
between these four groups 
TV and newspaper bias is higher in Liberal 
systems 
4.9 Media partisanship is 
expected to be higher in newer 
than in older democracies  
No Support: Neither TV and Newspaper 
balance nor External diversity measures are 
connected with age of democracy 
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However, the differences between their work and my own results 
must be underlined. My analysis shows the existence of several differences 
between stable democracies placed by Hallin & Mancini (2004) within the 
Liberal and the Democratic Corporatist models, and most of the Southern 
and Eastern European countries. This is in line with the reasoning of 
Bardoel (2007), according to which in Europe, more than three or four 
models, there are mainly two clusters of media systems, the most 
significant differences being found between old and new democracies.  
 In other words, democratic history seems to be associated to the 
nature of the media systems. Even if the role of democracy’s age and 
stability as a factors/ correlates of media system’s characteristics is only 
superficially addressed in this thesis, the results are encouraging: stable, 
older democracies tend to have bigger and more diverse markets, finance 
their PBS channels to a greater degree, have less commercialized TV 
settings (from the audience point of view) and display higher levels of 
press freedom and journalist professionalization (Table 5.22).  
It seems that, seen within the framework of the EU, Britain is not 
very different from other Western Democracies not only in terms of market 
development and journalist professionalization (its press qualitative 
diversity is similar to the one found in the Netherlands, the number of titles 
in the UK and France is virtually the same), but also in terms of TV 
audience (Britain, Finland, Germany and Belgium are truly dual systems) 
and press freedom. In fact, there is criticism about Hallin & Mancini´s 
(2004) inclusion of Britain along with the USA and Canada in the Liberal 
Model, instead of within the democracies of Western Europe (Czepek, 
Hellvig & Novak, 2009). Norris (2009) defends the idea that “Britan and the 
the United States seem, at first glance, to have almost nothing in common” 
(p. 334). My results tend to support the idea that this country is quite close 
to the other Western democracies. Humphreys (2009), in turn, believes that 
the British system is rather sui generis, as is France, Germany or Italy, but 
my results show that only Germany seems to constitute a truly sui generis 
media system within the EU.  
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 My analyses also show that there is considerable variation within 
Southern and Eastern Europe. For instance, the new members of the EU do 
not form media system types of their own, but are close to several Western 
or Southern European countries. Baltic countries are close to English 
language nations such as Ireland and Malta (for instance, in what regards 
development of the press market, journalist professionalization or legal and 
political menaces to press freedom). In terms of press development, TV 
audiences or political balance in the TV, the Czech Republic seems to be 
close to central Southern countries (France, Italy, Spain).  
  It is worth noting that the idea that Scandinavian countries have 
shifted towards the liberal model due to diminishing influences from 
parties and government in the political content of outlets (Nord, 2008) is 
supported in this thesis. In Finland, for instance, parties still own 
newspapers but 95% of them declare to be politically unaffiliated 
(Salovaara-Moring, 2009) – a declaration that we tend to believe in, 
considering that the levels of political balance in the Finnish printed media 
are much higher than in contexts where newspapers do not have such clear 
connections to political parties.  
  Another interesting remark concerns the issue of partisanship. 
Several scholars believe that the modern media are not driven by a political 
logic, as most newspapers were at the beginning of the mass press (Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004), but by their own media logic (Voltmer, 2006; Mazzoleni 
& Schulz, 1999). Some argue that “as politics becomes increasingly 
mediatized, the important question no longer is related to the 
independence of the media from politics and society. The important 
question becomes the independence of politics and society from the media” 
(Strömbäch, 2008, p. 228). The data presented in this chapter shows that 
there are relevant levels of political partisanship in several outlets 
throughout Europe, which, in a way, could be presented as evidence 
against the proliferation of the media logic argument. However, only a 
longitudinal analysis of this phenomenon will be able to provide an answer 
to this question, by testing empirically whether the political partisanship of 
the press is really decaying vis-à-vis the recent past.  
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 The second relevant point of this chapter is the fact that the 
informational context in Europe is also very different between countries, 
and in some degree between outlets in each country. The four dimensions 
of the informational environment studied here – exposure, agenda 
diversity, information quality and trust – are connected to several different 
media system characteristics (Table 5.26). This enhances the possibility of 
media system characteristics moderation of agenda-setting effects being 
actually mediated by their outcomes in terms of informational milieu. This 
hypothesis is tested in the next chapters.  
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PART IV – AGENDA-SETTING 
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6 
 
ASSESSING AGENDA-SETTING IN  
THE EU, 2009 
 
  
 
 In the previous section, the focus was put on the media system and 
information environment dimensions which are believed to moderate the 
occurence of agenda-setting in Europe. Before testing this possibility, it is 
important to address the issue of agenda-setting measurement in a pan-
European setting, as well as discussing the operationalization of the 
relevant variables used for the study of this phenomenon. This chapter will 
therefore deal will these two points.  
6.1 Data Analysis Strategy  
 
The main and most frequent criticism that is made of agenda-setting 
research has to do with the establishment of causality between the media 
agenda and the public agenda (e.g. Saperas, 1987; Takeshita, 2006). 
Causality is related to three different features – the existence of a 
relationship between the cause (A) and the effect (B), temporal antecedence 
(causes must happen before the effects) and absence of other explanations 
of B (which is related with both the concepts of spurious relationship and 
endogeneity). The first two assumptions are usually easy to deal with, the 
third being the condition for causality – assuring that B is not caused by 
factors other than A – the trickier.  
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The best way of proving that the relationship between A and B is 
causal is experimentation; indeed, several agenda-setting studies have gone 
that way. However, several scholars have displayed stronger concerns 
regarding external validity, reason why survey studies – where causation is 
harder to test – are so frequent in this field of studies. In the realm of 
observational studies, the control for other explanations of B may be done 
statistically or, in order to limit omitted variable bias, through the use of 
panel data that allows for intra-individual comparisons to be made (see 
Barabas & Jerit, 2009). This latter approaches combine the strengths of 
survey and experimental designs (Barabas & Jerit, 2009), but panel data is 
not always available to the researchers or suitable to all research questions. 
The first agenda-setting survey-based research suffered seriously 
from causality-related problems from several points of view. The first 
studies tried to convincingly establish a relationship between the media 
and the public agenda by means of aggregate analysis which did not 
consider the patterns of media consumption of the citizens – their degree of 
exposure or their preference for a specific newspaper or TV station 
(Roessler, 1999). The analysis was done by comparing aggregate data units 
(the individuals as a homogeneous group, and the aggregate content of 
several media; McCombs & Shaw, 1972), and therefore checking the actual 
correspondence between the expressed attitudes and the individual use of 
media outlets was not possible (Roessler, 1999). The researchers would 
depart from a list of several issues and test the rank-order correlation 
between the percentage of people saying that each of them were the most 
important problem facing the country (DV) and the percentage of 
articles/news shows covering them (IV). Quite often, there was no space 
for controls nor a clear distinction between people that actually were 
exposed to the media and the people that were not (and how often, to 
which channels, etc.).   
Later studies adopted a more sophisticated approach. Instead of 
analysing the public opinion and the media landscape in general, 
researchers split their survey dataset according to the newspaper/TV 
channel people said they watched the most, and did the same to the media 
content. By doing so, they could test the agenda-setting hypothesis in an 
 207 
aggregate way, but testing the influencing capacity of different 
newspapers/TV channels over their own audiences. There is evidence that 
agenda-setting is stronger when the media variables express the content of 
the medium that the respondents actually consumed, at least in the case of 
newspapers (Benton & Frazier, 1976). 
According to some authors, the problem with aggregate studies is 
that the agenda-setting effect probably does not happen to the group in 
itself, but to the individuals in that group. Therefore, there is the risk of 
falling into the ecological fallacy (Roessler, 1999). The fact that there is a 
relationship between the ranking of the issues in public opinion and the 
amount of news coverage they have received at the community level does 
not mean that the same association holds at the individual level.  
To deal with these problems (causality and risk of ecological fallacy), 
the literature suggests the individualization of the information about the 
content of the media. This method, used for the first time by Erbring, 
Goldenberg & Miller (1980) 87, consists in transferring the information about 
the content of the media agenda to the individual level. The independent 
variable is the percentage of coverage of the issue in the newspaper most 
read/news show most watched by the respondent, whereas the dependent 
variable is the reference to that issue as being an important problem.  
This analysis, made issue by issue, allows for a stronger statistical 
analysis through the use of control variables and the direct introduction of 
individual-level moderators in the analysis (the classical method required 
the creation of sub-groups, as it is done, for instance, in Santana Pereira, 
2007). With this procedure, the agenda-setting hypothesis is confirmed if 
the reference to the issue at stake as important varies according to the 
salience it obtains in the media consumed by the respondents. Individual-
level analysis of agenda-setting tend to report smaller but consistent results 
(e.g. Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Roessler, 1999; Santana Pereira, 
2007).  
                                                 
87 These authors transformed the information about the media agenda into 
individual data, including it in a dataset in which each case was a respondent to a 
public opinion survey. By doing so, they were able to control the impact of real 
world cues (for instance, having unemployed relatives) on the importance 
conferred to the issues (for instance, unemployment).  
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 Other authors refute the ecological fallacy argument, stating that 
agenda-setting is aggregate in nature, and therefore conferring full 
credibility to aggregate approaches. Agenda-setting is believed to be about 
agendas, and not about specific issues; moreover, its students are 
“concerned with the effects of one aggregate-level phenomenon (media 
agenda) on another aggregate-level phenomenon (public agenda)” (Moy & 
Scheufele, 2004, p. 27). Therefore, since agenda-setting is aggregate in 
nature, it is not unexpected to find that aggregate studies do not belong to a 
past in which statistical and methodological tools were less sophisticated 
and harder to use, but are still conducted nowadays (e.g., Soroka, 2002; 
Wirth et al., 2010). Nor it is surprising to know that most studies of agenda-
setting conducted since 1972 were done in an aggregate fashion (Roessler, 
1999; McCombs et al., 2011).  
In this dissertation, I reproduce the three strategies of agenda-setting 
analysis presented above, in order to provide support to the agenda-setting 
hypothesis and answer different questions about the nature of this process. 
Moreover, since there is considerable variation between countries in terms 
of media coverage of issues and the relevance that public opinion confers 
on them, a different twist to the classical aggregate strategy (this time issue-
focused) is also implemented (Table 6.1).  
The aggregate analysis (either at the country or audience levels) will 
allow me to test hypotheses concerning the impact of media systems and 
information environments on agenda-setting. When the focus of the 
research is the agenda-setting process and not the substantive interest on 
particular issues, individual approaches lose relevance, because the 
processual features of this phenomenon are watered down by the 
disaggregation. However, these strategies can provide a strong test of 
agenda-setting because they allow for the inclusion of alternative 
explanations of issue salience in public opinion.  
 In sum, in this dissertation issue and individual level strategies are 
used to prove that the relationship betweet media content and importance 
conferred to the issues by the public opinion exists and is not spurious, 
whereas country and audience-level analysis focus on the process, trying to 
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understand whether media systems and information environments shape 
the media’s agenda-setting capacity in Europe. 
 
Table 6.1 – Four Levels of Analysis of Agenda-Setting Effects 
 
 Issue-Focused 
Aggregate Level 
(N=27) 
Issue-focused 
Individual 
Level 
(N=25400) 
Country-
focused Level 
(N=15) 
Audience-
focused Level 
(N=138) 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Salience of 
Issue in 
National 
Media Outlets 
(TV and 
Newspapers)88 
Salience of 
Issue in 
outlets used 
by R89 
Salience of 
Issues in the 
Media 
Salience of 
issues in a 
given outlet 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Salience of 
Issue in 
National 
Public 
Opinions 
R named 
Issue as 
salient? 
Salience of 
Issues in 
Public 
Opinion 
Importance of 
issues for the 
users of those 
outlets 
Individual 
level controls 
No Yes No No 
Real world 
Cues (country 
statistics) 
Yes Yes 
(multilevel 
analysis) 
No No 
Issue-level 
Moderators 
Yes Yes No No 
Media 
System-level 
Moderators 
No No Yes Yes 
(multilevel 
analysis) 
     
 
 
                                                 
88
 The absence of radio in this study has no actual theoretical ground, but it is 
basically due to the lack of data both in terms of radio content and usage. Radio is 
a particular kind of medium, because it allows for a virtually continuous exposure 
(one can listen to it while doing lots of other kinds, which is less possible in the 
case of TV) and is granted reasonable levels of trust in most European countries. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to include it in the major panorama of media 
under study. Regarding internet-based media, I do have data about how often 
European citizens looked at websites concerning the elections, or whether they 
used voter advice applications such as the EU Profiler. However, there is no data 
about the use of the Internet as source of information about current affairs; even if 
it existed; no data was collected about the content of the major online journals and 
the most influent blogs. Future research shall be enriched by the inclusion of these 
two types of media.  
89 The PIREDEU Voter Survey (EES, 2009a) includes questions about the 
consumption of the most watched TV news shows and most read newspapers in 
each country. Therefore, each respondent gets information about the salience of the 
issues in the newspapers and TV shows that they actually use.  
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6.1.1 Ranks or Percentages? 
 
How to deal with aggregate information on media and public 
opinion? In early studies of agenda-setting, both independent and 
dependent variables were operationalized as rank-order numbers, and not 
as percentages (see Winter, Eyal & Rogers, 1982). In other words, instead of 
analysing the percentage of news in a given newspaper with the percentage 
of readers that have considered the issue important, the researchers 
attributed a rank to each issue, according to their salience in newspapers 
and public opinion. For instance, the issue that had had the highest 
proportion of news would receive the value “1” on the independent 
variable, the second issue would get the value “2”, and so on; the same 
kind of code was used for the dependent variable. As a consequence, 
Spearman Rho was used instead of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient. 
This strategy is still used by a few students of agenda-setting effects (e.g. 
Wirth et al., 2010; Tanjong & Gaddy, 1994).  
This operationalization is, in my opinion, less valid in a test of the 
agenda-setting hypothesis than the use of raw percentages. At the core of 
the agenda-setting hypothesis (i.e. the cognitive processes connected to 
them) there is the perception of frequency with which the issues are 
covered by the media, and not actually the rank that a given issue assumes 
in the set of issues. Moreover, the transformation of percentages into 
rankings means going from ratio to ordinal variables (which implies the 
use of ordinal regression techniques instead of the straightforward OLS); it 
also means transforming intervals with a very diverse amplitude into 
regular intervals, which means adding measurement error into both 
independent and dependent variables. For instance, let us assume that the 
most covered issue got 20% of the news, whereas the second got 9% and 
the third 8%. Therefore, the interval between the first and the second would 
be eleven times bigger than the distance between the second and the third 
issues. This is why I use raw percentages in the analysis of agenda-setting 
reported in this dissertation. 
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6.1.2 Selective Exposure 
 
In studies of media effects, endogeneity is a constant threat, and can 
take several forms. To start with, the relationship between media exposure 
and vote choice is bound to be influenced by selective exposure. In fact, 
self-selection, or selective exposure, is one of the minimizing factors of 
media effects – it is actually proposed as the main factor explaining 
minimal effects of the mass media (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944; 
Klapper, 1960). Of course, if someone chooses to listen to a specific radio 
frequency, to watch a specific TV news and/or read a certain newspaper 
because they deliver a worldview that is similar to one’s political attitudes 
and values, there is not much space for effects – it is the partisanship (or 
other value-related characteristic) that explains both exposure to media and 
the individual patterns of political attitudes and behaviour.   
Selective exposure is believed to be more important in the case of 
newspapers: on the one hand, newspapers are believed to be more partisan 
than television channels; on the other, their consumption implies 
investment in terms of daily purchase or subscription. Therefore, exposure 
to TV news in some countries is probably less rationalized in terms of 
ideological similarities between medium and audience than exposure to 
newspapers.  
In a comprehensive literature review, Sears & Freedman (1967) found 
some evidence of de facto selectivity in the choice of media outlets, but the 
psychological grounds leading users to select information on the base of 
their attitude bias are unclear – some people in particular contexts prefer 
information supporting their views, others express no preference, and 
others still express a preference for nonsupportive information, explaining 
selective exposure with factors that are incidental to the degree of support 
of the information displayed.  
Moreover, there is mixed evidence about preference for exposure to 
congruent information in the 21st century. On the other hand, a study of 
Fox News, CNN and The Daily Show (on Comedy Central) shows that 
partisan watchers do perceive more bias in programs that do not align with 
their own political perspective; moreover, partisanship shapes viewers’ 
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perceptions of news content as interesting and informative (Coe et al., 
2008). On the other hand, it is not true that everyone prefers to be exposed 
to news that are in tune with one’s predispositions. For instance, Morris 
(2005) reports that Fox News audiences exposed themselves less to news 
depicting the Bush administration in a negative light and express a 
preference for news that shares their own views, whereas CNN watchers 
express a preference for quality, hard news, such as in-depth interviews 
with public officials independently of their political colour. 
How to deal with selective exposure? Some authors (Aarts & 
Semetko, 2003; Popescu, 2008) use an instrument designed for capturing 
the part of media exposure that is explained by the respondents’ socio-
demographic characteristics and party identification. They regress the 
independent variable on exogenous variables in the system, so that the 
predicted values resulting from those regressions will no longer be 
correlated with the error terms in the equations. The predicted value for 
television watching derived from the regression using exposure as the 
dependent variable and socio-demographic variables and direction of 
partisanship (government vs. opposition) as the independent variables is 
then used as a «selective exposure-free» measure.  
How can selective exposure be an issue on agenda-setting research as 
much as on research focusing on persuasion effects. Obviously, selective 
exposure based on issue salience does not make much sense. One canargue 
that people choose to expose themselves to a specific outlet due to 
similarities in their political or ideological leaning, but the argument does 
not hold as much when what is at stake is a potential similarity on lists of 
issues that have salience. On the other hand, one could also argue that 
someone decides to buy a specific newspaper because the front-page news 
covers an issue that is important for that person. Issue-based selective 
exposure is probably more likely for inconsistent, casual, users of news 
media, but it does not make much sense in the case of people that usually 
buy the daily newspaper and/or follow the evening news.  
However, there is still a problem: selective exposure based on 
ideology can have an impact on agenda-setting, harming the establishment 
of causality between media and public agendas. In other words, the 
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relationship between issue salience in a media outlet and on its audience’s 
agendas may be spurious: the amount of coverage of a given issue by the 
outlet, the importance granted to that issue and the decision to read/watch 
a specific newspaper may all be explained by partisanship or ideology. For 
instance, an Italian citizen who feels close to the left-wing party Partito 
Democratico probably chooses La Repubblica (a highly biased outlet) as 
his/her preferred newspaper. Sympathizers of this left-wing party grant a 
great deal of relevance to minority rights; in the same vein, this newspaper 
(written by left-wing sympathizers who share that same ideological 
agenda) may give considerable space to minority rights. Therefore, the 
relationship between high salience of minority rights in La Repubblica’s 
contents and on its audiences’ agendas would be explained by a third 
variable: ideology.  
Due to the constraints associated with the research conducted for this 
dissertation, no statistical or design correction for selective exposure is used 
in this dissertation. Future studies should, however, try to establish: a) how 
likely is selective exposure for each one of the thousands of media outlets 
in Europe, and b) whether it has an effect in the way that agenda-setting 
occurs. If the only outlets to display agenda-setting effects are highly 
partisan and the majority of their readers/watchers share the outlet’s 
political leanings, then the empirical support to the agenda-setting 
hypothesis will be easily refutable.     
6.1.3 Choosing the Issues 
 
The number of issues focused by an agenda-setting research can vary 
substantially – from 1 to, for instance, 52 in my analysis of agenda-setting 
in Portugal (Santana Pereira, 2007). In this research, I wish to have a 
comprehensive amount of issues, in order to be able, on one hand, to test 
the agenda-setting hypothesis in an aggregate way with just one time point, 
and, on the other, to ensure variability of issue characteristics in the 
individual-level analysis.  
How can the issues be chosen? The most reasonable option is to select 
the issues that really got onto the public agenda – that is to say, that were 
mentioned by at least 10 per cent of the survey respondents (McCombs, 
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2004). This allows for sufficient variation in the dependent variable at the 
individual level. But it is known that those issues are usually the ones 
where agenda-setting is weaker or even absent, because their salience is not 
due to media coverage but to other reasons (individual situation, real 
world cues). In fact, in the case of the PIREDEU Voter Survey, the two most 
frequently mentioned issues were the economic conditions (53.3%) and 
unemployment (42.5%). Therefore, centering the agenda-setting analysis in 
those issues only would probably lead to an excessively conservative test of 
my hypotheses.  
An alternative approach is to choose those issues in which agenda-
setting is thought to be stronger, that is to say, the ones that do not have 
much proximity to the common person in everyday life – foreign policy, 
EU issues, and so on. However, this would lead to a research focused on 
strong effects in the relevance conferred to abstract and complex issues by a 
small subset of the population. I therefore chose issues from right across the 
continuum between obtrusive and unobtrusive issues.  
I also tried to select the issues for which it is possible to control for 
additional causes of salience in regards to real world cues and personal 
sensitivity. For instance, unemployment was chosen also because there is 
information available about the respondent being unemployed, which is a 
competing factor driving issue salience, beyond the amount of media 
coverage that it has received in the news. 
The PIREDEU´s Voter and Media Studies offer a set of 147 topics 
summarizing the most important problems referred by the citizens, the 
candidates, and the issues covered by the media outlets in the three weeks 
of the campaign. Since this is a wide amount of topics, there was the need 
to categorize some and exclude others. But how? 
 As McLeod, Becker & Byrnes (1974) wisely remind us, the creation 
of categories in content analysis involves decisions about number, 
specificity and origin that are not easy or straightforward. If, on the one 
hand, it would be interesting to have as many categories as possible in 
order to strengthen the basis of statistical inference, for parsimony sake the 
number of issues should be kept as low as possible.  
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 Keeping both concerns (variety vs. parsimony) in mind, and using 
Dearing and Rogers’s (1988) definition of issue (set of related events that fit 
together in a broad category), I categorized the 147 original issues into 15 
broader categories: Economic Situation; Economic Structure and Policy; 
Unemployment; Health Care; Social Justice; Social Minorities; Immigration; 
Political Corruption; Government ; European Union; Environment; Crime 
and Justice; Foreign Policy/Defence; Democracy and Human Rights; 
Education/Culture. Their correspondence with the original topics in the 
PIREDEU Voter and Media Studies are presented in Appendix 3. 
 
6.1.4 Time  
 
Time is a crucial element in agenda-setting research In general terms 
this refers to the time needed for the media agenda to have an impact on 
the public agenda of a given community (Saperas, 1987). However, one has 
to consider not only the time frame per se, but also other dimensions: time 
lag (the period between the measurement of the media agenda and the 
public agenda), the duration of the media agenda measurement, the 
duration of the public agenda measurement; some studies also try to 
identify the optimal effect span, which is the period of time in which the 
strongest relationship between media and public agenda is observed 
(Weaver et al., 1981; Watt, Mazza & Snyder, 1993). 
 Time-lag selection is a very important feature in agenda-setting 
research, in which the goal is to test a causal hypothesis. A time-lag that is 
too short will not capture the causal relationship (there is a need for 
repetition of media content and/or time for sinking in, before effects are 
observable) whereas a time-lag that is too long is also undesirable because 
the causal effect could disappear over time if the researcher waits too long 
to study it (Chaffee, 1972, in Wanta, 1997b) 
There is, however, no consensus about any of these aspects of time. 
The time frame itself depends on the issue and the research agenda that the 
authors want to put in action – for instance, Winter & Eyal (1981) present a 
22-year time frame, but the time period considered by McCombs & Shaw is 
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considerably inferior. Table 2.1, in Chapter Two, shows how different time 
frames can be in terms of length.  
The time lag is not homogeneous in the literature as well. Brosius & 
Kepplinger (1990), in their study of television impact on the salience of a 
series of issues, used a time lag of one to three weeks; in turn, Roberts, 
Wanta & Dwzo (2002), observed the agenda-setting phenomenon with a 
much smaller time lag (one to seven days), but some studies about printed 
press have shown that the time lags can vary between three and ten weeks 
(see, for instance, Wanta & Hu, 1994a; Wanta, 1997b).  
 In terms of the optimal effect span, opinions are not in agreement 
either – some authors report a period of four to six weeks, and others 
suggest a cycle of two, six months or – in the case of obtrusive issues – even 
eighteen months (Winter & Eyal, 1981; Watt, Mazza & Snyder, 1993; 
Roberts, Wanta & Dzwo, 2002). Television seems to involve quicker and 
short-term agenda-setting effects, whereas the press takes more time to 
impact the agenda, but its impact tends to last longer (Wanta & Hu, 1994a; 
Wanta, 1997b).  
I had little choice about the time aspects of this research, since my 
research involves data collected by someone else. However, the features of 
the timing in the PIREDEU Media Study and Voter Survey seem to fit my 
needs quite well. To start with, the media agenda was measured for 21 
days, which allows for a comprehensive idea of the media content in the 27 
EU countries. The lag between the measurement of the media content and 
the measurement of public opinion is rather small, since the Voter Survey 
fieldwork started the day after the elections. It would only be possible to 
use information about the date of media content and survey interview date 
to manipulate, even if to a very small degree, the time lag and the duration 
of the media and public opinion agendas’ measurement.  
This panorama will probably lead to stronger television agenda-
setting effects – usually newspapers need more time to have an impact. I 
am assuming here, of course, that an unmeasured intervening factor (the 
amount of coverage of issues before the start of the media data collection) 
will not have an impact. It is a dangerous assumption, but the lack of data 
makes it impossible to make (and test) a different assumption.    
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6.2 Data Sources 
 
 In the field of media effects studies, it is often difficult to pass from 
the research question to the empirical research due to absence of data and 
good indicators of theoretical concepts. Media content is particularly hard 
to collect and use, in the case of the traditional outlets and also in terms of 
the new media (considering the amount of information available on the 
web, what to collect and how to collect it?). Moreover, in comparative 
studies, the barriers of language make these difficulties even harder. 
Fortunately enough, the PIREDEU study, with its focus on the 27 EU 
countries, allows for me to have sufficient variance in the majority of the 
factors I am interested in. Therefore, in the following chapter, most of the 
data used comes from the PIREDEU research project, namely the Voter 
Survey and Media Study.  
 In the case of the Voter Survey, the data collection was started on 
the first working day following the 2009 European Parliament elections (4 
to 7 June 2009). A thousand successful interviews were conducted in each 
member-State (van Egmond et al., 2010), mainly via CATI (Computer 
Assisted Telephone Interviewing).90 Information about sampling 
techniques, response rates, length of interview and other fieldwork details 
can be found in the 27 country reports made available at the PIREDEU 
website. Regarding content, the questionnaires included items about 
political attitudes, opinions, affiliations and behaviours, amongst which 
several variables that are relevant for this study – the Gallup question 
about the Most Important Problem (MIP) facing the country, the degree of 
exposure to the media, information about which outlets are used the most, 
and several socio-demographic variables.  
 The Media Study was designed in order to connect the information 
collected by the Voter Survey about media use to the actual content of 
                                                 
90 There were seven countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) where representative phone sampling 
was not feasible. In these countries, 70 percent of interviews were achieved by face-
to-face mode, while the remaining 30 percent was achieved by phone. To exclude 
mode-effects as much as possible, face-to-face interview did not use additional 
visual aids that, of course, were not available in the telephone surveys (van 
Egmond et al., 2010).  
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specific outlets (Schuck et al., 2010). The content analysis was carried out on 
a sample of national news media coverage in all member-States. In each 
country, the main national evening news broadcasts of the most widely 
watched public and commercial television stations were included; 
moreover, in each country, two quality (i.e. broadsheet) and one 
tabloid/sensationalistic newspaper were selected. Therefore, the television 
sample consists of 57 TV news shows (one per TV channel) in the same 
number of networks, while the newspaper sample consists of 81 different 
newspapers (Appendix 4).  
 The data was collected for the three weeks prior to the election (i.e., 
from May 14 to June 4 in some countries, and from May 17 to June 7 in 
others, depending on the actual Election Day). There are no relevant 
problems about missing data in newspaper content, but TV news content in 
some countries (Portugal, UK, Greece, Romania, Sweden) is severely 
damaged by a considerable number of broadcast days that were not 
covered (Schuck et al., 2010). The information about position, size, and type 
of story, visual aids, as well as about the primary, secondary and tertiary 
topics (issues) covered and other relevant content information, was 
registered and coded by a team of native speakers of the languages in 
which the media messages were conveyed.  
 All broadcast news items were coded. In the case newspapers, all 
news items on the first page and on one randomly selected page as well as 
all stories pertaining particularly to the EU and/or the EU election on any 
other page of the newspaper were coded.  In total, 52,009 news stories were 
coded in all 27 EU-member countries.  
 Only daily titles were processed by the Media Study. Daily 
newspapers are thought to be the dominant type, essential to the processes 
of political learning and political opinion-building, while weeklies 
sometimes have relatively lower circulation and less space to cover issues, 
although they often serve as opinion leaders and have a considerable 
impact on their readers (Voltmer, 2000; Santana Pereira, 2007).  
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 Moreover, just a small sample of the total offer of newspapers in 
each country was considered – three newspapers in each country. 
PIREDEU selected the most relevant (reference/elite/prestige91 and 
tabloid) newspapers in circulation in each media system, which are 
believed to be representative of the content of the press in the country. This 
assumption is backed by previous research: in the United States, the New 
York Times is frequently selected as the medium to analyse (e.g. Neuman, 
1990, Winter & Eyal, 1981; Stroud & Kenski, 2007), even though its 
circulation is relatively small compared to many other American 
newspapers and magazines. Why? Because the New York Times media 
agenda is considered to influence the agendas of the other American 
newspapers (e.g. Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Rogers, 2004; Son & Weaver, 
2005). In a similar vein, other studies selected the most important 
newspaper (in terms of circulation and/or quality) as the best proxy for the 
press agenda (Anokwa & Salwen, 1988; Winter, Eyal & Rogers, 1982).  
The PIREDEU Media Study dataset (EES, 2009b) offers information 
about articles on front-pages and a randomly selected set of pages in each 
newspaper. Only front-page news were included in my analysis. Some 
scholars argue that television newscasts are an audiovisual representation 
of newspaper front pages; and news usually passes from internal pages (or 
oblivion) to front pages and TV news shows more or less at the same time 
(Shaw, n.d., in Ramaprasad, 1983; McCombs, 1977, in Wanta, 1997b). By 
including only front-page news, the comparison between newspapers and 
television channels is, therefore, more balanced.  
One minor shortcoming of the media dataset produced by PIREDEU 
is the fact that is does not include media content data about radio and 
internet. Nevertheless, this does not strike me as being a big problem, since 
television and press still are the major sources of information about current 
                                                 
91 In a book edited by Aalberg & Curran and published in 2012, the expression 
used is elite/prestige, which corresponds to the traditional concept of reference but 
focus on the status granted to the users of the journal more than the role of the 
journal itself (i.e., to be a source of reference information). Elite journals selected by 
this research team for their EU member state cases are the same newspapers that 
the PIREDEU team selected as being “reference”. Therefore, the terms “reference” 
“elite” or “prestige” newspapers will be used interchangeably. 
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issues in the majority of the European Union member-States, as several 
Eurobarometers have shown.92 
6.3 Variable Operationalization 
6.3.1 Independent Variable  
 
In agenda-setting studies independent variable is the Salience of a 
given Issue in the Media. It basically refers to how frequently it was 
mentioned in the newspaper or news show (i.e., the number of stories 
addressing the issue, percentage of time/space devoted to the issue). In real 
context studies, this variable has been traditionally studied by using media 
content analysis (for instance, McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Funkhouser, 
1973). The same is done here, though the use of the PIREDEU Media Study 
dataset.  
  The index of attention given to an issue was planned not to be a 
simple measure of intensity of coverage, but to combine frequency of 
coverage and relative prominence in terms of display or placement in the 
outlet (McLeod, Becker & Byrnes, 1974; Peter, 2003). The PIREDEU dataset 
includes information about page number, section, type of story, number of 
visual illustrations, length and location on the page. All stories here 
considered are front-page stories93, which means that page number and 
section are not relevant weights. However, the news stories were 
multiplied by 1 if no visual aids are used, by 1.5 if one visual aid is used, 2 
if two visual aids are used, and so on (each visual illustration adds .5 to the 
weight factor; after 6 visual aids, stories were weighted by a factor of 4). 
Pieces covering up to ¼ of the page were weighted by 1, up to ½ got a 
weight of 1.5, and so on (each ¼ adds .5 to the weight factor). Finally stories 
presented at the top half of the page were weighted by 2, while those at the 
second half of the page were weighted by 1. For instance, a piece occupying 
a quarter of a page, without any pictures or graphs, and located in the 
lower half of the page counts as one piece, whereas a piece starting on the 
                                                 
92 For more details, consult, for instance the latest Eurobarometer reports at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm.  
93 This corresponds to 34.6% of all press news pieces collected by the PIREDEU 
Media Study.  
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upper half of the page, occupying ¾ of a page and using two visual aids 
count as 8 pieces (=1*2(visual aids)*2(size)*2(position). The types of article 
(news story, column/commentary, reportage/background story, editorial, 
portraits, interviews, bullets, headlines, documentations, 
maps/pictures/graphs, letters to the editor, quiz) were not used to weight 
the newspaper articles, since it is not clear which types can lead to stronger 
visibility of issues or retention in memory.  
In the end, the weights did not change significantly this independent 
variable. The relationship between the weighted and unweighted variables 
is, in the case of reference rates, of .97 (Pearson coefficient), and in the case 
of rankings the correlation is perfect. This basically means that the size, 
position and number of visual aids within issues are very similar. I 
therefore decided not to use the weighted variables, since they do not add 
much to the quality of this research.   
Regarding television, the dataset offers information about length of 
newspiece and position of newspiece in the newscast alignment. In fact, in 
their television agenda-setting study, Iyengar & Kinder (1987) noted that 
the first news pieces have the strongest influence on the public agenda. In a 
similar fashion, Behr & Iyengar (1985) only found agenda-setting effects for 
lead stories in televisions news shows; nonlead stories had no effect, 
perhaps because they were less noticed by viewers, whose attention span is 
smaller than the duration of a news show – meaning that only the first 
news item in each news show is received before the audience’s attention 
focus on other things. However, the most plausible reason for this is that 
people are able to understand that the order by which the issues are 
presented is not arbitrary, but refers to the degree of importance granted by 
the editors to each issue that they cover in the newscast (Iyengar & Kinder, 
1987).  
Stories of less than 10 seconds were weighted by a factor of 1, and 
each additional second implied an increase of .01 in the weight factor. 
Position within the news show is also used to weight the pieces. The first 
story gets a weight of 5, the second a weight of 4.9, and so on (a decrease in 
primacy in the news show means a decrease of .1 in the weight factor. 
Those appearing after story 38 got a weight of just 1. Therefore, for 
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instance, a 3-minute story presented at the beginning of the newscast 
counts as 8.5 stories [180 – 10 seconds (baseline) =170; 170*.01=1.7; 
1*1.7(length factor)*5(position factor].  The relationship between weighted 
and unweighted variables is also very strong, very close to 1. Once again, 
the length and position of the news pieces referring to specific issues is 
probably very similar within issues. Therefore, weighted measures are not 
used.  
     
 6.3.2 Dependent Variable  
 
  The dependent variable is the Salience of the Issues in the Public 
Agenda. This variable is traditionally operationalized through survey data. 
The classic open-ended Gallup question about the most important problem 
affecting the nation, usually referred to as the MIP (Most Important 
Problem) measure, or its variants, are used in a large proportion of the 
research on this area (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Behr & Iyengar, 1985), even 
if it is often criticized as not being the best measure of the public agenda 
(Rogers, 1993). In fact, questions in which people are asked to rate the 
degree of importance of a previously selected list of issues (see Iyengar & 
Kinder, 1987) are less dependent of the interviewee verbal and memory 
abilities, and can lead to different results94. A third possibility is to use the 
MIP question, with several multiple responses, asking the respondents to 
pick an issue or, alternatively, to mention other topics. In this research, only 
the first possibility was available.  
 As mentioned earlier, the PIREDEU Voter Survey data (EES, 2009a) 
is used to operationalize the public agenda in my study. The data was 
collected by the open-ended questions “What do you think is the most 
important problem facing [country] today?”, “And what do you think is the second 
most important problem facing (country) today?”, and “And what do you think is 
the third most important problem facing (country) today?”. The answers are 
coded according to the issues they portray.  
                                                 
94
 Schuman, Ludvig & Krosnick (1986) observed that closed questions lead to a 
concentration of the respondents on the offered possibilities in a greater extent 
than open-ended questions. 
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 The information retrieved by the MIP questions is used in different 
ways. In the aggregate analysis, the dependent variable is the percentage of 
interviewed citizens stating that the issue X was the most important 
problem facing their country. In the individual level analysis, the 
dependent variable is a dummy (0= issue not mentioned as the most 
important problem; 1= it was mentioned as the most important problem).  
Needless to say, the measurement of the public agenda is done by 
taking the survey answers of the interviewees that used the media during 
the election campaign, since exposure is a conditio sine qua non for the 
occurrence of media effects of any kind.  
6.3.3 Control Variables 
 
 The focus on issues and the individualization of the analysis opens 
space for the inclusion of control variables, which is a widespread strategy 
to deal with the threat of spurious relationships between the IV (issue 
salience in the media) and the DV (issue importance in public opinion).  
 But what other reasons may account for a specific issue’s salience in 
public opinion? First, personal sensitivity can be a relevant factor. 
Depending on the issue at stake, there are material reasons (for instance, 
being very rich or very poor when the issue is redistribution; being 
unemployed when the issue is employment; having children when the 
issue is education) or attitudinal reasons (for example, a strongly anti-EU or 
pro-EU attitude explains why the EU may be particularly salient for 
someone) that may explain why a specific problem is mentioned as the 
most important problem in the country.  
  Second, over and above personal experience, there are real-world 
causes of issue relevance (Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Kosicki, 
1993; Iyengar & Ottati, 1994), especially in the case of very obtrusive issues 
(Hubbard, DeFleur & DeFleur, 1975; Demers et al., 1989), but also in the 
case of distant issues such as foreign policy (Soroka, 2003). 
In this dissertation, the individual-level controls related to personal 
sensitivity vis-à-vis the issues are measured with data from the PIREDEU 
Voter Survey dataset (EES, 2009a), whereas the information concerning the 
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real world cues comes from different sources (Eurostat, World Bank, 
others). The list of control variables is presented in the following chapter.  
6.3.4 Moderators 
 
The different nature of the 15 issues under study allows me to test the 
effects of issue obtrusiveness. This is a fairly subjective concept, which 
usually depends on the setting in which the research takes place, as well as 
on the characteristics of the participants. However, the degree of 
obtrusiveness of specific issues can be assessed by a team of independent 
judges (Lee, 2004), a technique that allows for the testing of inter-coder 
reliability afterwards and tries to avoid subjectivity in the categorization. 
 The degree of obtrusiveness of the issues under study was assessed 
by two independent judges. Obtrusive issues are those that are visible for 
the majority of the citizens: economic conditions, unemployment, health 
care, environment, and crime and justice. Unobtrusive issues are both those 
that have a potential to be blatant, but its inner visibility depends a great 
deal on citizen or country characteristics (political corruption, immigration, 
social minorities, education and culture, and social justice) and those that 
are very abstract or distant, such as democracy and human rights, 
government, foreign policy and defence, economic policy, and the EU.  
The media system and media outlet level moderators were described 
in the previous sections of this dissertation: development of press markets, 
commercialization of the TV market, freedom of press, journalist 
professionalization, political balance, exposure, trust, quality and diversity. 
No individual-level moderations will be tested in this dissertation. 
Despite the fact that there is a considerable number of studies on this 
matter, some factors are considered important to the agenda-setting 
phenomenon by some authors and proven irrelevant by others; moreover, 
some of the moderators presented in Chapter Two (e.g. political 
knowledge, discussion of public affairs) are believed to buffer or boost the 
agenda-setting effect, according to the particular study. Considering the 
goals and characteristics and main goals of the research reported here, 
there is no space for this kind of analysis, which however must be part of 
future comparative studies of agenda-setting.  
 225 
7 
 
THE MODERATING EFFECT OF MEDIA 
SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION 
ENVIRONMENTS:  
AGENDA-SETTING IN THE EU 
 
 
 
 
 In this chapter, the media impact on public agendas is addressed 
through an analysis of media content and public opinion in 27 different 
settings. The occurrence and strength of agenda-setting will be tested at 
different levels, in order to allow for the inclusion of controls and, more 
importantly, the test of moderating variables.  
The main hypothesis is that the salience of issues in the media will 
have an impact on the perceived importance of those issues in public 
opinion, even when one controls for other causes of issue salience 
(Hypothesis 7.1). This hypothesis will be tested separately for the TV and 
newspapers, due to all the evidence suggesting that these types of media 
may have impacts of different magnitude (see Chapter Two).  
 This chapter is organized in three sections, each focusing on 
different strategies of agenda-setting analysis: issue-focused (aggregate and 
individual), country-focused, and audience-focused. The general 
hypothesis is tested in the three sections, while other hypotheses are tested 
in the section depicting the most appropriate analytical strategy.  
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 The issue-focused section is designed mainly for the test of the 
agenda-setting hypothesis in a fairly conservative way, via the inclusion of 
control variables and (at the individual level) the establishment of 
relationships between media content and opinion about issue salience 
based on the habits of media consumption reported by the respondents. 
After establishing that the connection between media and public opinion 
holds even when other reasons for issue salience are controlled for, the 
analysis turns to the study of inter-country and inter-audience variability, a 
setting in which competing factors of issue salience cannot be controlled 
for, but where it is possible to test hypotheses about the role of media 
systems and information environments as moderators of agenda-setting.  
 The following hypotheses depart from the postulate that the 
patterns of agenda-setting will not be the same in the 27 member-states, or, 
in other words, that the strength of the media effect will vary between countries: 
• Systems with developed press markets will display strong agenda-setting 
effects (Hypothesis 7.2); this relationship is not direct, but 
mediated by information quality, which is higher in developed 
markets (see Chapter Five).  
• Systems with developed TV markets will display strong TV agenda-
setting effects (Hypothesis 7.3), since this subsystem’s development 
is connected to higher frequency of exposure to TV newscasts (see 
Chapter Five).  
• Systems with strong public broadcasters are those where the occurrence 
of TV agenda-setting is higher (Hypothesis 7.4), either due to the fact 
that frequency of exposure to news is higher in those settings or 
because it has an impact on the media agendas’ diversity (see 
Chapter Five) 
• Press freedom has a strong impact on agenda-setting (Hypothesis 7.5), 
because it boosts trust and news exposure, as well as the quality 
of the information offered by the media actors (see Chapter Five).  
• Countries with highly professionalized journalists have a greater 
probability of displaying agenda-setting (Hypothesis 7.6), because 
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professionalization boosts trust in the media and information 
quality (see Chapter Five).  
• For the same reason, countries with politically balanced media have a 
higher probability of agenda-setting occurrence (Hypothesis 7.7). 
 
More specific hypothesis about mediation effects will be drawn 
further on, based not only on the results displayed in Chapter Five about 
the relationship between media systems and information environment 
dimensions, but also on the impact that the media systems will have in the 
occurrence or magnitude of agenda-setting effects.  
The second set of hypotheses is tested at the audience level. The role 
of source characteristics in the success of persuasive messages, frequently 
observed in studies focusing on media impact (e.g. Hovland, 1954; Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Kopacs & Volgy, 2005; Santana Pereira, 2007; see also 
Saperas, 1987), cannot be neglected, especially when there is data available. 
In fact, it can be that the media system by itself has no effect on the 
occurrence or strength of agenda-setting effects, but that the key factor of 
agenda-setting variability is connected with the characteristics of the media 
outlets that people use most often.  
Therefore, I propose two additional hypotheses that compete with the 
those proposed above, which postulate the same kind of effects from the 
same set of variables, but at the media outlet level. In other words, I expect 
that media outlets will be more able to set their readers agendas when the 
information they provide is of high quality (Hypothesis 7.8). In terms of 
political bias, my hypothesis is that if a given outlet has strong and clear 
links with a given political party, its agenda-setting power will be weaker. 
In other words, agenda-setting will be stronger in outlets without a visible 
political partisanship, i.e. without a clear connection to political parties 
(Hypothesis 7.9).  
Lastly, at the issue- and individual-level, the nature of the issues, 
namely its obtrusiveness, is thought to moderate the impact that the media 
have on the public relevance that they are granted (Hypothesis 7.10).  
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7.1 Issue-focused Analysis 
7.1.1 General Panorama 
 
The aggregate analysis of the relationship between public agendas 
and media content focusing on the 15 issues under study, therefore having 
each one of the 27 polities as cases, is presented in the following pages.  
Figure 7.1 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between 
salience of the issue in the media (proportion of news pieces/newspaper 
front pages depicting the subject) and in the public opinion (percentage of 
survey respondents mentioning it as one of the MIPs in the country). It is 
very clear that the variation in the salience of six issues throughout the 27 
countries is more strongly associated with television coverage than with 
newspaper coverage. Such issues are immigration, government, social 
justice, crime and justice, political corruption and foreign policy. For the 
other nine issues, the correlation coefficients are lower, thus not providing 
an empirical support to the agenda-setting hypothesis.  
 
Figure 7.1 – Correlation between media and public opinion salience conferred to 
each issue in 27 polities, 2009 
 
Source: PIREDEU Voter Survey (EES, 2009a) and Media Study (EES, 2009b). 
Calculations made by the author.  
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European Union and Government seem to be rather distinct issues from 
the point of view of media impact, despite the fact that both deal with the 
realm of politics and governance. For the EU issue, the agenda-setting 
effects are small, whereas the impact of the amount of pieces about the 
government in the TV, and, to a lesser extent, in newspapers, is 
considerable (Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3).  
The European Union is rarely depicted in the French, German, British 
and Dutch media, being present in about 4 percent of the TV news stories 
during routine times and 10 percent of the stories broadcast just before the 
European summits (Peter & de Vreese, 2004). What about during electoral 
campaigns? According to the data presented in de Vreese et al. (2006), the 
visibility of the EU during the campaign in these countries was low (i.e., 
inferior to 10% of the news stories in the TV) both in 1999 and 2004. The 
same panorama is seen in 2009, but these countries are not the only ones in 
which the EU appeared in less than 10% of the news broadcasted during 
the election campaign – in fact, more than half of the 27 polities lie below 
the 10% threshold (Figure 7.2). However, in general terms and compared 
with previous elections, reference to Europe and the EP elections were not 
only more positive, more polarized and evaluative (Schuck et al., 2011a; 
Schuck et al., 2011b), but also more visible in the media in 2009 than in 
previous years.  
In Denmark, the visibility of Europe in the TV news is usually quite 
high, corresponding to between one fifth (during routine times) and one 
quarter (during summit times) of all stories broadcast in 2000 (Peter & de 
Vreese, 2004). In the other countries, visibility varied a great deal but 
almost never crosses the threshold of 20% of news stories (de Vreese et al., 
2006). In 2009, however, the number of stories referring to the EU during 
the electoral campaign in the Danish media was as low as in the countries 
described above, not surpassing the 10% level either for television 
newscasts or newspaper front pages (Figure 7.2).  
On the other hand, in the case of television, Greece, and to a lesser 
extent, Portugal, Poland, Austria or Malta, are settings where the EU got 
more than 20% in the TV newscasts. In Portugal, the focus on European 
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issues seems to be even stronger in party campaign materials (ads and 
posters) than in the media coverage of the campaign (Jalali & Silva, 2011). 
 
Figure 7.2 – Correlation between Media and Public Opinion Salience conferred 
on the European Union, 2009 
 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Voter Survey (EES, 2009a) and Media Study (EES, 2009b). Calculations 
made by the author.  
 
 
 
European Union - Television
MT
GB
AT
BE-W
GR
IT
DK
ES
CY
NL
SE
IEFR
BE-F FI
EE
DE
LT
BG
CZ
PT
LV
SK SI
PL
RO
HU0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
TV                            
Pu
bl
ic
 
Op
in
io
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Union - Newspapers
MT
GB
AT
BE-W
GR
IT
DK
ES
CY
NL
SE
IE FR
BE-F
FI
EE
DE
LT
BG
CZ
PT
LV
SK
SI
PL
RO
HU0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Newspaper                            
Pu
bl
ic
 
O
pi
n
io
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 231 
In previous EP elections, the visibility of the EU in newspapers was 
lower than in television. Moreover, whereas visibility of EU in the TV grew 
between 1999 and 2004, the inverse phenomenon happened in newspapers 
(de Vreese, Lauf & Peter, 2007).  In 2009, the EU had more space in news 
broadcasts than in the newspapers in countries such as Austria, Spain, 
Slovakia, Poland, Portugal, and especially Greece. France and Czech 
Republic present the opposite phenomenon (more space in the press than 
in the TV), and in the other polities – the majority – the differences between 
TV and newspapers are fairly small.  
What about the effect of media coverage? The European Union is one 
of the issues that present a weaker association between media coverage and 
importance conferred by public opinion. In fact, the coefficient is negative 
in the case of TV (r = -.14, not significantly different from 0), and positive 
but also indistinguishable from 0 in the case of newspaper front pages (r= 
.08). The absence of agenda-setting effects is particularly noticeable in 
contexts such as Malta or Greece, where the amount of television and press 
attention to the EU is very high but only a few citizens consider it to be a 
relevant issue, or in the Netherlands (the country in which more citizens 
mentioned the EU as an important problem, but the visibility of such topic 
in the news was very small) (Figure 7.2). The key finding to this result may 
be that the EU was depicted as an issue but not as a problem, which would 
mean that its propensity to become an MIP was low even in high-coverage 
settings.  
With regards to the government, it is an unobtrusive issue that 
presents a strong agenda-setting effect in this study. Television newscasts 
seem to have more power in influencing the relevance granted to the 
strength, stability and efficiency of the governing cabinet (r= .68), when 
compared to newspaper agenda-setting capacity in this issue (r=.36). 
Ireland and the Czech Republic are interesting cases in which the 
government is viewed as an MIP is very high, despite the low coverage that 
this issue gets in the TV and newspaper front pages (Figure 7.3).  
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Figure 7.3 – Correlation between Media and Public Opinion Salience conferred 
to the Government, 2009 
 
Source: PIREDEU Voter Survey (EES, 2009a) and Media Study (EES, 2009b). Calculations 
made by the author.  
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Does the nature of the issues have an impact on agenda-setting 
capacity in Europe? In the case of the TV, the differences between agenda-
setting in obtrusive  and unobtrusive issues95 are not statistically significant 
(t=.464; p =.650), but this medium seems to have a stronger impact on 
unobtrusive issues than in obtrusive matters (Figure 7.4), even if the intra-
group variance is rather high (standard deviations vary between .26 and 
.31). Regarding newspaper agenda-setting capacity, the results would 
support a negative relationship between obtrusiveness and strength of 
agenda-setting, since the coefficients are higher in the case of uobtrusive 
issues than for the other types of issues (t= 6.319; p = .013) (Figure 7.4).  
Interestingly enough, it is only in the case of obtrusive issues that 
there is a difference between newspapers and TV channel’s agenda-setting 
capacity, with television much better placed than the press (t= -2.505; p= 
.066) (Figure 7.4).  
 
Figure 7.4 – Agenda-Setting in Europe: The effect of issue obtrusiveness  
 
Source: PIREDEU Voter Survey (EES, 2009a) and Media Study (EES, 2009b). Calculations 
made by the author.  
 
                                                 
95 As explained before, obtrusive issues are those that are visible and relevant for 
the major part of the citizens – economic conditions, unemployment, health care, 
environment, crime and justice, and government were considered to be so. 
Unobtrusive issues are distant or abstract – political corruption, immigration, 
social minorities, education and culture, social justice, democracy and human 
rights, foreign policy and defence, economic policy, and the EU.  
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7.1.2 Agenda-Setting Analysis with Real World Cues 
 
In this and the following sections, I will use regression analysis in 
order to examine the isolated and the competing effects of newspaper and 
TV content on issue salience throughout Europe, controlling for other 
factors of issue salience. These controls are, of course, related to the nature 
of each single subject, and try to tackle the extent by which the issue can be 
visible to the common citizen independently of his consumption of media 
products (see Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980).  
For instance, unemployment rates may have a positive impact on 
issue salience independently of the media coverage because in contexts 
where those rates are higher, the odds of being unemployed or having 
friends, relatives or neighbours in that same situation are higher. In 
addition, the levels of public expenditure on healthcare can be a good 
proxy for the amount and quality of the service provided to the common 
citizen (number of hospitals, velocity, efficiency, etc). Crime rates in the 
country are believed to increase their visibility as a social problem, and, as 
a consequence, have an impact on how relevant crime is believed to be. 
Lastly, levels of air pollution can be pretty eloquent about the importance 
of environmental issues over and above media coverage. 
The rationale expressed in the previous paragraph can be applied to 
the other real world indicators of issue salience (Table 7.1). The goal is not 
to provide a complete test of factors of issue salience for each one of the 15 
subjects under analysis, which would be out of the scope of this 
dissertation. Instead, the objective is simply to test whether the impact of 
the media is still observable when real-world causes of issue salience are 
controlled for. If so, it is reasonably safe to argue that my measures of 
media content are not mere proxies of the objective conditions of existence 
leading to higher or lower issue relevance, and that their effect is not 
spurious. 
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Table 7.1 –Real World Cues – Potential Factors of Issue Salience 
 
 Real World Control Notes 
 
 
 
Economic 
Situation 
GDP Fluctuation 
(Eurostat96) 
 
Real growth in the GDP as percentage change on 
the previous year. 
 This variable is not correlated with GDP per capita 
(Pearson’s r =.27; p =.172), but it is negatively 
correlated with unemployment rates (Pearson’s r= 
-.56; p =.002). 
GDP per Capita 
(Eurostat) 
--- 
Unemployment 
(Eurostat) 
Unemployment rate in the Country 
Economic 
Structure /Policy 
Same as Above Same As Above 
Unemployment Same as Above Same As Above 
 
 
 
Health Care 
Health Care 
Expenditure 
(Eurostat) 
 
As % of the GDP 
Data for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Austria and 
Portugal is from 2008.  
No data for Ireland, Greece, Malta, UK and Italy. 
Not correlated with number of doctors 
Practising 
Physicians per  
100, 000 inhabitants 
(Eurostat) 
Number of practicing doctors per 100 thousand 
inhabitants in the country.  
There is no data for France, Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece.  
For Cyprus, Finland and Sweden, the data depicts 
the situation in 2008. 
Social Justice People at risk of 
Poverty or Social 
Exclusion 
(Eurostat) 
% of the general Population 
 
Gini Coefficient 
(Eurostat) 
The Gini coefficient depicts the relationship of 
cumulative shares of the population arranged 
according to the level of disposable income, to the 
cumulative share of the total disposable income 
received by them. 
 It varies between 0 and 100, and higher values 
correspond to more inequality in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Minorities 
Gay 
Marriage/Partners
hip Legally 
Recognized 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Greece, and Italy do not 
allow/recognize same sex marriages/partnerships. 
Dummy variable. No data for Cyprus and Malta.  
 
 
Elderly People 
Risking Poverty 
(Eurostat) 
Share of older persons with a disposable income, 
before social transfers, below the risk-of-poverty 
threshold. Pensions are counted as income before 
transfers.  
This variable is negatively correlated with the 
existence of same-sex marriage or recognized 
partnerships (Pearson’s r= -.47; p = .019), which 
strengthens the argument that both variables are 
good proxies for social minority protection 
 
Immigration 
Number of 
Immigrants in 
Country (Eurostat) 
Number of immigrants (in thousands) per 1 000 
000 inhabitants.  
Higher numbers display stronger immigrant 
visibility.  
No data available for Greece and Romania. 
                                                 
96
 This and all the other Eurostat data used in this chapter are available online at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes.  
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 Real World Control Notes 
Political 
Corruption 
World Bank data 
on Control of 
Corruption97 
This factor varies between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher 
values denote a better situation in terms of absence 
of corruption in the political sphere. 
Government  World Bank Data 
on Government 
Efficiency 
This index varies between -2.5 and 2.5, being 
higher values associated with more government 
efficiency. 
 
 
European Union 
Old vs. New 
Member States 
Dummy identifying the 12 new EU members 
whose accession happened in 2004 and 2007.  
% Public Support 
EU (PIREDEU 
Voter Survey) 
% of survey respondents saying that the country’s 
EU membership is a good thing. 
 
Environment 
Air pollution 
statistics  
(Eurostat) 
Urban population exposure to air pollution by 
ozone (micrograms per cubic metre day). Higher 
levels represent stronger levels of air pollution.  
There is no data available for Cyprus or Malta, and 
the data for Greece was collected in 2007. 
 
Crime and 
Justice 
Crime Statistics 
(Eurostat) 
Number of crimes reported by the police (in 
thousands) per 1 000 000 inhabitants.  
Higher numbers mean stronger criminality 
visibility.  
No data available for Ireland. 
 
Foreign Policy, 
Defence 
Expenditure with 
Defence/Military 
(World Bank) 
 
As % of the GDP 
No data for Estonia.  
 
NATO member Austria, Malta, Cyprus, Ireland, Finland and 
Sweden are not NATO members. 
Dummy Variable 
 
Democracy/ 
Human Rights 
Polity IV 
Democracy 
Indexes98 
The "Polity Score" captures the regime variance in 
the world on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy). 
No data for Malta 
 
 
Education/ 
Culture 
% Expenditure 
with Education 
(Eurostat) 
 
Data for Greece refers to 2005 
Literacy Levels of 
Pupils (Eurostat) 
Share of 15-year-old pupils who are at level 1 or 
below of the PISA combined reading literacy scale.  
Lower levels represent higher quality of the 
education system.  
No data available for Malta and Cyprus. This 
variable is negatively correlated with expenditure 
in the education sector (Pearson’s r = -.51; p = .010). 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
97 This and all the other World Bank data used in this chapter is available online at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.  
98
 The Polity IV data used in this chapter is available online at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
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Let us start by analysing the independent impact of media content on 
public opinion. Table 7.2 displays unstandardized regression coefficients 
from OLS regressions, therefore representing the impact of a one-unit 
increase in the amount of coverage that the issue got in the media on the % 
of people considering it a relevant problem in the country. Some models 
included only the relevant media variable, whereas others incorporated the 
controls presented and discussed above. This set of regression analysis 
reproduce the patterns already identified with the study of simple 
correlations, and show that the inclusion of the real-world cues (some 
significant, and others not, as we will see below, has some impact on the 
size of the media coefficients, but never compromises its statistical 
significance (Table 7.2).  
 
Table 7.2 –TV and Agenda-Setting Effects as Independent – Coefficients of OLS 
Regressions of Issue Salience on Media Content 
 
 Newspapers TV 
 Basic 
Model 
With Real-
World Controls 
Basic 
Model 
With Real 
World 
Control 
Immigration 3.40** 2.22* 6.08*** 4.89** 
Political Corruption .42** .40** .60** .53** 
Social Justice 1.78* 1.95* 2.66*** 2.80** 
Government  .73* .70* 1.95*** 1.92** 
Crime/Justice .21 .18 .71** .77** 
Foreign Policy .14 .16 .40** .42** 
Democracy/H. Rights .01 -.12 -.29 -.41 
European Union .03 .03 -.03 -.03 
Economic Structure -.13 -.69 .10 -.13 
Social Minorities .32 .07 .12 -.07 
Education/Culture .36 .48 -.41 -.37 
Economy .50 .52 .48 .58 
Health Care -.75 -.71 -.10 -.46 
Unemployment -1.62 -3.98 1.12 1.33 
Environment -1.03 -1.07 .53 1.73 
N 27 20-27 27 20-27 
Notes: 
1. VIF values for each variable are always lower than 2.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
 
However, considering that newspapers and TV channels coexist and 
compete in the same media environments and that, for a varying but 
substantial part of the population, both are used as sources of information 
about current affairs, an analysis of the competing effects of TV and front 
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page contents (i.e., inserting both measures in the regression model) is 
more relevant. The following pages present a set of regression analyses 
computed at the aggregate level of analysis for 13 out of the 15 issues under 
study. The two missing subjects are political corruption and government, 
excluded for methodological reasons.99 This analysis is organized in three 
sections, according to the level of obtrusiveness of the issues at stake.  
7.2.1.1 Agenda-Setting and Obtrusive Issues 
 
As explained above, obtrusiveness refers to the easiness of contact 
with the issue. An issue is obtrusive if the public has direct experience with 
it, and unobtrusive if the public has no direct contact with it (Zucker, 1978, 
in Zhu & Boroson, 1997). The obtrusive issues under analysis are the 
following: crime/justice, the economy, unemployment, health care and 
environment. Table 7.3 presents the results of the several regression models 
computed for obtrusive issues.  
 The media indicators only reach statistical significance in the case of 
crime/justice. The relationship between the amount of news pieces on 
criminal and justice-related topics that were broadcast and the proportion 
of citizens mentioning this issue as one of the MIPs is positive, and holds 
even when crime visibility is controlled for (Table 7.3).  
What about the impact of personal sensitivity? Before providing an 
answer, a methodological note must be made. In this and the following 
subsection, I will pick specific issues and analyse them at the individual 
level, adding to the models individual causes of issue relevance measured 
with PIREDEU Voter Study data.   
                                                 
99
 At this country level, the correlation between the amount of newspaper front 
pages dealing with political corruption and the space that this issue had in 
newscast is very high (Pearson’s r = .90), which created problems of 
multicollinearity in the models. Therefore, it is not possible to test the competing 
effect of TV and Newspaper coverage on issue salience. The same happens in the 
case of government (Pearson’s r =.79).  
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In this setting, each independent variable refers to the sum of the 
space conferred to the issue in newspaper front pages and TV newscasts, 
weighted by the frequency by which each outlet was used.100 The 
underlying assumption is that consumption of several TV 
newscasts/newspapers has a cumulative effect, whereas consumption of 
TV and newspapers may have a competing effect. The dependent variable 
is dichotomic, and identifies respondents that mentioned the issue as being 
an important problem in their country. Due to the nature of the dependent 
variable, to the structure of the individual data (clustered in countries) and 
the inclusion of country-level controls in the equations, I will use multilevel 
logit regressions.  
Aside from socio-demographic characteristics, attitudes towards the 
issue at stake will be used as controls forissue salience, under the 
theoretical assumption that attitudes are more stable than opinions and 
judgements – especially when the attitudinal items are believed to be 
strong indicators of value orientations. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
attitudinal scales and the MIP question were posed at the same time, it is 
reasonably safe to argue that there is no endogeneity here – attitudes may 
have an impact on the assessment of an issue’s importance, or on its 
accessibility in memory when someone is (formally or informally) faced 
with a MIP question, whereas the other direction of causality is, in my 
opinion, rather unlikely.  
The obtrusive issue that I chose for the individual level analysis is 
crime and justice. At the individual level, age (proxy for increased concern 
with own safety; see Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980) and extreme 
attitudes towards the harshness of the country’s penal system101 
(potentially associated with strong authoritarian vs. libertarian value 
orientations; see Flanagan & Lee, 2003) are added in the analysis.  
                                                 
100 The nature of the data used to measure media content restricts the amount of TV 
news shows to 2 in most polities, 3 in Spain and 4 in Germany. The maximum 
number of newspapers whose content can be analysed here is 3.  
101 The attitudinal item is “People who break the law should be given much 
harsher sentences than they are these days”. The original variable was measured 
with a 5-point Likert scale; in the model, the variable is a dummy where 1 
corresponds to the people that strongly disagreed (1) or strongly agreed (5) with 
this proposition.  
 
 241 
The impact of the newspaper content is still null, and the relevance of 
TV coverage of crime seems to be smaller at this level of analysis, but is still 
statistically significant. There are no changes in the impact that media 
content have on the probability of mentioning crime/justice as a relevant 
issue before and aftern the insertion of control variables. However, age and, 
to a greater extent, holding a strong attitude towards the penal system have 
a positive impact of the probability of considering that crime is the most 
relevant problem in the country (Table 7.4).  
 
Table 7.4 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level Logit Regression of Salience of 
Crime/Justice on Media Coverage, Real World Cues and Personal Sensitivity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Fixed   
Salience TV 1.07* 
(.01) 
1.07* 
(.01) 
Salience NP 1.00 
(.00) 
1.00 
(.00) 
Number of Crimes    1.00 
(.00) 
Age  1.01* 
(.00) 
Attitudes towards Penal System  1.27*** 
(.07) 
Random   
Country-level (sigma_u2) .79 
(.23) 
.81 
(.24) 
Wald chi-square 6.55* 33.2*** 
Model Fit   
Log-likelihood -6566.96 -6010.11 
AIC 13141.9 12034.23 
BIC 13174.5 12090.7 
N Countries/Respondents 27/25406 27/23532 
 
Notes: 
1. A standard linear regression was computed in order to obtain information about possible 
multicollinearity. The VIF values for each variable are always lower than 2.  
2. Due to the complexity of obtaining predicted probabilities in multilevel logistic regression 
models, odds ratios are used in order to allow an easier interpretation of the results.  
3. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .01;  * p< .05 
 
There is not much to say about the other issues – the media indicators 
do not produce any kind of impact, and most real world cues also prove 
not to be particularly significant. The reasons for considering the economy, 
healthcare and the environment relevant problems need to be found 
elsewhere. The only real world indicator that actually has an impact on 
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issue salience is the country’s unemployment rates – a one percentage point 
increase in unemployment adds about 3% to this issue’s reference rate. 
Unemployment rates alone account for almost half of the variance in the 
dependent variable (Table 7.3). 
7.2.1.2 Agenda-Setting and Unobtrusive Issues 
 
This subsection focus on unobtrusive issues – those that are very 
abstract and distant from the everyday live of the average European 
citizen. In this study, issues such as political corruption, government, the 
European Union, economic structures and policies, foreign policy and 
democracy/human rights, immigration, social justice, social minorities and 
education/culture are considered to be unobtrusive.102  
Some of the issues placed under this umbrella could be seen as 
moderately obtrusive issues, since their visibility may depend on country 
or individual characteristics. For instance, immigration is pretty visible if it 
constitutes a palpable social phenomenon, but in Eastern European 
countries such as Poland or Bulgaria the immigration rates are rather low. 
In the same vein, political corruption is a cancer in some European polities 
(such as Italy or Romania) but more unfamiliar to Scandinavia.103 However, 
even in favourable contexts, the degree of obtrusiveness of these issues 
would be rather low when compared with unemployment or crime. 
The regressions that deal with the complementary (or competing) 
impact of TV and newspapers on public opinion are presented on Tables 
7.5 and 7.6. Previous evidence would lead us to expect that media effects 
would be more frequent and strong in this subset of issues than in the case 
of obtrusive ones, and it seems to be the case: media effects are observed in 
about half of the unobtrusive issues under study.  
                                                 
102
 The first two issues  mentioned above – political corruption and government – 
are not analysed here, due to methodological problems associated with a perfect 
relationship between their salience in the TV and on newspapers during the 
European Parliament election campaign of 2009, which would cause strong 
multicollinearity issues in the estimated models. 
103 The Transparency International data on Corruption Perception shows, indeed, 
that Romania, Bulgaria and Italy are closer to the “very corrupt” end of the 
continuum, whereas the “very clean” side of the spectrum is inhabited by countries 
such as Sweden, Finland or Denmark. This data is available online at: 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009.  
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For immigration and social justice, the amount of space in the TV has 
an impact on the proportion of people considering those to be relevant 
social problems. The impact is, however, much stronger in the case of 
immigration than in the case of social justice, especially after controlling for 
real world cues. Whereas it takes two additional percentage points in the 
amount of news pieces dedicated to poverty in order to increase the 
reference rate of this issue by 1 per cent, the impact of TV coverage on 
immigration is almost ten times bigger (Table 7.5).  
The newspaper coefficients do not reach statistical significance – if the 
TV does not speak about immigrants and poverty or social exclusion, 
newspapers have not much of a say in terms of how many people grant 
salience to those subjects. The Gini coefficient or the levels of poverty in the 
country do not have an impact on social justice reference rates, but 
immigration is mentioned more often in contexts where the immigration 
rates are higher. In fact, when controlling for media content, an increase of 
2000 immigrants per million people raises awareness about this issue in 
more 1% of the general population (Table 7.5).  
If the TV is a relevant agenda-setter for immigration and poverty, 
newspapers have a stronger impact in terms of how important education 
and culture are believed to be. A simple model of media effects depicts a 
positive effect of newspapers and a negative effect of TV content on the 
reference rates, but the inclusion of controls (about quantity of investment 
and quality of the educational system) reduces considerably this negative 
coefficient. In fact, when student literacy levels and expenditure with 
education (both statistically insignificant) are inserted into the equation, 
salience in TV is no longer relevant. In the case of newspapers, a 1% growth 
in the space devoted to these issues increases the proportion of people 
mentioning them by the same figure (Table 7.5). However, media coverage 
explains a low amount of DV variance (about 5%), especially when 
compared with the models computed for immigration (almost 50%) and 
social justice (about 35%).   
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The case of the European Union is rather interesting. For the full 
sample, the results were not significant, but the inclusion of a dummy 
variable distinguishing old from new member states changes the panorama 
completely. This dummy has an impact on the EU reference levels, which 
seem to be lower in the 12 new member States than in the old Europe. In 
addition, when one controls for it (i.e., when one focus on the EU15), the 
media do have a (small) impact on the amount of people granting 
importance to the EU. Interestingly enough, it seems that in a context 
where the TV would not have covered EU issues at all, the amount of 
newspaper coverage would have a positive impact on the public opinion 
reference rates (Table 7.6). 
The media seems to matter also to foreign policy and defence’s public 
salience. Independently of levels of military expenditures or NATO 
memberships, the amount of coverage that this issue had on the TV during 
the electoral campaign has a positive impact on its reference rates – when 
everything else is controlled for, a 2% increase in the proportion of pieces 
focusing this subject raises the percentage of people considering it 
important in 1% (Table 7.6).  
There are also some negative findings to report. Neither the levels of 
media coverage nor the country situation in terms of gay rights and 
protection of elderly people explain the levels reference of social minorities 
as the major problem facing the nation (Table 7.5). In addition, the 
reference of democracy and human rights is not explained by the proposed 
model. Regarding economic structure and policy the only relevant factor is 
GDP fluctuation: the lower the growth rate (or, considering that we are 
talking about 2009, the bigger the decrease), the higher the relevance of this 
complex economic argument for citizens. The size of this effect, is, 
however, rather small (Table 7.6).  
Let us now focus on the individual analyses. The issue Social Justice 
refers to concerns about the welfare state and protection of the 
economically disadvantaged by means of childcare, social housing and 
pensions in the country. In this case, the respondent’s subjective standards 
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of living104 and the possession of extreme attitudes about wealth 
redistribution105 (potentially linked with strong socio-economic left-wing or 
right-wing value orientations; see Knutsen, 2009) are believed to increase or 
display personal sensitiveness with this issue.  
The basic media effects model shows us that the negative coefficient 
for newspaper content, also present in the issue-level analysis, is 
statistically significant. This would mean that, if the amount of news 
depicting poverty and social justice subjects in the TV were equal to zero, 
newspaper coverage of this issue would actually conduct to lower odds of 
mentioning it as the MIP in the country (Table 7.7).  
The full model, that also controls for real world cues and personal 
sensitivity, shows us that this awkward negative effect of newspaper 
content is no longer statistically significant. However, TV still plays a role – 
in fact, an increase of one point in the index of TV coverage raises the 
probability of considering social justice as an important issue by a factor of 
1.3 when the other factors are controlled for.  
From the real-world and individuality controls used here, only the 
latter have a substantial impact on our dependent variable: higher living 
standards are associated with a lower probability of mentioning this issue, 
whereas holding a strong attitude about redistribution increases the odds 
of it being mentioned by 14% (Table 7.7).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 This is measured with the question “Taking everything into account, at about 
what level is your family’s standard of living? If you think of a scale from 1 to 7, 
where 1 means a poor family, 7 a rich family, and the other numbers are for the 
positions in between, about where would you place your family?”. This index 
varies between 1 (respondent belongs to a poor family) and 7 (respondent belongs 
to a rich family).  
105 The attitudinal item is “Income and wealth should be redistributed towards 
ordinary people”. Answers to this item were transformed in a variable measuring 
the existence of a strong positive or negative attitude towards this policy option. 
The original variable was measured with a 5-point Likert scale; in the model, the 
variable is a dummy where 1 corresponds to the people that strongly disagreed (1) 
or strongly agreed (5) with this proposition.  
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Table 7.7 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level Logit Regression of Salience of 
Social Justice on Media Coverage, Real World Cues and Personal Sensitivity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Fixed   
Salience TV 1.03** 
(.01) 
1.03** 
(.01) 
Salience NP -.96* 
(.01) 
-.97 
(.02) 
% Population Risking Poverty  1.03 
(.03) 
Gini Coefficient  -.98 
(.07) 
Subjective Standard of Living  -.89*** 
(.02) 
Attitude on Redistribution   1.14*** 
(.04) 
Random   
Country-level (sigma_u2) .97 
(.28) 
.89 
(.26) 
Wald chi-square 16.69** 69.85*** 
Model Fit   
Log-likelihood -8857.81 -8273.34 
AIC 17723.64 16562.7 
BIC 17756.2 16627.3 
N Countries/Respondents 27/25406 27/23736 
 
Notes: 
1. A standard linear regression was computed in order to obtain information about possible 
multicollinearity. TheVIF values for each variable are always lower than 2.  
2. Due to the complexity of obtaining predicted probabilities in multilevel logistic regression 
models, odds ratios are computed.  
3. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .01;  * p< .05 
 
Foreign policy and defence is the last issue that will be studied at the 
individual level. This allows for the inclusion of a dummy variable 
assessing whether the respondent was serving in the military when the 
interview took place. The number of people that were actually on military 
service in late 2009 is very small in our sample, but this group of people 
display greater odds of mentioning foreign affairs and defence as the MIP 
vis-à-vis the absolute majority of people whose working situation is 
different (Table 7.8).  
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Table 7.8 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level Logit Regression of Salience of 
Foreign Policy and Defence on Media Coverage, Real World Cues and Personal 
Sensitivity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Fixed   
Salience TV 1.02*** 
(.01) 
1.02*** 
(.01) 
Salience NP 1.00 
(.01) 
1.00 
(.01) 
Military  3.73*** 
(2.05) 
Military Expenses  1.55 
(.44) 
NATO  .54 
(.43) 
Random   
Country-level (sigma_u2) 2.42 
(.78) 
2.24 
(.75) 
Wald chi-square 16.40** 30.28*** 
Model Fit   
Log-likelihood -3071.7 -2885.6 
AIC 6151.4 5785.1 
BIC 6183.98 5841.8 
N Countries/Respondents 27/25406 27/24406 
 
Notes: 
1. A standard linear regression was computed in order to obtain information about 
possible multicollinearity. The VIF values for each variable are always lower than 2.  
2. Due to the complexity of obtaining predicted probabilities in multilevel logistic 
regression models, odds ratios are displayed instead of coefficients.  
3. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .01;  * p< .05 
 
7.2 Country-focused Analysis 
 
Having demonstrated that, for a considerable number of issues, 
there is a statistically significant relationship between visibility in the 
media and salience in public opinion, we can now focus on the main 
question of this dissertation: is the agenda-setting (as an aggregate process 
of salience transfer between the media and the public agendas), shaped by 
the media systems and information environments in which the media 
outlets and their users interact? 
In order to provide an answer to this question, there will be a shift in 
the level of analysis. In this section, I present the results of a country-
focused analysis, in which TV, newspaper and public agendas are taken as 
a whole and assessed within countries. The agendas at stake include the 
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issues for which the impact of the media was very strong and also those 
where no statistically significant impact was found. This is so because I 
believe that reducing the agenda in order to accommodate only the issues 
that «work» in the issue-level analysis would artificially increase country-
level agenda-setting coefficients. Thus, I took the 15 issues as cases, and 
tested the relationship between the salience that they had in the media (% 
of news pieces in the news shows/newspapers) and their importance for 
public opinion (% of respondents naming them in the survey) in each 
polity.   
7.2.1 The European Agendas 
 
I begin this section by exploring the content of the agendas in Europe. 
Table 7.9 presents the salience of the 15 issues in public opinion in the 27 
European polities. The economic situation and unemployment are, 
unsurprisingly, the issues most frequently named by the respondents as the 
main problems in their countries. On the other hand, abstract or distant 
issues such as the European Union, Foreign Policy or Democracy and 
Human Rights are seldom mentioned.  
It is also interesting to see that some issues seem to have an intrinsic 
main-problem quality: they are proposed by a substantial proportion of 
respondents when they are asked about the most important problem, but 
the proportion of reference decreases in the following two questions. Such 
issues are economic situation and unemployment.  Other issues seem to 
have a second-level nature – their reference rate is small in the first 
question, but increases in the others. Such topics are social justice, economic 
structure and policy, health care, environment, crime and justice, 
education/culture/language, social minorities and foreign policies. Lastly, 
some issues are rarely mentioned as being a problem in response to any of 
the questions – government, immigration, political corruption, democracy 
and human rights and European Union.  
Taken as a whole, the public agenda is different from the other 
agendas (Table 7.10). In Europe, news broadcasts and newspaper front 
pages are very similar in terms of issue coverage: both have given 
particular attention to crime and justice issues, the economic situation and – 
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since an electoral campaign was ongoing – the European Union. At the 
same time, and comparatively speaking, issues such as immigration, 
unemployment, government status or environment have received, grosso 
modo, poor interest from the part of newspapers and television newscasts.  
 
Table 7.9 – Issue Salience in the European Public Opinion, 2009 
 
 % First 
Problem 
% Second 
Problem 
% Third 
Problem 
% 
General106 
Rank 
Economic 
Situation 
33.7 24.1 16.7 53.3 1 
Unemployment 25.5 17 9.7 42.5 2 
Social 
Justice/Policies 
3.8 6.5 8 12.5 3 
Economic 
Structure/ Policy 
4.7 5.6 6.6 11.9 4 
Government  4.7 4.6 4.4 10 5 
Health Care 1.7 5.2 7.4 9.9 6 
Immigration 3.5 4.6 4.3 9.3 7 
Environment 2.4 4 4.4 7.9 8 
Crime and Justice 1.9 4.1 5.4 7.9 9 
Political 
Corruption 
2.9 3 3.4 6.9 10 
Education/Cultur
e 
1.1 3.2 5.7 6.8 11 
Social Minorities 1.5 2.7 4 5.6 12 
Democracy and 
Human Rights 
1.9 2.1 2.5 4.6 13 
Foreign Policy/ 
Defence 
.7 1.7 2.2 3.2 14 
European Union .9 .9 1 2 15 
Others 9.1 10.6 14.4 21.1 -- 
N 24710 20593 15049   
Source: PIREDEU Voter Survey (EES, 2009a). Calculations made by the author.  
 
The correlation between newspaper and public opinion salience of 
issues is stronger (Pearson’s r =.29) than in the case of TV, whose 
relationship does not achieve statistical significance (Pearson’s r=.20).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 This data refers to the percentage of respondents that named the issue one of the 
three MIP questions, independently of the order. 
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Table 7.10 – Top Three Issues in Europe, 2009 – Media Users, Newspapers and 
Television Newscasts 
 
 Media Users 
(%) 
Salience 
Newspapers (%) 
Salience 
 TV (%) 
First Issue Economic 
Situation 
(53.4) 
Economic 
Situation 
(32.2) 
Crime and Justice 
(15.7) 
Second Issue Unemployment 
(42.6) 
Crime and Justice 
(10.7) 
Economic 
Situation 
(11.3) 
Third Issue Social Justice 
(12.6) 
EU 
(7.3) 
EU 
(10.8) 
    
Sources: PIREDEU Voter Survey (EES, 2009a), Media Study (EES, 2009b).  Calculations made 
by the author.  
 
7.2.2 Testing Agenda-Setting 
 
The two simple correlations reported in the previous section offer a 
very general idea of how the variables of interest correlate. Given the 
variety of countries, outlets and citizens that are summarized by just a 
handful of statistics, it would be a poor and risky endeavour to say that 
agenda-setting took, or did not take place in Europe during the EP election 
of 2009, even under the umbrella of the aggregate data analysis strategy, 
based on two simple correlation coefficients.  
But even with a sample of 15 cases (i.e., 15 issues), it is possible to test 
the association between media coverage and public relevance of issues in a 
more sophisticated manner. A sensible strategy, still in the realm of the 
classic agenda-setting data analysis strategy (see McCombs & Shaw, 1972), 
is to measure agenda-setting country by country, since issue salience in 
public opinion and the media varies considerably between countries. 
Sometimes this variation is similar to the one in public opinion, and this 
results in strong correlations between one and the other; some other times 
the co-variation is lower.   
Figure 7.5 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients for the 
relationship between, on the one hand, the media users’ agenda, and, on 
the other, TV and newspaper coverage of the same issues. The picture 
shows that newspapers seem to be more relevant agenda-setters than 
television newscasts.  
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However, there is considerable variation in the existence and degree 
of agenda-setting measured in this classical fashion. Eight countries present 
moderate to high correlations – Slovenia, Bulgaria, Poland, Netherlands, 
Estonia, Latvia, Germany and Flanders. In the other countries, the 
measures of association are very weak, and in Sweden there seems to be a 
negative correlation between the amount of salience that the issues got in 
the media and how important those problems are for the Swedish people. 
Regarding television, the correlations are, generally speaking, more 
modest. Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Flanders and the Netherlands are the 
five cases where the strength of agenda-setting is greater than .3. In the 
other cases, the correlations are very weak.  
 
Figure 7.5 – Correlation between Media and Public Opinion salience of 15 issues 
by country, 2009 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Voter Survey (EES, 2009a) and Media Study (EES, 2009b). 
Calculations made by the author.  
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7.2.3 Media Systems as Moderators of Agenda-Setting 
 
Can the variation in the media’s influencing capacity be explained by 
the characteristics of media systems and information environments? Tables 
7.11 and 7.12 present my first approach to this question – a regression 
model of each dependent variable (i.e., the correlation coefficients 
computed in the previous section, raw or recoded) on factors such as 
development of press markets, TV ownership, freedom of press, 
partisanship and journalism professionalization.  
 Two analytical strategies are used: the first focuses on the strength 
of the relationship between issue salience in the media and in public 
opinion (varying between -1 and 1), and therefore a straightforward 
regression is computed. The second strategy focuses on the occurrence of 
agenda-setting portrayed as the existence of, at least, a small correlation 
between issue salience in the media and public opinion – logistic analysis is 
therefore used. Moreover, all models include only independent variables 
dealing with structure and partisanship that are specifically related to the 
newspaper and TV subsystems. For instance, in the analysis of TV agenda-
setting capacity, measures of development of the press market of political 
balance of the newspapers are not used.  
 The regression analysis does not provide interesting results in terms 
of newspaper agenda-setting capacity, but it seems that the strength of TV 
agenda-setting depends a great deal of the general levels of political 
balance in this subsystem. In fact, when the other dimensions are controlled 
for, a one-point increase in the levels of TV political balance (i.e., going 
from the theoretical minimum to the maximum value) boosts the 
correlation coefficient between issue salience in the TV and on public 
opinion by .74 points (Table 7.11).  
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Table 7.11 – Parameter Estimates for OLS Regression of Media Influence on 
Media System Characteristics 
 
 TV Agenda-
Setting Power 
Newspaper 
Agenda-Setting 
Power 
Intercept -.03 
(.35) 
.33 
Diff Tab-Ref.  .02 
(.50) 
Number of Titles  .15 
(.32) 
Average Circulation  -.39 
(.36) 
Relative Audience .06 
(.13) 
 
Public Funding -.01 
(.20) 
 
Choice TV .09 
(.17) 
 
Cable Dissemination -.04 
(.16) 
 
Economic Constraints .19 
(.31) 
.13 
(.56) 
Political Constraints -.01 
(.31) 
-.49 
(.45) 
Journalist Professionalization -.24 
(.34) 
-.41 
(.62) 
Balance TV .74** 
(.35) 
 
Balance NP  .42 
(.59) 
N 27 27 
R2 25.9 14.9 
   
 
Notes: 
1. In all models the VIF values for each variable are always lower than 3.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
 
The logistic regression analysis, aimed at assessing more generically 
the conditions under which agenda-setting occurrence is more probable, 
confirms and qualifies the results presented above. Political balance is still 
the most relevant factor of TV agenda-setting: when everything else is 
controlled for, the country where the TV channels are the most unbalanced 
in the European context has a 65% lower probability of agenda-setting 
occurrence than the country with the politically more balanced TV 
panorama (Table 7.12).  
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The logistic analysis of newspaper agenda-setting capacity allows us 
to observe that, even if political balance does not explain the intensity of 
agenda-setting, it is associated with the odds of its occurrence. When all the 
other variables are kept at their mean values, going from the minimal value 
of newspaper political balance (.55) to the maximum value (1) increases the 
probability of agenda-setting occurrence by 80% (Table 7.12).  
 
Table 7.12 – Parameter Estimates for Logistic Regression of Media Influence on 
Media System Characteristics 
 
 TV Agenda-
Setting Power 
Newspaper 
Agenda-Setting 
Power 
Intercept -10.18 -4.93 
Diff Tab-Ref.  1.08 
(4.80) 
Number of Titles  .15 
(2.55) 
Average Circulation  .33 
(2.81) 
Relative Audience 3.00 
(2.05) 
 
Public Funding -.26 
(3.19) 
 
Choice TV 2.66 
(2.59) 
 
Cable Dissemination .49 
(2.68) 
 
Economic Constraints -.81 
(4.52) 
6.83 
(5.81) 
Political Constraints 4.52 
(5.03) 
-6.10 
(4.37) 
Journalist Professionalization .81 
(5.52) 
-6.58 
(5.57) 
Balance TV 8.46* 
(5.36) 
 
Balance NP  10.52* 
(6.15) 
   
N 27 27 
Pseudo R2 24.7 20.1 
   
 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is a dichotomy, being 1 = agenda-setting occurrence.  
2. In all models the VIF values for each variable are always lower than 3.  
3. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
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7.2.4 Information Environments as Mediators 
 
According to Baron & Kenny (1986), in order to successfully prove 
the existence of a mediation with survey data, four requirements must be 
met: 1) the existence of a significant relationship between the IV or 
independent variable (in my case, media system dimensions) and the DV 
or dependent variable (agenda-setting strength/ occurrence); 2) the 
identification of a significant relationship between the IV and the mediator 
(information environment dimensions); 3) the mediator must be 
significantly related to the DV in a model that also contains the IV; and 4) 
the effect of IV on DV must be smaller (or not significant) when the 
mediator is included in the equation. 
The first requirement was tested in the previous section, whereas the 
second condition was tested in Chapter Five. From the results retrieved in 
these two sections, I was able to narrow down the list of mediation 
hypotheses, by excluding the media system dimensions that did not have 
an impact both on agenda-setting and on trust/quality/exposure/agenda 
diversity. As a result, mediation paths are only possible between political 
balance, trust and information quality (Table 7.13).  
In the case of trust, the mediation hypothesis states that political 
balance in the TV sector leads to a higher degree of media credibility, and 
this has a positive impact on agenda-setting. This hypothesis is not 
supported by the empirical results: the impact of the media system 
dimensions on TV agenda-setting occurrence/strength does not change 
with the inclusion of trust-related moderators, which seem not to be 
associated with TV agenda-setting at the country level  (Table 7.14).  
 
Table 7.13 – Mediation Hypotheses Tested in this Section  
 
Mediator Mediation Hypotheses 
Trust Balance TV => Credibility =>  TV agenda-setting 
Information 
Quality 
Balance TV => Soft Frames => TV agenda-setting  
Balance TV => Accuracy TV => TV agenda-setting 
Balance NP => Accuracy NP => NP agenda-setting 
Balance NP => Analysis NP => NP agenda-setting 
  
 258 
Table 7.14 – Test of Trust as Mediator of TV agenda-setting 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -.29 
(.47) 
-11.57 
(6.74) 
Relative Audience .07 
(.14) 
2.47 
(2.65) 
Public Funding -.01 
(.22) 
-1.05 
(3.47) 
Choice TV .09 
(.19) 
1.85 
(2.86) 
Cable Dissemination -.04 
(.17) 
-.17 
(2.86) 
Economic Constraints .19 
(.33) 
.24 
(4.69) 
Political Constraints -.01 
(..32) 
5.87 
(5.94) 
Journalist 
Professionalization 
-.23 
(.47) 
4.98 
(8.03) 
Balance TV .75* 
(.48) 
13.6* 
(9.7) 
Credibility -.03 
(.61) 
7.62 
(10.65) 
Trust   
N 27 27 
Adj/Pseudo R2 24.5 26.2 
   
Notes: 
1. All models have TV agenda-setting as dependent variable, but model 1 is an OLS 
regression of agenda-setting strength, whereas model 2 is a logistic regression of 
agenda-setting occurrence.  
2. In all models the VIF values for each variable are always lower than 3.  
3. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
 
Let us now test the hypotheses about the mediating impact of 
information quality variables. The first two refer to TV agenda-setting, and 
were empirically tested via the regression analyses presented on Table 7.15. 
The impact of TV political balance on agenda-setting occurrence/strength 
may happen via soft frames. Since politically balanced TV settings lead to a 
weaker use of soft frames, television audiences may therefore develop less 
sceptical attitudes towards the information conveyed by the newscasts and 
use them to develop their agendas. The second hypothesis would assume 
that the mediating dimension can be information accuracy, the line of 
reasoning being similar to the one expressed above: countries in which the 
TV panorama is politically balanced deliver more accurate information to 
their audiences, who therefore may feel more at ease with using it in order 
to establish their issue priorities.  
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From these two possibilities, only one is supported by the data. 
Accuracy in the information conveyed by the TV is positively associated 
with agenda-setting, and the inclusion of this factor reduces the coefficient 
for TV political balance and erases its statistical significance (Table 7.15). 
Therefore, it seems that, in the realm of television, accuracy mediates the 
relationship between political equilibrium and agenda-setting capacity.  
In terms of newspaper agenda-setting, two possibilities were tested: 
the impact of political balance on the agenda-setting capacity of the press 
would be explained by the higher levels of accuracy and analysis in the 
information offered in politically neutral newspaper markets. The first 
hypothesis is not testable due to multicollinearity issues (the inclusion of 
the mediator increased the VIF values to unacceptable values, and the 
coefficients become highly unstable). The mediating impact of amount of 
analysis is not supported by the data – in fact, the inclusion of this variable 
in the regression produces few changes to the results reported on the table 
7.12. Needless to say, the amount of analysis in the newspapers does not 
have an impact on agenda-setting occurrence at this level of analysis.  
The mediation hypotheses tested above concerned only two out of 
the four informational environment variables under study. This is so 
because the media system dimensions that accounted for diversity of media 
agendas (commercialization) and exposure (development of TV market, 
strength of public TV, political constraints to press freedom) are unrelated 
to agenda-setting occurrence/intensity. Therefore, one of the assumptions 
suggested by Baron & Kenny (1986) for the test of mediation is not met.  
However, exposure and media agenda’s diversity may have a direct 
impact on agenda-setting. In the case of TV agenda-setting, results are 
disappointing: a model that controls for trust (or credibility) and 
information quality showed no impact of exposure to news or diversity of 
media agendas. In the case of newspapers, though, diversity of media 
agendas has a negative impact on the probability of agenda-setting 
occurence, which testifies the need for some country-level homogeneity for 
this phenomenon to occur (McCombs, 2005). In this sample, passing from a 
situation of extreme homogeneity in the media agendas to a situation of 
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extreme diversity decreases the probability of newspaper agenda-setting 
occurrence by 34%. At this national level, exposure has no effects.107   
7.3 Audience-focused Analysis 
7.3.1 General Panorama 
 
In this section, agenda-setting refers to the correlation between the 
agendas of specific media outlets (TV channel’s newscasts and newspapers) 
and the salience conferred by the audience/readership of those outlets to 
the same set of issues (N=15). The audience/readership groups are 
composed by people that mentioned having used the outlet during the 
election campaign at least once a weak. This means that my 
operationalization of audience is rather broad, and, as a corollary, the test 
of agenda-setting in such an environment is more conservative than one 
that would include in the audience group respondents with very high 
levels of exposure. 
On average, agenda-setting seems to be relatively greater in the case 
of public channels (mean=.20) and newspapers (mean=.18) than in the case 
of private channels (mean=.14). The correlations between the outlet agenda 
and audience agenda are superior to .30 in just 35 out of the 138 outlets 
under analysis. All German and Latvian outlets under consideration, as 
well as most of the Flemish (except for the private channel VTM) and 
Dutch (except for the newspaper De Telegraaf) outlets have shown some 
degree of influence on the people that read/watch them (Figure 7.6). 
It is also interesting to note that there are differences in the size of the 
effects within the countries in which almost all outlets have some degree of 
agenda-setting capacity. For instance, in Germany, all newspapers 
(including the tabloid Bild) present high coefficients, that are similar to 
those found for the public broadcasters and superior to those that depict 
the agenda-setting capacity of private broadcasters such as RTL or Sat1. In 
the case of Flanders, the reference newspaper De Standaard presents a very 
strong correlation between its contents and the opinions of its audience 
                                                 
107 Due to  space restrictions, this logistic regression is not reported in table format. 
The pseudo-R2 associated to this regression is of 29.9%; the number of factors was 
6, and the number of cases was 27.  
 262 
about issue salience (actually, the stronger association found in the sample 
of media outlets), whereas the public broadcaster and the other newspapers 
display modest coefficients, and the private channel VTM seems not to 
have any agenda-setting capacity. In the case of Latvia and the 
Netherlands, the differences between outlets are more modest.  
 
Figure 7.6 – Correlation between Media and Public Opinion Salience by Media 
Outlet – Outlets with Moderate to High Correlations 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Voter Survey (EES, 2009a) and Media Study (EES, 2009b). 
Calculations made by the author.  
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7.3.2 The Impact of Media Systems and Information 
Environments 
 
The TV channels’ agenda-setting capacity seems to be exclusively a 
function of the political balance in the field of broadcasting, as Table 7.16 
shows. The positive impact of absence of political leanings on agenda-
setting is observed even when several other control variables are inserted 
in the equation. It is, however, relevant to mention that the agenda-setting 
capacity of each TV channel here considered does not vary significantly 
between countries – which may explain why the regression results are so 
small.  
Several mediation hypotheses can be tested at this level. In Chapter 
Five we learned that TV’s political balance is associated with increased 
media credibility and accuracy (both at the subsystem and at the outlet 
level), as well as with a lower use of soft frames in political news. From 
these possibilities, only one is actually supported by the data. Accuracy, 
referring either to the TV market in general or to the specific TV channel at 
stake, mediates the relationship between political balance and agenda-
setting. This mediation is complete at the subsystem level (i.e. when 
accuracy in the TV market is included in the analysis, political balance loses 
its explanatory power) and partial at the outlet level (i.e. when channel 
accuracy is inserted in the model, the coefficient for balance in the TV 
market decreases somewhat) (Table 7.17). Neither credibility nor use of soft 
frames seems to be connected with agenda-setting capacity by the TV 
channels under study.  
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Table 7.16 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level MLE Regression of TV Agenda-
Setting Capacity on Media Systems 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed    
Intercept .17 
(.03) 
-.27 
(.33) 
-.27 
(.37) 
Journalist  Prof.   -.33 
(.31) 
-.15 
(.33) 
Economic constraints  .12 
(.31) 
.12 
(.31) 
Political constraints  -.07 
(.30) 
-.07 
(.31) 
Public Funding  .01 
(.30) 
.01 
(.20) 
Relative Audience  .04 
(.13) 
.04 
(.13) 
Choice TV  .06 
(.17) 
.06. 
(.17) 
Cable Dissemination  .02 
(.16) 
.02 
(.16) 
Balance TV 
 
 .68** 
(.34) 
.67** 
(.35) 
Political Bias Outlet   -.01 
(.15) 
Random    
Country-level (sigma_u2) .02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
Individual-level (sigma_e2) .02 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
Wald chi-square --- 6.70 6.60 
Model Fit    
Log-likelihood 23.19 20.47 19.55 
AIC 54.98 32.42 30.85 
BIC 59.21 43.76 42.62 
N Countries/Outlets 27/57 27/57 27/57 
 
Notes: 
1. Standard linear regressions were computed in order to obtain information about 
possible multicollinearity. Some degree of multicollinearity is expected, but in all 
models the VIF values for each variable are always lower than 4.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. All independent variables vary between 0 (low quantity of the dimension) and 1 (high 
quantity). The dependent variable varies between -1 and 1.   
4. Variables related with legal menaces to press freedom are not included because they 
increase multicollinearity in the models. Variables related with gender gaps in 
newspaper reading and imbalance between newspaper and TV consumption are not 
used due to lack of data for all the 27 polities under study.  
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Table 7.17 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level MLE Regression of TV Agenda-
Setting Capacity on Media Systems, With Mediators 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed     
Intercept -.44 
(.40) 
-.36 
(.35) 
-.30 
(.34) 
.38 
(.66) 
Journalist  Prof.  -.42 
(.35) 
-.23 
(.33) 
-.31 
(.41) 
-.13 
(.32) 
Economic constraints .34 
(.31) 
.18 
(.30) 
-08 
(.26) 
.22 
(.31) 
Political constraints -.14 
(.29) 
-.10 
(.31) 
.01 
(.24) 
-.04 
(.30) 
Public Funding -.05 
(.19) 
.02 
(.20) 
.05 
(.20) 
.02 
(.20) 
Relative Audience -.04 
(.13) 
.05 
(.13) 
.07 
(.11) 
.07 
(.13) 
Choice TV .17 
(.17) 
.09 
(.17) 
.11 
(.18) 
.07 
(.17) 
Cable Dissemination .09 
(.15) 
.02 
(.16) 
.06 
(.17) 
.01 
(.15) 
Balance TV 
 
.21 
(.41) 
.61** 
(.34) 
.45* 
(.29) 
.49* 
(.27) 
Accuracy TV .83* 
(.48) 
   
Accuracy Outlet  .23* 
(.13) 
  
Credibility   .39 
(.50) 
 
Soft Frames Use    -.69 
(.59) 
Random     
Country-level 
(sigma_u2) 
.02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
Individual-level 
(sigma_e2) 
.02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
Wald chi-square 10.56 9,74 7.15 8.16 
Model Fit     
Log-likelihood 22.13 20.90 21.14 21.55 
AIC 26.17 26.03 23.33 21.22 
BIC 54.90 54.76 55.30 54.71 
N Countries/Outlets 27/57 27/57 27/57 27/57 
 
Notes: 
1. Standard linear regressions were computed in order to obtain information about 
possible multicollinearity. Some degree of multicollinearity is expected, but in all 
models the VIF values for each variable are always lower than 4.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. All independent variables vary between 0 (low quantity of the dimension) and 1 (high 
quantity). The dependent variable varies between -1 and 1.   
4. Variables related with legal menaces to press freedom are not included because they 
increase multicollinearity in the models. Variables related with gender gaps in 
newspaper reading and imbalance between newspaper and TV consumption are not 
used due to lack of data for all the 27 polities under study.  
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The mediation hypotheses tested above did not include the four 
informational environment variables under study, since the media system 
dimensions that accounted for diversity of media agendas 
(commercialization) and exposure (development of TV market, strength of 
public TV, political constraints to press freedom) are unrelated to TV 
channels’ agenda-setting capacity. Nevertheless, exposure has a direct 
impact on agenda-setting. Unlike the country-level account of the 
relationship between TV agenda-setting and news consumption, a 
multilevel model that controls for trust (or credibility) and information 
quality shows that audiences that follow the TV channel’s newscast more 
frequently are also more likely to reproduce that channel’s issue agenda. 
Diversity of media agendas has no impact upon this phenomenon.108  
Let us now focus our attention on the newspapers, and replicate the 
analytical strategy used so far for the test of hypotheses concerning TV 
agenda-setting and its connections with media systems and informational 
environments. The first set of results is pretty straightforward, showing 
that, independently of the outlet levels of political bias, the only media 
system dimension that has an impact on newspaper agenda-setting 
capacity is associated with freedom of press. In fact, the absence of political 
constraints to press freedom is associated with greater newspaper agenda-
setting coefficients. In the European contexts where such threats are 
greater, the relationship between the audience and the specific newspapers’ 
agendas is, with everything else controlled for, .50 smaller than in a context 
where political constraints are minor (Table 7.18).  
There are two possible pathways of mediation: the relationship 
between political constraints to press freedom may be due to its impact on 
hard news or on intensity of exposure to the news. None of these 
possibilities hold. The amount of hard news has no impact on agenda-
setting in the model that controls for several media system characteristics. 
Moreover, intensity of exposure seems not to be associated with stronger 
agenda-setting capacity of newspapers in our sample (Table 7.19). For a 
mediation to be present, these variable’s coefficients should be significant, 
                                                 
108 Due to space restrictions, this regression is not reported in form of table. The 
coefficient for exposure is of .05.  
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while the role of political menaces to press freedom in the model should 
decrease considerably and/or become statistically insignificant. Therefore, 
there is probably some step missing in the causal chain linking political 
constraints to freedom of press and agenda-setting capacity.  
 
Table 7.18 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level MLE Regression of Newspaper 
Agenda-Setting Capacity on Media Systems 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed    
Intercept .18*** 
(.04) 
.14 
(.51) 
.27 
(.52) 
Journalist  Prof.   -.24 
(.47) 
-.29 
(.47) 
Economic constraints  .43 
(.43) 
.40 
(.42) 
Political constraints  -.51* 
(.24) 
-.47* 
(.24) 
Average Circ./Million   -.27 
(.27) 
-.24 
(.27) 
Number of Titles  .18 
(.24) 
.19 
(.24) 
Diff. Tabloids/Reference   .14 
(.38) 
.09 
(.38) 
Balance Newspapers 
 
 .35 
(.45) 
.34 
(.44) 
Political Bias Outlet   -.13 
(.17) 
Random    
Country-level (sigma_u2) .02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
Individual-level (sigma_e2) .05 
(.01) 
.04 
(.01) 
.04 
(.01) 
Wald chi-square -- 4.34 5.01 
Model Fit    
Log-likelihood -3.27 -3.11 -3.67 
AIC 12.54 26.23 29.39 
BIC 19.73 50.17 55.73 
N Countries/Outlets 27/81 27/81 27/81 
Notes: 
1. Standard linear regressions were computed in order to obtain information about 
possible multicollinearity. Some degree of multicollinearity is expected, but in all 
models the VIF values for each variable are always lower than 4.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. All independent variables vary between 0 (low quantity of the dimension) and 1 (high 
quantity). The dependent variable varies between -1 and 1.   
4. Variables related with legal menaces to press freedom and differences between tabloids 
and reference newspapers are not included because they increase multicollinearity in 
the models. Variables related with gender gaps in newspaper reading and imbalance 
between newspaper and TV consumption are not used due to lack of data for all the 27 
polities under study.  
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Table 7.19 – Parameter Estimates for Two-Level MLE Regression of Newspaper 
Agenda-Setting Capacity on Media Systems, With Mediators 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed   
Intercept -.20 
(.62) 
.22 
(.53) 
Journalist  Prof.  -.41 
(.50) 
-.25 
(.47) 
Economic constraints .73 
(.54) 
.44 
(.43) 
Political constraints -.72* 
(.41) 
-.44* 
(.34) 
Average Circ./Million  -.26 
(.27) 
.13 
(.38) 
Number of Titles .19 
(.24) 
.18 
(.24) 
Diff. Tabloids/Reference  .34 
(.44) 
-.24 
(.27) 
Balance Newspapers .27 
(.46) 
.36 
(.45) 
Hard News .47 
(.49)  
Exposure to the Newspaper  .03* 
(.01) 
Random   
Country-level (sigma_u2) .03 
(.01) 
.03 
(.01) 
Individual-level (sigma_e2) .04 
(.01) 
.04 
(.01) 
Wald chi-square 5.20 4.63 
Model Fit   
Log-likelihood -2.46 -5.21 
AIC 26.92 32.42 
BIC 53.25 58.76 
N Countries/Outlets 27/81 27/81 
Notes: 
1. Standard linear regressions were computed in order to obtain information about 
possible multicollinearity. Some degree of multicollinearity is expected, but in all 
models the VIF values for each variable are always lower than 4.  
2. Significance: *** p < .001;  ** p < .05;  * p< .10 
3. All independent variables vary between 0 (low quantity of the dimension) and 1 
(high quantity). The dependent variable varies between -1 and 1.   
4. Variables related with legal menaces to press freedom and differences between 
tabloids and reference newspapers are not included because they increase 
multicollinearity in the models. Variables related with gender gaps in newspaper 
reading and imbalance between newspaper and TV consumption are not used due 
to lack of data for all the 27 polities under study.  
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What about the role of trust and media agenda diversity? As 
observed at the country-level, diversity of media agendas has a negative 
impact on the probability of agenda-setting occurrence: once again, 
newspaper agenda-setting seems to be dependent on some degree of media 
agenda homogeneity. Trust has no direct impact on the the newspapers’ 
agenda-setting capacity.109   
7.4 Final Comments 
 
 The analysis presented at the beginning of this chapter had three 
main goals: to present the dynamics of relationship between issue salience 
TV, newspaper and public opinion; to perform a convincing test of agenda-
setting, by isolating the potentially confusing impacts of real world cues 
and personal sensitivity to the issues; and, to test whether issue 
obtrusiveness shapes the agenda-setting strength/occurrence in the 
European context. 
The results showed that, even with an N as small as 27, media effects 
were powerful enough to be statistically significant in about half of the 
issues at stake. The isolated analysis of TV and newspaper agenda-setting 
capacity shows that the first has a stronger impact in a higher amount of 
issues. Conversely, the competing/complementary approach showed that, 
when both TV and newspapers are considered, it is usually the broadcast 
content that has a stronger impact on issue salience (both at the country 
and at the individual level) (Table 7.20).  
By measuring the media agendas before the public agenda, showing 
the existence of an association between the two, and controlling for other 
causes of issue salience in public opinion, I was able to provide sufficient 
empirical support to the agenda-setting analysis. Surely, a perfect pattern 
would be to find agenda-setting effects in every single issue at stake, but 
this result was not expected. As debated before, the occurrence, strength 
and even direction of causality of the relationship between media coverage 
and relevance of issues on public opinion depends greatly on the nature of 
                                                 
109 Due to the secondary nature of this statistical analysis and space restrictions, 
this regression is not reported in table format. The coefficient for media agenda 
diversity is of -.13.  
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the issues. The relationship between newspaper agenda-setting capacity 
and issue obtrusiveness is negative; the same could be said about TV 
agenda-setting, but in this case the differences are not statistically 
significant. Hypothesis 7.11 is therefore confirmed (Tables 7.20 and 7.21).  
Table 7.20 – Summary of Results 
 
 Country 
 Level 
Audience 
Level 
Issue Level 
(Aggregate) 
Issue Level 
(Individual) 
TV agenda-
setting? 
Yes, but less 
frequent than 
newspaper 
agenda-
setting 
Yes, but more 
frequent in 
public than in 
private 
broadcasters 
More frequent 
than in 
newspapers; 
strong effects 
on 
immigration, 
moderate 
effects in five 
other issues 
Present in the 
three issues 
analysed; size 
of effects is 
small 
NP agenda-
setting? 
Yes, in about 
half of the 
countries 
under 
analysis 
Yes, and as 
frequent as in 
public 
broadcasters 
Less frequent; 
effects often 
vanish when 
TV content is 
controlled for 
In the three 
issues 
analysed, no 
effects when 
TV controls 
are inserted 
Role of 
Controls 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
Sometimes 
qualify but 
almost never 
erase the role 
of the media 
Sometimes 
qualify but 
almost never 
erase the role 
of the media 
Issue 
Moderators 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Obtrusiveness 
play its 
expected role 
 
--- 
 
Media 
System 
Moderators 
Political 
balance 
moderates 
agenda-
setting 
occurrence  
For TV, 
political 
balance in the 
subsystem; 
for 
newspapers, 
absence of 
political 
constraints 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
 
---- 
Mediation Accuracy 
(Only for TV) 
Accuracy 
(Only for TV) 
--- --- 
Direct Impact 
of 
Information 
Environment 
Variables 
Agenda 
Diversity  
(Only for 
Newspapers) 
Exposure 
(Only for TV) 
Agenda 
Diversity  
(Only for 
Newspapers) 
Exposure 
(Only for TV) 
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What about the results coming from the country and audience 
analysis? These sections provided empirical support to the assumption that 
agenda-setting capacity or magnitude varies greatly between European 
countries, and also between the major media outlets in those countries. 
Moreover, political-related media system dimensions proved relevant 
for the explanation of why agenda-setting strength and occurrence varies in 
European countries. It seems that, both in the case of TV and newspapers, 
political balance in their subsystems is associated with the occurrence of 
agenda-setting effects, with this phenomenon being more likely in 
politically unbiased settings than in contexts where political leanings are 
more evident. But why is balance important for agenda-setting to take 
place? In the case of TV, the impact of political balance on agenda-setting is 
mediated by information accuracy; in the case of newspapers, the 
association is less clear.  
Interestingly enough, it seems that the specific level of partisanship of 
a specific TV channel has no effect on its agenda-setting capacity over its 
audience, but it is the general panorama in the subsystem (press or 
broadcasting) that matters. This may be so because, at the audience level, 
there can be strong similarities between the political leanings of audience 
and outlets.  More than “my favourite TV news show is politically 
balanced”, what seems to matter is to think “TV channels in my country are 
fairly unbiased and provide accurate information about current affairs”.  
Several hypotheses were drawn about the relationship between 
media systems, information environments and media effects. Table 7.21 
differentiates between those that were confirmed and those that were not.  
In the European context, structural dimensions and journalist 
professionalization seem not to have an impact on agenda-setting, although 
most of these dimensions explain some of the variation in the levels of 
exposure to news (choice, low levels of commercialization), information 
accuracy (press qualitative diversity, absence of economic constraints to 
freedom, professionalized journalistic body) and diversity of the media 
agendas (commercialization). While trust seems to matter less for agenda-
setting, accuracy of the information provided by the TV does contribute to 
a stronger incidence of this phenomenon, agenda diversity (which is lower 
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in commercialized settings) has a negative impact on newspaper agenda-
setting, and frequency of exposure (higher in commercialized settings and 
in contexts where press freedom is higher) is positively associated with TV 
agenda-setting capacity. Therefore, even if there is not a mediation effect, 
there are several indirect causal paths that link agenda-setting to structural 
media system characteristics.  
A final note about media types (press vs. broadcasting) is due. The 
question about which type of media have stronger impacts on the public 
agenda does not receive a full answer in this dissertation. On the one hand, 
it seems that it is the amount of TV coverage that matters for the 
importance conferred by the public to several issues (immigration, 
government, crime and justice, foreign policy and defence, social justice, 
political corruption). On the other hand, when agendas are taken as a 
whole, the public opinion agenda’s resemble those of newspapers to a 
greater degree than those of TV news shows (Table 7.20).  
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Table 7.21 – Hypotheses Tested: Relationship between Agenda-setting, Media 
Systems and Information Environments 
 
Hypothesis Result 
7.1 The salience conferred to the issues will 
be associated with the amount of coverage 
in TV and newspapers 
Confirmed at the four levels of 
analysis, but varies depending on 
issues and countries at stake.  
7.2 Systems with developed press markets 
display strong agenda-setting effects. This 
relationship is not direct, but mediated by 
information quality 
Not confirmed 
7.3 Systems with developed TV markets 
display strong TV agenda-setting effects, 
since this subsystem’s development is 
connected to higher frequency of exposure 
to TV newscasts 
There is no mediation, but cable 
dissemination boosts frequency of 
exposure to newscasts, which in 
turn is positively associated with 
TV channel’s agenda-setting 
capacity 
7.4 Systems with strong public broadcasters 
are those where the occurrence of TV 
agenda-setting is higher, either due to the 
fact that frequency of exposure to news is 
higher in those settings or because it has an 
impact on the media agendas’ diversity 
There is no mediation, but 
commercialization is associated 
with more agenda homogeneity, 
which boosts agenda-setting in the 
case of newspapers. Moreover, 
commercialization reduces 
exposure to news , which has a 
negative  impact on TV agenda-
setting capacity 
7.5 Press freedom has a strong impact on 
agenda-setting, because it reduces trust and 
news exposure, as well as the quality of the 
information offered by the media actors 
There is no mediation, but political 
constraints are associated with 
lower levels of exposure to TV 
news, and exposure to TV news has 
a positive impact on those 
channel’s agenda-setting capacity 
7.6 Countries with highly professionalized 
journalists have a greater probability of 
displaying agenda-setting, because 
professionalization boosts trust in the media 
and information quality 
There is no mediation, but 
professionalization leads to more 
information quality, and this factor 
has a positive impact on agenda-
setting 
7.7  Countries with politically balanced 
media have a higher probability of agenda-
setting occurrence 
Confirmed  
7.8 Outlet accuracy boosts the outlet’s 
agenda-setting capacity 
Confirmed 
7.9 Outlet bias buffers the outlet’s agenda-
setting capacity 
Not confirmed 
7.10 Agenda-setting capacity will be 
stronger for unobtrusive issues 
Confirmed 
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 8 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
The study of media effects, particularly in Europe, is challenging. 
Scholars working in this area often face difficulties in finding data on 
media content or in controlling the quality of the data that is sometimes 
produced. Moreover, a century of research history with ups and downs, 
and the ghost of the minimal effects paradigm, teaches us to be cautious 
and keep our expectations low. The complexity of the media realm and its 
connections to the political world puts us in a difficult position, torn 
between the need of controlling for all the relevant variables that may be 
hiding the small, easy-to-miss, but nevertheless relevant, media effect, and 
the need to be parsimonious and deliver intelligible feedback to the rest of 
the academic community. This is the story of this dissertation: a project 
with several goals, an incredibly complex web of causal chains, 
moderators, mediators and controls and low expectations about the final 
outcomes grew into a (relatively) parsimonious account of contextual 
effects in the field of agenda-setting.  
The major goal of the research reported in this dissertation was to 
contribute to the agenda-setting theory by addressing some of the 
unanswered questions resulting from the lack of comparative studies of 
agenda-setting. The underlying objective was therefore to understand the 
role of national-level dimensions (namely those related to media systems) 
of the agenda-setting process. 
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In order to do so, it was necessary to know the specificities of media 
systems and information environments in the EU. In Chapter Three, the 
theoretical grounds of this endeavour were established, through the 
identification of the most relevant theories of media systems in Western 
Societies, the choice/adaptation of the most relevant dimensions and the 
argumentation of why those dimensions may matter for the agenda-setting 
occurrence. Due to the inexistence of a unique source of comparative 
quantitative data measuring all the dimensions of interest (development of 
media markets, TV market commercialization, political partisanship, 
freedom of press, journalist professionalization), a considerable effort was 
devoted to putting together data taken from several sources and collecting 
my own data in order to measure the softer dimensions of the media 
system theoretical model (see Chapter Four and Appendix 1).  
The efforts were well rewarded: the main features of media systems, 
and their correlates in terms of the informational environment, were 
proven to vary considerably within EU borders. Moreover, not only was I 
able to prove that there is substantial variation in the media systems in 
Europe, but also that the polities under study tend to come together in a 
way which is not completely unlike that postulated by Hallin & Mancini 
(2004). However, there were some differences between their work and my 
own: instead of three models of media systems, my results would support a 
divide between stable democracies in Northern and Western Europe and 
most of the Southern and Eastern European countries.  
The other relevant finding of the analysis of media systems and 
information environments is the fact that the informational context in 
Europe is also very different between countries. The four informational 
environment dimensons – diversity and quality, exposure and trust – are 
connected to some and, in some cases, several media system characteristics.  
The second step of this research endeavour was to measure agenda-
setting in different European contexts, in order to test the second 
assumption of the comparative framework: a substantial degree of variance 
in the outcome of interest. Writing Chapter Two involved understanding 
the existing theoretical and empirical literature in the field of agenda-
setting, which is quite useful for a full appreciation of this phenomenon 
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and to make decisions about how to measure agenda-setting in the EU 
framework. Those decisions, expressed in Chapter Six, lead to four 
different analysis of this phenomenon, all of which proved that agenda-
setting occurrence and strength varied considerably within the EU during 
the Summer of 2009.  
 The issue-focused analysis showed that, even with a small number 
of cases, media effects were powerful enough to be observable in about half 
of the issues at stake. Moreover, TV seems to play a more important role 
than newspapers. The isolated analysis of TV and newspaper agenda-
setting capacity shows that the first has a stronger impact in a greater 
number of issues; the competing/complementary approach showed that, 
when both TV and newspapers are considered, it is usually the broadcast 
content that has a stronger impact on issue salience. The analysis carried 
out at the country and audience levels also provided empirical support to 
the assumption that agenda-setting occurred in Europe both during and in 
the aftermath of the European Parliament election of 2009. In addition, it 
was shown that capacity or magnitude varies greatly between European 
countries, and also between the main media outlets in those countries. 
The final step of the research reported here was to see whether media 
systems and information environments mattered. Generally speaking, 
some of the dimensions under study proved to have a direct, mediating or 
mediated impact in the occurrence and strength of agenda-setting, 
especially in the case of television. To start with, politics-related media 
system dimensions (political balance, press freedom) proved to be relevant 
for the explanation of why agenda-setting varies between European 
countries. It seems that, both in the case of TV and newspapers, political 
balance at the country level explains the occurrence of agenda-setting 
effects, with this phenomenon being more probable in politically unbiased 
contexts.  
The information environment seems to matter more in terms of 
information quality (and, in particular, accuracy), diversity and exposure to 
news than in terms of general levels of media trust. In the case of TV, the 
impact of political balance on agenda-setting is mediated by information 
accuracy, whereas the contexts where the media are more credible or 
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trustworthy do not display a stronger probability of agenda-setting 
occurrence.  Frequency of exposure is associated with TV agenda-setting 
effects, whereas homogeneity in media agendas boosts the newspaper’s 
capacity to set their readers’ agendas.  
 In sum, the comparative framework built and used in this 
dissertation shows that cross-country studies of political communication 
that do more than controlling for between country variability via country 
dummies are not only necessary but also possible. Country-level variation 
can be controlled or accounted for substantive factors related to the setting 
in which the political communication occurs.  
 However, there is a series of negative results that need to be 
mentioned. For instance, the structural dimensions studied here 
(development of press markets, patterns of commercialization of the TV 
market) and journalist professionalization, seem not to have a direct impact 
on agenda-setting vis-à-vis political partisanship and press freedom. The 
reasons for this may be due a misinterpretation of the position of the five 
media system dimensions in our funnel of causality. Indeed, it may well be 
that structural and value dimensions are not correlates of press freedom 
and political balance, but factors that shape and explain these dimensions, 
and that their effects on the information environment and on agenda-
setting are mediated by partisanship and press freedom. Future theoretical 
and historical research on media systems should focus more upon the 
relationship patterns between the several variables used to capture an 
image of the media landscape, and take this particular hypothesis into 
account.  
8.1 Paths for Future Research  
 
 The fact that the most relevant media system dimensions proved to 
be those related to the interaction between media and politics (one the one 
hand, political balance; on the other, absence of political constraints to 
freedom of press) remind us of the close connections between these two 
powerful actors in modern societies. However, among the shortcomings 
present in the research reported here, the most relevant concerns the 
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pictures I built up of the media and political environments. Both worlds 
can be depicted in a more complete way.   
For instance, future studies can bring political system variables into 
the equation, since the influence of the media is very likely enhanced or 
diminished by the strength or weakness of other players in the political 
arena. In terms of agenda setting, what does this mean? Semetko et al. 
(1991, p. 178) stress that when party systems are more stable and 
institutionalized, the media have less power to set the agenda during 
electoral campaigns. Stable party systems tend to insulate the parties from 
short-term developments; unstable party systems might also cause more 
need for orientation by citizens (unable to deal with the complexity of a 
continuously changing political arena), and therefore media agenda-setting 
effects might be stronger.  
Differences in the relative agenda-setting power of media and 
politicians might also be related to how competitive the political system is, 
both in terms of getting political power and media attention. That is to say, 
larger parliaments undermine individual MPs’ efforts to set the agenda, 
since there are several other colleagues trying to do the same; in those 
contexts, media power would be stronger than in less competitive settings. 
This idea was presented in a recent article on political agenda-setting (van 
Aelst & Walgrave, 2010), and its empirical test can also improve the quality 
of agenda-setting studies.  
Lastly, the focus of the current thesis on traditional media may be 
seen as a weakness of this work. As Aalberg & Curran (2012, p. 3) put it: 
“Politically relevant information is now more widely available than at any 
time in the past. But never before has it been so easy to avoid new and 
current affairs in the media…The rise of cable TV and the Internet have 
given people greater control over what media they consume.  The use of 
internet does not necessarily mean access to more politically relevant 
information, since people tend to use the Internet more for their special and 
personal interests than to consume mass media websites.” Accordingly, 
Takeshita (2006) believes that future agenda-setting research should deal 
with questions related the media environment, in particular the 
development of communication technology and increases in amount and 
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variety of news outlets poses a challenge to agenda-setting and might 
reduce media effects, due to a fragmentation in the public agenda. Free 
newspapers were also not a part of this study. This could pose a problem, 
especially in markets where they occupy a predominant position amongst 
the most read newspapers, as is the case in the Baltic countries (Balcytiene, 
2009). 
 
 
The research reported in this dissertation prepared the way for 
subsequent comparative studies of agenda-setting in (and beyond Europe). 
That was done through the proposal of a specific research design, the 
creation or identification of relevant data sources, the test of the 
relationship between agenda-setting and the context in which it happens, 
and the identification of shortcomings from substantial and methodological 
points of view. We now know that agenda-setting varies within Europe 
and have some insigh on why that is so. We now know what can be done to 
reinforce our understanding of this phenomenon. Therefore, let us do it... 
let us be comparative.  
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Appendix 1: The Expert Survey on European Media Systems –  
Basic Information 
 
In late 2009, a group of researchers composed by Marina Popescu 
(University of Essex), Tania Gosselin (Universitè du Quebec a Montreal) 
and myself, carried out an expert survey in 33110 European countries, 
including 26 out of the 27 European Union (EU) member-States111 (Figure 
A). The purpose of the expert survey was to gather data about the media 
systems in those countries, posing a relevant set of questions to particularly 
well-informed citizens – academic experts in communication studies, 
public opinion, political communication and electoral behaviour. 
 
Figure A – Countries included in the Expert Survey on European Media Systems  
(Popescu, Santana Pereira & Gosselin, 2010) 
 
 
Notes: Dark grey countries were included. All European countries were part of the 
survey, except for Iceland, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Albania and Belarus.  
 
                                                 
110 The study was conducted in 34 different media systems. Belgium is considered 
to enclose two different realities – the media and party systems in Wallonia 
(French-speaking) and Flanders (Dutch-speaking) are independent (see, for 
instance, the MAVISE reports; MAVISE-EAO, 2010). 
111 Due to the special characteristics of Luxembourg – namely the inexistence of a 
public broadcasting entity and the fact the most watched TV channels are foreign 
or cable TV (MAVISE - EAO, 2010) – this country is not part of the expert survey 
(see also Popescu, 2011).  
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 The major aim of the expert survey was to operationalize Hallin and 
Mancini’s (2004) model, by measuring the dimensions they propose in a 
way that would allow a) to capture country specificities hidden by the 
three ideal-types created by the authors, and b) the inclusion of the media 
systems dimensions proposed by these authors in quantitative comparative 
studies, creating data that can be matched with survey data produced by 
PIREDEU, ESS or INTUNE.  
 The second goal was to enlarge the scope of media systems 
research, following a very recent trend in the field and including Eastern 
European countries – most of which became members of the European 
Union right after the book by Hallin and Mancini was published. Our 
geographical scope is wider than the EU borders, in the sense that it also 
comprises countries that are still not part of the EU but might become 
member-States in the future (e.g.: Croatia and other countries in the Balkan 
Peninsula), or relevant neighbours, such as Russia.  A third goal was to 
enrich the study of media systems in Europe by measure dimensions that 
are not addressed by Hallin & Mancini (2004), such as freedom of press, the 
role of the media in the society, the quality of the media content or the 
changes brought by the online news media.  
The Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire was built during the spring and summer of 2009. 
Due to the nature of the target population (academic researchers) we 
decided to produce just one version of the questionnaire, in the lingua 
franca of European scholars – English.  
As stated above, one of the major goals of the expert survey on 
European media systems was to operationalize the mainly theoretical 
model of media systems proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) – 
therefore, the most relevant dimensions in the expert survey’s 
questionnaire are the development of media markets, journalist 
professionalization, and political parallelism. Since state ownership is 
measurable in a very straightforward way (just finding out how many 
television stations and press companies belong to the state), this dimension 
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is not part of the expert survey, giving space to another relevant dimension 
– freedom of press.  
 In a developed press market, the target of the journals are the 
general population (instead of the political elite), there are similar patterns 
of consumption of electronic media and press (instead of a clear 
predominance of the latter), a clear separation between sensationalist or 
tabloid press and quality press, and a reasonable number of media outlets 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004). The expert survey includes some questions that 
tackle the issue of development – namely the existence of style differences 
between different types of journals (questions 2, 3 and 5) or between public 
and private television (questions 26-32).  
Journalist professionalization is defined as the degree by which the 
practice of journalism reached the level of profession. Questions 39-42 were 
specifically designed to operationalize this dimension.  
Hallin & Mancini (2004) analyse the idea of media partisanship 
under the more general umbrella of political parallelism. The expert survey 
questionnaire operationalizes this dimension both at the country level 
(questions 6, 11, 12 are about journalism partisanship, air time and physical 
space given to different parties in general) and the media outlet level 
(questions 33, 34, 37 and 38 are about the political colour of the outlet and 
its influence on news content).112  
Finally, freedom of press, which is often operationalized through the 
use of indexes created by international organizations such as Freedom 
House or Reporters Without Borders (Norris, 2004; Norris & Inglehart, 
2007). Our expert survey comprises two questions about freedom of press, 
one focusing on the country in general (question 4) and other on the 
influence that media outlet owners have on their news contents (question 
35).  
                                                 
112
 For each country, we created a list of relevant media outlets and political 
parties. The political parties considered are those that are represented in the 
national parliament and had at least 3% of the votes in the previous election. The 
media outlets are the ones with the biggest shares/sales in the country; the lists 
were composed by 7 to 10 outlets: newspapers (reference and tabloid, and, when 
relevant, daily and weekly) and TV channels (public and private).  
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The expert survey also includes other questions, such as about online 
news media (questions 8-10), the role of the news media (questions 1, 7, 43-
48) and media content quality (13-25, 36).  
All questions were reviewed by colleagues who usually work with 
survey data. Their comments lead to substantial changes in wording and 
format. The questionnaire was also pre-tested in a small convenience 
sample, and additional changes were then implemented. The pre-test was 
especially useful to identify poor wording, typos and small technical flaws, 
secondary problems that, however, can reduce the participant’s motivation 
to answer the questions and induce drop out (Fan & Yan, 2010).  
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Table A – List of questions in the Expert Survey 
(the empty lines represent a change of page in the online survey) 
 
 
QUESTION Scale 
 News media enjoy a lot of credibility in [COUNTRY] 0 Untrue 10 True 
 
Citizens can find in-depth reporting and analysis in the news media if they are 
interested in something 
0 Untrue 10 True 
 The production costs of hard news content are so high that most news media cannot 
afford to present carefully researched facts and analyses 
0 Untrue 10 True 
 Politicians, business people and interest groups influence what the news media report 
and how by pressurizing and bribing individual journalists 0 Untrue 10 True 
 There is little difference between the way tabloid and quality newspapers cover public 
affairs 0 Untrue 10 True 
 The political orientation of the most prominent journalists is well-known to the public 0 Untrue 10 True 
 The news media have significant influence on what is discussed by politicians by 
focusing public attention on particular problems in [COUNTRY] 0 Untrue 10 True 
 
 The internet has made journalism more responsive to the public 0 Untrue 10 True 
 The internet has significantly broadened the range of actors who can influence public 
opinion 0 Untrue 10 True 
 Online news media outlets are not yet significant competitors of traditional media 
outlets 0 Untrue 10 True 
 
 Would you say that all major political opinions in [COUNTRY] are present in the 
newspapers or rather that only some opinions are present?  
0 only 
some 
10 All 
 And how about television, would you say that all major political opinions or that only 
some political opinions in [COUNTRY] are present in broadcasting? 
0 only 
some 
10 All 
 Independently of the above, would you say that on the whole in [COUNTRY] an 
accurate representation of the facts in public affairs or not at all-... in the newspapers? 
0 not at all 
accurate Accurate 
 Independently of the above, would you say that on the whole in [COUNTRY] an 
accurate representation of the facts in public affairs or not at all -... on television? 
0 not at all 
accurate Accurate 
 Thinking now about the analysis of the causes, contextual circumstances, 
consequences and implications of important developments in public affairs, would you 
say that newspapers provide a lot, enough or rather too little analysis?-... in the 
newspapers? 
0 too little 
5 enough  
10a lot of 
analysis 
 And how about television channels, would you say that they present a lot, just about 
enough or too little analysis of the causes, consequences and implications of 
important developments in public affairs?-... on television? 
0 too little 
5 enough 
10 a lot of 
analysis 
 Looking at the [COUNTRY]n news media in general, how wide is the range of 
specialists from different domains presenting expert information and analysis 
0 just a few 10 wide 
range 
 And would you say that the different media outlets in [COUNTRY] provide a variety of 
different stories and information or that the same few things are repeated in nearly all 
media outlets 
0 same few 10 many different 
 
 
Do the news media in [COUNTRY] focus too much, just enough or too little on 
information about economic issues facing [COUNTRY]? 
0 too little 
5 enough        
10 too 
much 
 
Do the news media in [COUNTRY] focus too much, just enough or too little on 
information about international affairs? 
0 too little 
5 enough        
10 too 
much 
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QUESTION Scale 
 
Do the news media in [COUNTRY] focus too much, just enough or too little on 
information about individual politicians, their character and motivations? 
0 too little 
5 enough        
10 too 
much 
 
Do the news media in [COUNTRY] focus too much, just enough or too little on 
information about policy differences between competing parties and politicians? 
0 too little 
5 enough        
10 too 
much 
 
Do the news media in [COUNTRY] focus too much, just enough or too little on 
information about investigative reports on important issues? 
0 too little 
5 enough        
10 too 
much 
 
Do the news media in [COUNTRY] focus too much, just enough or too little on 
information about the sensational aspects of events and stories? 
0 too little 
5 enough        
10 too 
much 
 
Do the news media in [COUNTRY] focus too much, just enough or too little on 
information about politics seen as a game, a horse-race, just a competition for power? 
0 too little 
5 enough        
10 too 
much 
 
 Do you think it is true that public television in [COUNTRY], compared to private 
television channels,...-More political news 
0 Untrue 10 True 
 Do you think it is true that public television in [COUNTRY], compared to private 
television channels,...-Wider range of programming 
0 Untrue 10 True 
 Do you think it is true that public television in [COUNTRY], compared to private 
television channels,...-More boring programmes for the average viewer 
0 Untrue 10 True 
 Do you think it is true that public television in [COUNTRY], compared to private 
television channels,...-More in-depth coverage of politics and public affairs 
0 Untrue 10 True 
 Do you think it is true that public television in [COUNTRY], compared to private 
television channels,...-A less sensationalist style 
0 Untrue 10 True 
 Do you think it is true that public television in [COUNTRY], compared to private 
television channels,...-More focus on the culture and traditions of minorities in 
[COUNTRY] 
0 Untrue 10 True 
 Do you think it is true that public television in [COUNTRY], compared to private 
television channels,...-More trustworthy information 
0 Untrue 10 True 
 
 
How would you characterize the political color of each of these media outlets in 
(COUNTRY)? 
List of political parties 
represented at the 
national parliament and 
having more than 3% of 
the vote share in the 
previous election 
 How far is the political coverage of each of the following media outlets influenced by a 
party or parties? (followed by a list of 7-10 media outlets) 0 Not at all 10 strongly 
 And how much is the political coverage in the following media outlets influenced by its 
owners? (followed by a list of 7-10 media outlets) 0 Not at all 10 strongly 
 
 To what extent do these media provide accurate information on facts backed by 
credible sources and expertise? (followed by a list of 7-10 media outlets) 0 Never 10 Always 
 To what extent does each present equally well the arguments of all sides in political 
debates? (followed by a list of 7-10 media outlets) 0 Never 10 Always 
 To what extent does each advocate particular views and policies? (followed by a list of 
7-10 media outlets) 0 Never 10 Always 
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QUESTION Scale 
 
Journalists in [COUNTRY] are motivated by an ethic of serving the public interest 0 Not al all 
10 Very 
much 
 Journalists in [COUNTRY] agree on the criteria for judging excellence in their 
profession regardless of their political orientations  0 Not al all 
10 Very 
much 
 Journalists have sufficient training to ensure that basic professional norms like 
accuracy, relevance, completeness, balance, timeliness, double-checking and source 
confidentiality are respected in news-making practices 
0 Not al all 10 Very 
much 
 The journalistic content of public television in [COUNTRY] is entirely free from 
governmental political interference 0 Not al all 
10 Very 
much 
 
 how far do media outlets in general succeed in...... stimulating general interest among 
citizens in public affairs?  0 Not al all 
10 Very 
much 
 how far do media outlets in general succeed in......providing a forum for politicians and 
parties to debate in front of citizens? 0 Not al all 
10 Very 
much 
 how far do media outlets in general succeed in...... providing a variety of perspectives 
on the important issues of the day? 0 Not al all 
10 Very 
much 
 how far do media outlets in general succeed in...... serving as watchdog scrutinizing 
the actions of government officials on behalf of citizens? 0 Not al all 
10 Very 
much 
 Media coverage of public affairs has a lot of influence on public opinion in [COUNTRY] 0 Untrue 10 True 
 Media coverage of public affairs has a lot of influence in political and policy circles in 
[COUNTRY] 0 Untrue 10 True 
 
 
The Media Outlets and the Political Parties 
 
The selection of the media outlets in each country respected three 
criteria: the outlets were chosen based on their audience share/circulation 
but also in order to represent both public and private channels, as well as 
reference and tabloid newspapers; moreover, outlets who’s content had 
been collected and analysef by PIREDEU Media Survey had to be 
represented in the expert survey. Most countries had 9 outlets analysed, 
with some exceptions (e.g.: Bulgaria=7; Romania =10), which means that 
there is information about 228 media outlets in the expert survey dataset. 
Regarding the political parties, we elaborated a list of political parties 
represented at the national parliament and having more than 3% of the 
vote share in the previous election. Due to space and reader-friendly 
constrains, the following table only presents the TV Channels, Newspapers 
and Political parties from the 27 polities under study in this dissertation; 
information on the other polities (Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, 
Serbia, Russia, Ukraine) is available in Popescu (2011). 
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Table B – List of TV Channels, Newspapers and Political Parties in the Expert 
Survey 
(Public Broadcasters are presented in Italics) 
 
 TV Channels Newspapers Political Parties 
Austria ORF1 
ORF2 
ATV 
Austria 9 TV 
Puls 4 
Der Standard 
Die Presse 
Neue Kronen Zeitung 
Kleine Zeitung 
SPÖ 
ÖVP 
FPÖ 
BZÖ 
GRÜNE 
Belgium 
Flanders 
VRT Een 
VRT Canvas 
VTM 
VT4 
2BE 
De Morgen 
De Standard 
Het Laatste Nieuws 
Gazet van Antwerpen 
 
CD&V 
VB 
N-VA 
VLD 
SPA 
SLP 
Groenen 
Belgium 
Wallonia 
RTBF La Une 
RTBF La Deux 
RTBF La Trois 
RTL-TVI 
Le Soir 
La Derniere Heure 
La Libre Belgique 
MR 
PS 
CDH 
Ecolo 
FN 
Bulgaria BNT Kanal 1 
bTV 
Nova TV 
 
24 Chasa 
Dnevnik 
Trud 
Monitor 
GERB 
BSP 
DPS 
ATAKA 
SDS 
DSB 
RZS 
NDSV 
Cyprus RIK1 
RIK2 
ANT1 
Sigma 
Mega 
Alithia 
Fileleytheros 
Haravgi 
Simerini 
AKEL 
DISY 
DIKO 
KSD-EDEK 
Evroko 
KOP 
Czech 
Republic 
Ceska televize 
TV Nova 
Prima 
 
Blesk 
Mlada Fronta Dnes 
Pravo 
Lidove novini 
ODS 
ČSSD 
KSČM 
KDU-ČSL 
SZ 
Denmark DR1 
DR2 
TV2 
TV3 
Kanal 5 
Dagbladet Politiken 
Berlingske Tidende 
Jyllands Posten 
Ekstra Bladet 
Venstre 
SD 
DF 
SF 
KF 
RV 
Liberal Alliance 
EL - De Rød-Grønne 
Estonia ETV 
ETV2 
Kanal 2 
TV3 
PBK 
Postimees 
SL Ohtuleht 
Eesti Ekspress Wochenblatt 
Eesti Paevaleth 
Eesti Reformierakond 
Eesti Keskerakond 
Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit 
Sotsiaal-demokraatlik Erakond 
Eestimaa Rohelised 
Eestimaa Rahvaliit 
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 TV Channels Newspapers Political Parties 
Finland YLE TV1 
YLE TV2 
MTV3 
Nelonen 
Sub 
Helsingin Sanomat 
Aamulehti 
Ilta-Sanomat 
KESK 
KOK 
SDP 
VAS 
VIHR 
KD 
SFP 
PS 
France France 2 
France 3 
France 5 
TF1 
M6 
 
Le Monde 
Le Figaro 
Libération 
Aujourd'hui en France 
 
UMP 
PS 
MoDem 
PCF 
Nouveau Centre 
Verts 
FN 
PRG 
MPF 
Germany ARD 
ZDF 
Sat1 
RTL 
ProSieben 
Die Welt 
Bild 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 
CDU 
SPD 
FDP 
Linke 
Grüne 
CSU 
Greece NET 
Mega 
ANT1 
Alpha TV 
Alter 
Ethnos 
Kathimerini 
Ta Nea 
Eleftherotypia 
 
PASOK 
ND 
KKE 
LAOS 
SYRIZA 
Oikologoi Prasinoi 
Hungary M1 
TV2 
ATV 
RTL Klub 
Hir TV 
Magyar Hírlap 
Magyar Nemzet 
Blikk 
Nepszabadsag 
 
MSZP 
FIDESZ 
SZDSZ 
MDF 
JOBBIK 
LMP 
Ireland RTÉ1 
RTÉ2 
TV3 
TG4 
Irish Independent 
Sunday World 
Irish Times 
Irish Daily Star 
Fianna Fail 
Fine Gael 
Labour 
Sinn Fein 
Green Party 
Italy RAI Uno 
RAI Due 
RAI Tre 
Canale 5 
Italia 1 
 
Corriere della Sera 
La Stampa 
La Repubblica 
Il Giornale 
 
PDL 
LN 
IDV 
PD 
UDC 
PRC 
PDCI 
Verdi 
PS 
Latvia LTV 
LNT 
TV3 
PBK Latvia 
Diena 
Latvijas Avize 
Vesti segodnya 
 
Tautas Partija 
Jaunais Laiks 
LSP 
TSP 
Latvijas Zaļā Partija 
LPP - Latvijas Ceļš 
CP - Latvijas Zemnieku Savienība 
Par Cilvēka Tiesībām Vienotā 
Latvijā 
Tēvzemei un Brīvībai /LNNK 
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 TV Channels Newspapers Political Parties 
Lithuania LTV 1 
TV3 
LNK 
BTV 
 
Lietuvos Rytas 
Respublika 
Vakaro Zinios 
 
TS-LKD 
TPP 
Tvarka ir Teisingumas 
LSDP 
Darbo Partija 
LRLS 
Liberalų ir Centro Sąjunga 
Malta TVM 
One TV 
Net TV 
Smash TV 
Nazzjon 
Orizzont 
The Times of Malta 
The Malta Independent 
Alternattiva Demokratika 
Partit Nazzjonalista 
Partit Laburista 
Azzjoni Nazzjonali 
Netherlands Nederland 1 
Nederland 2 
Nederland 3 
RTL 4 
SBS 6 
 
De Telegraaf 
De Volkskrant 
Algemeen Dagblat 
NRC Handelsblad 
 
CDA 
PvdA 
SP 
VVD 
PVV 
GL 
CU 
D66 
Poland TVP 1 
TVP 2 
TVP 3/TVP reg 
TVN 
Polsat 
 
Fakt 
Gazeta Wyborcza 
Super Express 
Rzeczpospolita 
 
PiS 
PO 
SLD 
PSL 
UP 
PD 
Samoobrona RP 
Portugal RTP1 
RTP2 
SIC 
TVI 
 
Correio da Manhã 
Público 
Jornal de Notícias 
Expresso 
 
PS 
PSD 
CDS-PP 
BE 
PCP 
PEV 
Romania TVR1 
Pro TV 
Antena 1 
PrimaTV 
Realitatea TV 
Evenimentul Zilei 
Libertatea 
Adevarul 
Jurnalul National 
Gandul 
PSD 
PDL 
PNL 
UDMR 
PRM 
PC 
Slovakia STV 1 
STV 2 
TV Markiza 
TV Joj 
 
Daily Pravda 
Nový Čas 
SME 
 
SMER 
SDKU-DS 
MKP 
SNS 
LS-HZDS 
KDH 
Slovenia TVS 1 
TVS 2 
POP TV 
Kanal A 
TV3 
 
Dnevnik 
Slovenske Novice 
Delo 
Večer 
SD 
SDS 
Zares 
DeSUS 
SNS 
SLS 
LDS 
NSI 
Spain TVE1 
TVE2 
Antena 3 
Cuatro 
Telecinco 
El País 
El Mundo 
ABC 
El Periodico 
 
PSOE 
PP 
IU 
UPD 
CiU 
PNV 
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 TV Channels Newspapers Political Parties 
Sweden SVT 1 
SVT 2 
TV3 
TV4 
Kanal 5 
Aftonbladet 
Dagens Nyheter 
Svenska Dagbladet 
Göteborgs-Posten 
SAP 
M 
C 
FP 
KD 
VP 
MP 
UK BBC One 
BBC Two 
ITV1 
Channel 4 
Five 
Daily Telegraph 
The Guardian 
The Sun 
The Times 
 
Labour 
Conservative 
Liberal Democrat 
SNP 
Playd Cymru 
BNP 
 
Selecting the Participants 
 
In this expert survey, 1826 experts in political communication and 
public opinion, living and working in 33 European countries (1531 in the 
EU member-States, Luxembourg excepted), were invited to answer a small 
online questionnaire about several features of the media system they were 
living in and dealing with on a daily basis. 
 The response rate for the 34 polities is of 38.7%. In the case of the 26 
member-States – that is to say, the specific dataset I will be using in the next 
pages – from the 1520 experts that received an invitation to participate in 
this online survey, 541 decided to participate. Therefore, for the EU-26 the 
response rate is slightly lower (37.8%) than for the complete set of 
countries, but it is still quite satisfactory. A considerable amount of 
countries have response rates that are not particularly difference from the 
average. However, in France, French-Speaking Belgium, Bulgaria and 
Greece less that 25% of the invited experts participated in the survey. On 
the other hand, the response rates in Romania, Lithuania and, particularly, 
Malta, are very high (Table C).   
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Table C – Expert Survey on Media Systems: Initial Sample, Number of 
Participants and Response Rates by Country  
 
 Initial Sample Participants Response Rate 
(%) 
Austria 56 19 33.9 
Belgium Flanders 67 23 34.3 
Belgium Wallonia 51 12 23.5 
Bulgaria 45 11 24.4 
Cyprus 21 9 42.9 
Czech Republic 42 13 31.0 
Germany 89 35 39.3 
Denmark 67 21 31.3 
Estonia 38 17 44.7 
Spain 78 33 42.3 
Finland 65 30 46.2 
France 92 18 19.6 
United Kingdom 96 25 26.0 
Greece 68 17 25.0 
Hungary 55 23 41.8 
Ireland 33 14 42.4 
Italy 78 23 29.5 
Lithuania 41 23 56.1 
Latvia 30 10 33.3 
Malta 10 7 70.0 
Netherlands 61 22 36.1 
Poland 43 15 34.9 
Portugal 70 22 31.4 
Romania 71 38 53.5 
Sweden 77 35 45.5 
Slovenia 37 18 48.6 
Slovakia 40 13 32.5 
    
TOTAL 1521 546 37.8 
Source: Popescu (2011).  
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Building and Launching the Online Survey 
 
When the content of the questionnaire was closed and all decisions 
about question wording had been made, the team started to build the 
online framework to collect the data. The expert survey was created 
through the use of Qualtrics, an online software for survey development, 
implementation and analysis113. This software was chosen due to its 
reliability, user friendliness and possibility of technical support during the 
building and maintenance of online surveys. 
The survey questionnaire was composed by 48 questions in nine 
pages, preceded by a short welcoming/instruction panel (Figure C). The 
decision of using a screen-by-screen design instead of a scrolling design 
(with just one page) was made due to the relatively high number of 
questions present in the questionnaire. The positive effect of scrolling 
design on completion time (Couper, Traugott & Lamias, 2001; Toepoel, Das 
& van Soest, 2008) or completion rates is actually still controversial in the 
literature (Manfreda et al., 2002, in Toepoel, Das & van Soest, 2008; Fan & 
Yan, 2010). 
The questions were distributed into the pages following two criteria – 
dimension covered (items measuring the same dimension were presented, 
as much as possible, together) and answering scale, in order to facilitate the 
respondent’s task (Toepoel, Das & van Soest, 2008; Fan & Yan, 2010). The 
easier questions (those for which no lists of parties or media outlets were 
presented) were place at the beginning and at the end of the questionnaire, 
whereas the hard questions were placed at the middle. The literature tells 
us that starting with hard questions (in terms of content or format – for 
instance, complex tables) cuts the motivation to participate and to complete 
the questionnaire (O’Neil, Penrod & Bornstein, 2003; Ekman et al., 2007), 
while putting the hard questions after a relatively long list of easy 
questions could have the same negative effect.  
 
 
 
                                                 
113 See a description of the software at http://www.qualtrics.com/.  
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                         Figure C – The Expert Survey’s Introduction Page 
 
 
 
 
The colours chosen for the survey’s layout are those that offered a 
bigger contrast between the text and the background, in order to improve 
general readability. The respondents inserted their answers by means of 
radio buttons (see Figure D). Radio buttons allow respondents to go 
through the survey using the mouse, and require less effort than typing a 
number/word, thus contributing to a greater number of completed 
questions (Couper, Traugott & Lamias, 2001).  
The survey design was interactive, in the sense that the data was not 
transmitted to the server just at the end of the questionnaire, but as each 
question was answered, which allowed us to have data from experts that 
decided not to answer all the questions in the survey.  
After completing the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to 
add comments, either to the survey in general or to a specific dimension or 
issue considered relevant in their countries’ media systems, and then their 
participation was thanked. 
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Figure D – A Survey Page (taken from the Austrian Survey) 
 
 
 
 
Throughout the online survey, a progress indicator was present at the 
bottom of the pages (Figure E), informing the respondent about how close 
he/she was to the end of the questionnaire. Progress indicators are 
believed to increase questionnaire completion rates (Couper et al., 2000, in 
Crawford, Couper & Lamias, 2001; Couper, Traugott & Lamias, 2001).  
 
Figure E – The Progress Indicator at the Bottom of the Webpages 
 
 
 
 
 A dataset with names and contacts was used to send the potential 
respondents an invitation to participate in the expert survey, as well as a 
link that would send them directly to the survey. This was done on 
December 15, 2009, and the first completed questionnaires were submitted 
by the participants in the next day.114 Drawing on the evidence provided by 
O’Neil, Penrod & Bornstein (2003) –  lower dropout rates when people have 
more spare time (in their case, weekends) –  the timing of the survey launch 
(just before the Christmas break) could not have been better.  
                                                 
114 In the case of Macedonia, the data gathering started later, in May 2010.  
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The hyperlinks to the survey were individualized, so that there was 
no need to enter passwords or other kind of identification to fill in the 
survey – a procedure that boosts response rates (Cook, Heath & Thompson, 
2000; Crawford, Couper & Lamias, 2001; Fan & Yan, 2010). Based on the 
evidence of Porter and Whitcomb (2003), Heerwegh & Loosweldt (2006) or 
Fan & Yan (2010), and considering the non sensitive nature of the questions 
in the survey (Joinson, Woodley & Reips, 2007), the invitation e-mail was 
personalized (including the name of the participant) and the signatures 
were accompanied by the academic affiliation of the survey authors. The 
invitation was sent by e-mail, and the probability of it being caught by 
spam-blocking tools – a constant menace in online surveys (Fan & Yan, 
2010) – was reduced by sending individual invitations (instead of one 
invitation for the whole pool) from a University of Essex e-mail address.  
Considering the nature of the population – scholars are, grosso modo, 
colleagues – no incentives were offered. In fact, there is mixed evidence 
about the impact of incentives (money, prizes, lotteries) on response rate 
(Cook, Heath & Thompson, 2000; Birnholtz et al., 2004; Fan & Yan, 2010) or 
completion rate (O’Neil and Penrod, 2001).  
Three reminders were sent on January 12, January 25 and May 9. 
Research shows that sending a third reminder does not have a strong 
impact on the response rate (Cook, Heath & Thompson, 2000; Fan & Yan, 
2010), and in most countries that was the case.  In addition, in spite of the 
advice from Crawford, Couper & Lamias (2001) of sending reminders just 
some days after the invitation, we decided to broaden the time between the 
first and the second contacts, in order to not bother the potential 
participants during their Christmas vacations.  
The reminders underlined the idea of scarcity – people were told that 
they were part of a small selected group, that the deadline was 
approaching and that the inclusion of their country on the final dataset 
depends on getting a minimal number of experts to fill in the questionnaire 
– a strategy that was shown to increase response rates (Porter & Whitcomb, 
2003). The last questionnaire was submitted on May 19, 2010115.  
 
                                                 
115
 In the case of Macedonia, the last questionnaire was filled in in June 22, 2010.  
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Appendix 3 
 
Issues Included in this Study  
(with reference to Original Codes under parenthesis; see EES, 2009, 2009b) 
Issue Original Topics in PIREDEU Voter and Media Studies 
Economic 
Situation 
Economic Conditions (4), Interest Rates (6), Inflation (74), Taxes, 
Trade Wages and Earnings, Stock Market, Business, Bankruptcies, 
Debt (topics 77-83), Effects of financial crisis (85) 
Economic 
Structure/ Policy 
Several points (topics 51 to 72, 76) 
Unemployment Unemployment (75) 
Health Care Health Care (7), National Health Care Service (93) Nursing Services 
(94) 
Social 
Justice/Policies 
Social Justice, Welfare State, Pensions, Social Housing, Child Care 
(90-92, 95,96) 
Social Minorities In general, handicapped, homossexual, women, old people (topics 
110-120) 
Immigration Immigration (5), Multiculturalism (99), National Immigration Policy 
(105) 
Political 
Corruption 
In general, national and in the EU (topics 38-40) 
Government  Efficiency, Strength, Stability (topics 37 and 41) 
European Union European Integration (1), European Issues (topics 41-50), Single 
market (73), Effect of Euro on the Economy (84), European Elections 
(topics 122-135) 
Environment Environment (2),  Climate Change (8), Environmental Protection 
(86), National Environment Policy (87) 
Crime and Justice Law and Order, National crime prevention, courts (100, 102, 103), 
Crime story (140) 
Foreign Policy/ 
Defence 
In general and towards several countries, imperialism (topics 9-13, 
15), military, peace-keeping missions, etc. (14, 16-22), Fight against 
terrorism (101) 
Democracy and 
Human Rights 
In general, several principles (e.g., rule of law, separation 
church/state, etc.) (topics 23-33) 
Education, Culture  Culture, cultural policy (88-89), Education, education policy (97-98), 
National language policy (121) 
Others The remaining 
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Appendix 4 
 
Media outlets whose content is used in this study 
 
 News Shows in TV Channels Newspapers 
Austria ORF1 (public) 
ATV (private) 
 
Der Standard 
Die Presse 
Neue Kronen Zeitung 
Belgium Flanders VRT (public) 
VTM (private) 
 
De Morgen 
De Standard 
Het Laatste Nieuws 
Belgium Wallonia RTBF La Une (public) 
RTL-TVI (private) 
Le Soir 
La Derniere Heure 
La Libre Belgique 
Bulgaria BNT Kanal 1 (public) 
bTV (private) 
24 Chasa 
Dnevnik 
Trud 
Cyprus RIK1 (public) 
ANT1 (private) 
Fileleytheros 
Haravgi 
Simerini 
Czech Republic Ceska televize (public) 
TV Nova (private) 
Blesk 
Mlada Fronta Dnes 
Pravo 
Denmark DR1 (public) 
TV2 (public) 
 
Dagbladet Politiken 
Berlingske Tidende 
Ekstra Bladet 
Estonia ETV (public) 
Kanal 2 (private) 
 
Postimees 
SL Ohtuleht 
Eesti Ekspress Wochenblatt 
Finland YLE TV1 (public) 
MTV3 (private) 
 
Helsingin Sanomat 
Aamulehti 
Ilta-Sanomat 
France France 2 (public) 
TF1 (private) 
 
Le Monde 
Le Figaro 
Libération 
Germany ARD (public) 
 ZDF (public) 
Sat1 (private) 
RTL (private) 
Bild 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Greece NET (public) 
Mega (private) 
 
Kathimerini 
Ta Nea 
Eleftherotypia 
Hungary M1 (public) 
RTL Klub (private) 
 
Magyar Nemzet 
Blikk 
Nepszabadsag 
Ireland RTÉ1 (public) 
TV3 (private) 
 
Irish Independent 
Irish Times 
Irish Daily Star 
Italy  RAI Uno (public) 
Canale 5 (private) 
 
Corriere della Sera 
La Repubblica 
Il Giornale 
Latvia LTV (public) 
LNT (private) 
 
Diena 
Latvijas Avize 
Vesti segodnya 
Lithuania LTV 1 (public) 
TV3 (private) 
Lietuvos Rytas 
Respublika 
Vakaro Zinios 
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 News Shows in TV Channels Newspapers 
Malta TVM (public) 
One TV (private) 
Nazzjon 
Orizzont 
The Times of Malta 
Netherlands Nederland 1 (public) 
RTL 4 (private) 
SBS 6 
De Telegraaf 
De Volkskrant 
NRC Handelsblad 
Poland TVP 1 (public) 
TVN (private) 
 
Fakt 
Gazeta Wyborcza 
Rzeczpospolita 
Portugal RTP1 (public) 
TVI (private) 
Correio da Manhã 
Público 
Jornal de Notícias 
Romania TVR1 (public) 
Pro TV (private) 
 
Evenimentul Zilei 
Libertatea 
Jurnalul National 
Slovakia STV 1 (public) 
TV Markiza (private) 
 
Daily Pravda 
Nový Čas 
SME 
Slovenia TVS 1 (public) 
POP TV(private) 
 
Dnevnik 
Slovenske Novice 
Delo 
Spain TVE1 (public) 
Antena 3 (private) 
Telecinco (private) 
El País 
El Mundo 
ABC 
Sweden SVT 1 (public) 
TV3 (private) 
Aftonbladet 
Dagens Nyheter 
Svenska Dagbladet 
UK BBC One (public) 
BBC Two (private) 
Daily Telegraph 
The Guardian 
The Sun 
 
Source: Media Study Data Advanced Release Documentation (Schuck et al., 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
